

Notes for a Course in Game Theory

Maxwell B. Stinchcombe

Fall Semester, 2002. Unique #29775

VISIT...

LANZAROTE
Caliente.COM

Contents

0	Organizational Stuff	7
1	Choice Under Uncertainty	9
1.1	The basics model of choice under uncertainty	9
1.1.1	Notation	9
1.1.2	The basic model of choice under uncertainty	10
1.1.3	Examples	11
1.2	The bridge crossing and rescaling Lemmas	13
1.3	Behavior	14
1.4	Problems	15
2	Correlated Equilibria in Static Games	19
2.1	Generalities about static games	19
2.2	Dominant Strategies	20
2.3	Two classic games	20
2.4	Signals and Rationalizability	22
2.5	Two classic coordination games	23
2.6	Signals and Correlated Equilibria	24
2.6.1	The common prior assumption	24
2.6.2	The optimization assumption	25
2.6.3	Correlated equilibria	26
2.6.4	Existence	27
2.7	Rescaling and equilibrium	27
2.8	How correlated equilibria might arise	28
2.9	Problems	29
3	Nash Equilibria in Static Games	33
3.1	Nash equilibria are <u>unc</u> correlated equilibria	33
3.2	2×2 games	36

3.2.1	Three more stories	36
3.2.2	Rescaling and the strategic equivalence of games	39
3.3	The gap between equilibrium and Pareto rankings	41
3.3.1	Stag Hunt reconsidered	41
3.3.2	Prisoners' Dilemma reconsidered	42
3.3.3	Conclusions about Equilibrium and Pareto rankings	42
3.3.4	Risk dominance and Pareto rankings	43
3.4	Other static games	44
3.4.1	Infinite games	44
3.4.2	Finite Games	50
3.5	Harsanyi's interpretation of mixed strategies	52
3.6	Problems on static games	53
4	Extensive Form Games: The Basics and Dominance Arguments	55
4.1	Examples of extensive form game trees	55
4.1.1	Simultaneous move games as extensive form games	56
4.1.2	Some games with "incredible" threats	57
4.1.3	Handling probability 0 events	58
4.1.4	Signaling games	61
4.1.5	Spying games	68
4.1.6	Other extensive form games that I like	70
4.2	Formalities of extensive form games	74
4.3	Extensive form games and weak dominance arguments	79
4.3.1	Atomic Handgrenades	79
4.3.2	A detour through subgame perfection	80
4.3.3	A first step toward defining equivalence for games	83
4.4	Weak dominance arguments, plain and iterated	84
4.5	Mechanisms	87
4.5.1	Hiring a manager	87
4.5.2	Funding a public good	89
4.5.3	Monopolist selling to different types	92
4.5.4	Efficiency in sales and the revelation principle	94
4.5.5	Shrinkage of the equilibrium set	95
4.6	Weak dominance with respect to sets	95
4.6.1	Variants on iterated deletion of dominated sets	95
4.6.2	Self-referential tests	96
4.6.3	A horse game	97
4.6.4	Generalities about signaling games (redux)	99
4.6.5	Revisiting a specific entry-deterrence signaling game	100

4.7	Kuhn's Theorem	105
4.8	Equivalence of games	107
4.9	Some other problems	109
5	Mathematics for Game Theory	113
5.1	Rational numbers, sequences, real numbers	113
5.2	Limits, completeness, glb's and lub's	116
5.2.1	Limits	116
5.2.2	Completeness	116
5.2.3	Greatest lower bounds and least upper bounds	117
5.3	The contraction mapping theorem and applications	118
5.3.1	Stationary Markov chains	119
5.3.2	Some evolutionary arguments about equilibria	122
5.3.3	The existence and uniqueness of value functions	123
5.4	Limits and closed sets	125
5.5	Limits and continuity	126
5.6	Limits and compactness	127
5.7	Correspondences and fixed point theorem	127
5.8	Kakutani's fixed point theorem and equilibrium existence results	128
5.9	Perturbation based theories of equilibrium refinement	129
5.9.1	Overview of perturbations	129
5.9.2	Perfection by Selten	130
5.9.3	Properness by Myerson	133
5.9.4	Sequential equilibria	134
5.9.5	Strict perfection and stability by Kohlberg and Mertens	135
5.9.6	Stability by Hillas	136
5.10	Signaling game exercises in refinement	137
6	Repeated Games	143
6.1	The Basic Set-Up and a Preliminary Result	143
6.2	Prisoners' Dilemma finitely and infinitely	145
6.3	Some results on finite repetition	147
6.4	Threats in finitely repeated games	148
6.5	Threats in infinitely repeated games	150
6.6	Rubinstein-Ståhl bargaining	151
6.7	Optimal simple penal codes	152
6.8	Abreu's example	152
6.9	Harris' formulation of optimal simple penal codes	152
6.10	"Shunning," market-place racism, and other examples	154

7	Evolutionary Game Theory	157
7.1	An overview of evolutionary arguments	157
7.2	The basic ‘large’ population modeling	162
7.2.1	General continuous time dynamics	163
7.2.2	The replicator dynamics in continuous time	164
7.3	Some discrete time stochastic dynamics	166
7.4	Summary	167

Chapter 0

Organizational Stuff

Meeting Time: We'll meet Tuesdays and Thursday, 8:00-9:30 in BRB 1.118. My phone is 475-8515, e-mail maxwell@eco.utexas.edu For office hours, I'll hold a weekly problem session, Wednesdays 1-3 p.m. in BRB 2.136, as well as appointments in my office 2.118. The T.A. for this course is Hugo Mialon, his office is 3.150, and office hours Monday 2-5 p.m.

Texts: Primarily these lecture notes. Much of what is here is drawn from the following sources: Robert Gibbons, *Game Theory for Applied Economists*, Drew Fudenberg and Jean Tirole, *Game Theory*, John McMillan, *Games, Strategies, and Managers*, Eric Rasmusen, *Games and information : an introduction to game theory*, Herbert Gintis, *Game Theory Evolving*, Brian Skyrms, *Evolution of the Social Contract*, Klaus Ritzberger, *Foundations of Non-Cooperative Game Theory*, and articles that will be made available as the semester progresses (Aumann on Correlated eq'a as an expression of Bayesian rationality, Milgrom and Roberts E'trica on supermodular games, Shannon-Milgrom and Milgrom-Segal E'trica on monotone comparative statics).

Problems: The lecture notes contain several Problem Sets. Your combined grade on the Problem Sets will count for 60% of your total grade, a midterm will be worth 10%, the final exam, given ***Monday, December 16, 2002, from 9 a.m. to 12 p.m.***, will be worth 30%. If you hand in an incorrect answer to a problem, you can try the problem again, preferably after talking with me or the T.A. If your second attempt is wrong, you can try one more time.

It will be tempting to look for answers to copy. This is a mistake for two related reasons.

1. Pedagogical: What you want to learn in this course is how to solve game theory models of your own. Just as it is rather difficult to learn to ride a bicycle by watching other people ride, it is difficult to learn to solve game theory problems if you do not practice solving them.
2. Strategic: The final exam will consist of game models you have not previously seen.

If you have not learned how to solve game models you have never seen before on your own, you will be unhappy at the end of the exam.

On the other hand, I encourage you to work together to solve hard problems, and/or to come talk to me or to Hugo. The point is to sit down, on your own, after any consultation you feel you need, and write out the answer yourself as a way of making sure that you can reproduce the logic.

Background: It is quite possible to take this course without having had a graduate course in microeconomics, one taught at the level of Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green' (MWG) *Microeconomic Theory*. However, many explanations will make reference to a number of consequences of the basic economic assumption that people pick so as to maximize their preferences. These consequences and this perspective are what one should learn in microeconomics. Simultaneously learning these and the game theory will be a bit harder.

In general, I will assume a good working knowledge of calculus, a familiarity with simple probability arguments. At some points in the semester, I will use some basic real analysis and cover a number of dynamic models. The background material will be covered as we need it.

Chapter 1

Choice Under Uncertainty

In this Chapter, we're going to quickly develop a version of the theory of choice under uncertainty that will be useful for game theory. There is a major difference between the game theory and the theory of choice under uncertainty. In game theory, the uncertainty is explicitly about what other people will do. What makes this difficult is the presumption that other people do the best they can for themselves, but their preferences over what they do depend in turn on what others do. Put another way, choice under uncertainty is game theory where we need only think about one person.¹

Readings: Now might be a good time to re-read Ch. 6 in MWG on choice under uncertainty.

1.1 The basics model of choice under uncertainty

Notation, the abstract form of the basic model of choice under uncertainty, then some examples.

1.1.1 Notation

Fix a non-empty set, Ω , a collection of subsets, called events, $\mathcal{F} \subset 2^\Omega$, and a function $P : \mathcal{F} \rightarrow [0, 1]$. For $E \in \mathcal{F}$, $P(E)$ is the **probability of the event**² E . The triple $(\Omega, \mathcal{F}, P)$ is a **probability space** if $\mathcal{F}$ is a **field**, which means that $\emptyset \in \mathcal{F}$, $E \in \mathcal{F}$ iff $E^c := \Omega \setminus E \in \mathcal{F}$, and $E_1, E_2 \in \mathcal{F}$ implies that both $E_1 \cap E_2$ and $E_1 \cup E_2$ belong to $\mathcal{F}$, and P is **finitely additive**, which means that $P(\Omega) = 1$ and if $E_1 \cap E_2 = \emptyset$ and $E_1, E_2 \in \mathcal{F}$, then $P(E_1 \cup E_2) = P(E_1) + P(E_2)$. For a field $\mathcal{F}$, $\Delta(\mathcal{F})$ is the set of finitely additive probabilities on $\mathcal{F}$.

¹Like parts of macroeconomics.

²**Bold face** in the middle of text will usually mean that a term is being defined.

Throughout, when a probability space Ω is mentioned, there will be a field of subsets and a probability on that field lurking someplace in the background. Being explicit about the field and the probability tends to clutter things up, and we will save clutter by trusting you to remember that it's there. We will also assume that any function, say f , on Ω is **measurable**, that is, for all of the sets B in the range of f to which we wish to assign probabilities, $f^{-1}(B) \in \mathcal{F}$ so that $P(\{\omega : f(\omega) \in B\}) = P(f \in B) = P(f^{-1}(B))$ is well-defined. Functions on probability spaces are also called **random variables**.

If a random variable f takes its values in $\mathbb{R}$ or $\mathbb{R}^N$, then the class of sets B will always include the intervals $(a, b]$, $a < b$. In the same vein, if I write down the integral of a function, this means that I have assumed that the integral exists as a number in $\mathbb{R}$ (no extended valued integrals here).

For a finite set $X = \{x_1, \dots, x_N\}$, $\Delta(2^X)$, or sometimes $\Delta(X)$, can be represented as $\{P \in \mathbb{R}_+^N : \sum_n P_n = 1\}$. The intended interpretation: for $E \subset X$, $P(E) = \sum_{x_n \in E} P_n$ is the probability of E , so that $P_n = P(\{x_n\})$.

Given $P \in \Delta(X)$ and $A, B \subset X$, the **conditional probability of A given B** is $P(A|B) := P(A \cap B)/P(B)$ when $P(B) > 0$. When $P(B) = 0$, $P(\cdot|B)$ is taken to be anything in $\Delta(B)$.

We will be particularly interested in the case where X is a product set.

For any finite collection of sets, X_i indexed by $i \in I$, $X = \times_{i \in I} X_i$ is the product space, $X = \{(x_1, \dots, x_I) : \forall i \in I, x_i \in X_i\}$. For $J \subset I$, X_J denotes $\times_{i \in J} X_i$. The canonical projection mapping from X to X_J is denoted π_J . Given $P \in \Delta(X)$ when X is a product space and $J \subset I$, the marginal distribution of P on X_J , $P_J = \text{marg}_J(P)$ is defined by $P_J(A) = P(\pi_J^{-1}(A))$. Given $x_J \in X_J$ with $P_J(x_J) > 0$, $P_{x_J} = P(\cdot|x_J) \in \Delta(X)$ is defined by $P(A|\pi_J^{-1}(x_J))$ for $A \subset X$. Since P_{x_J} puts mass 1 on $\pi_J^{-1}(x_J)$, it is sometimes useful to understand it as the probability $\text{marg}_{I \setminus J} P_{x_J}$ shifted so that it's "piled up" at x_J .

Knowing a marginal distribution and all of the conditional distributions is the same as knowing the distribution. This follows from Bayes' Law — for any partition $\mathcal{E}$ and any B , $P(B) = \sum_{E \in \mathcal{E}} P(B|E) \cdot P(E)$. The point is that knowing all of the $P(B|E)$ and all of the $P(E)$ allows us to recover all of the $P(B)$'s. In the product space setting, take the partition to be the set of $\pi_{X_J}^{-1}(x_J)$, $x_J \in X_J$. This gives $P(B) = \sum_{x_J \in X_J} P(B|x_J) \cdot \text{marg}_J(P)(x_J)$.

Given $P \in \Delta(X)$ and $Q \in \Delta(Y)$, the product of P and Q is a probability on $X \times Y$, denoted $(P \times Q) \in \Delta(X \times Y)$, and defined by $(P \times Q)(E) = \sum_{(x,y) \in E} P(x) \cdot Q(y)$. That is, $P \times Q$ is the probability on the product space having marginals P and Q , and having the random variables π_X and π_Y independent.

1.1.2 The basic model of choice under uncertainty

The bulk of the theory of choice under uncertainty is the study of different complete and transitive preference orderings on the set of distributions. Preferences representable as the

expected value of a utility function are the main class that is studied. There is some work in game theory that uses preferences not representable that way, but we'll not touch on it.

(One version of) the basic expected utility model of choice under uncertainty has a signal space, S , a probability space Ω , a space of actions A , and a utility function $u : A \times \Omega \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$. This utility function is called a **Bernoulli** or a **von Neumann-Morgenstern** utility function. It is *not* defined on the set of probabilities on $A \times \Omega$. We'll integrate u to represent the preference ordering.

For now, notice that u does not depend on the signals $s \in S$. Problem 1.4 discusses how to include this dependence.

The pair $(s, \omega) \in S \times \Omega$ is drawn according to a **prior distribution** $P \in \Delta(S \times \Omega)$, the person choosing under uncertainty sees the s that was drawn, and infers $\beta_s = P(\cdot|s)$, known as **posterior beliefs**, or just **beliefs**, and then chooses some action in the set $a^*(\beta_s) = a^*(s)$ of solutions to the maximization problem

$$\max_{a \in A} \sum_{\omega} u(a, \omega) P(\omega|s).$$

The maximand (fancy language for “thing being maximized”) in this problem can, and will, be written in many fashions, $\sum_{\omega} u(a, \omega) \beta_s(\omega)$, $\int_{\Omega} u(a, \omega) dP(\omega|s)$, $\int_{\Omega} u(a, \omega) d\beta_s(\omega)$, $\int_{\Omega} u(a, \omega) \beta_s(d\omega)$, $E^{\beta_s} u(a, \cdot)$, and $E^{\beta_s} u_a$ being common variants.

For any sets X and Y , X^Y denotes the set of all functions from Y to X . The probability β_s and the utility function $u(a, \cdot)$ can be regarded as vectors in Ω , and when we look at them that way, $E^{\beta_s} u_a = \beta_s \cdot u_a$.

Functions in A^S are called **plans** or, sometimes, a **complete contingent plans**. It will often happen that $a^*(s)$ has more than one element. A plan $s \mapsto a(s)$ with $a(s) \in a^*(s)$ for all s is an **optimal plan**. A caveat: $a^*(s)$ is not defined for any s 's having $\text{marg}_S(p)(s) = 0$. By convention, an optimal plan can take any value in A for such s .

Notation: we will treat the point-to-set mapping $s \mapsto a^*(s)$ as a function, e.g. going so far as to call it an optimal plan. Bear in mind that we'll need to be careful about what's going on when $a^*(s)$ has more than one element. Again, to avoid clutter, you need to keep this in the back of your mind.

1.1.3 Examples

We'll begin by showing how a typical problem from graduate Microeconomics fits into this model.

Example 1.1 (A typical example) *A potential consumer of insurance faces an initial risky situation given by the probability distribution ν , with $\nu([0, +\infty)) = 1$. The consumer has preferences over probabilities on $\mathbb{R}$ representable by a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility*

function, v , on $\mathbb{R}$, and v is strictly concave. The consumer faces a large, risk neutral insurance company.

1. Suppose that ν puts mass on only two points, x and y , $x > y > 0$. Also, the distribution ν depends on their own choice of safety effort, $e \in [0, +\infty)$. Specifically, assume that

$$\nu_e(x) = f(e) \text{ and } \nu_e(y) = 1 - f(e).$$

Assume that $f(0) \geq 0$, $f(\cdot)$ is concave, and that $f'(e) > 0$. Assume that choosing safety effort e costs $C(e)$ where $C'(e) > 0$ if $e > 0$, $C'(0) = 0$, $C''(e) > 0$, and $\lim_{e \uparrow +\infty} C'(e) = +\infty$. Set up the consumer's maximization problem and give the FOC when insurance is not available.

2. Now suppose that the consumer is offered an insurance contract $\mathcal{C}(b)$ that gives them an income b for certain.

- (a) Characterize the set of b such that $\mathcal{C}(b) \succeq X^*$ where X^* is the optimal situation you found in 1.
- (b) Among the b you just found, which are acceptable to the insurance company, and which is the most preferred by the insurance company?
- (c) Set up the consumer's maximization problem after they've accepted a contract $\mathcal{C}(b)$ and explain why the insurance company is unhappy with this solution.

3. How might a deductible insurance policy partly solve the source of the insurance company's unhappiness with the consumer's reaction to the contracts $\mathcal{C}(b)$?

Here there is no signal, so we set $S = \{s_0\}$. Set $\Omega = (0, 1]$, $\mathcal{F} = \{\bigcup_{n=1}^N (a_n, b_n] : 0 \leq a_n < b_n \leq 1, N \in \mathbb{N}\}$, $Q(a, b] = b - a$, so that $(\Omega, \mathcal{F}, Q)$ is a probability space. Define $P \in \Delta(2^S \times \mathcal{F})$ by $P(\{s\} \times E) = Q(E)$. Define a class of random variables X_e by

$$X_e(\omega) = \begin{cases} x & \text{if } \omega \in (0, f(e)] \\ y & \text{if } \omega \in (f(e), 1] \end{cases}.$$

Define $u(e, \omega) = v(X_e(\omega) - C(e))$. After seeing s_0 , the potential consumer's beliefs are given by $\beta_s = Q$. Pick e to maximize $\int_{\Omega} u(e, \omega) dQ(\omega)$. This involves writing the integral in some fashion that makes it easy to take derivatives, and that's a skill that you've hopefully picked up before taking this class.

Example 1.2 (The value of information) $\Omega = \{L, M, R\}$ with $Q(L) = Q(M) = \frac{1}{4}$ and $Q(R) = \frac{1}{2}$ being the probability distribution on Ω . $A = \{U, D\}$, and $u(a, \omega)$ is given in the table

$A \downarrow, \Omega \rightarrow$	L	M	R
U	10	0	10
D	8	8	8

Not being able to distinguish M from R is a situation of partial information. It can be modelled with $S = \{l, \neg l\}$, $P((l, L)) = P((\neg l, M)) = \frac{1}{4}$, $P((\neg l, R)) = \frac{1}{2}$. It's clear that $a^*(l) = U$ and $a^*(\neg l) = D$. These give utilities of 10 and 8 with probabilities $\frac{1}{4}$ and $\frac{3}{4}$ respectively, for an expected utility of $\frac{34}{4} = 8\frac{1}{2}$.

Compare this with the full information case, which can be modelled with $S = \{l, m, r\}$ and $P((l, L)) = P((m, M)) = \frac{1}{4}$, $P((r, R)) = \frac{1}{2}$. Here $\beta_l = \delta_L$, $\beta_m = \delta_M$, and $\beta_r = \delta_R$ (where δ_x is point mass on x). Therefore, $a^*(l) = U$, $a^*(m) = 8$, and $a^*(r) = U$ which gives an expected utility of $9\frac{1}{2}$.

1.2 The bridge crossing and rescaling Lemmas

We ended the examples by calculating some *ex ante* expected utilities under different plans. Remember that optimal plans are defined by setting $a^*(s)$ to be any of the solutions to the problem

$$\max_{a \in A} \sum_{\omega} u(a, \omega) \beta_s(\omega).$$

These are plans that can be thought of as being formed after s is observed and beliefs β_s have been formed, an “I’ll cross that bridge when I come to it” approach. There is another way to understand the formation of these plans.

More notation: “iff” is read “if and only if.”

Lemma 1.3 (Bridge crossing) *A plan $a(\cdot)$ is optimal iff it solves the problem*

$$\max_{a(\cdot) \in A^S} \int_{S \times \Omega} u(a(s), \omega) dP(s, \omega).$$

Proof: Write down Bayes’ Law and do a little bit of re-arrangement of the sums. ■

In thinking about optimal plans, all that can conceivably matter is the part of the utilities that is affected by actions. This seems trivial, but it will turn out to have major implications for our interpretations of equilibria in game theory.

Lemma 1.4 (Rescaling) $\forall a, b \in A, \forall P \in \Delta(\mathcal{F}), \int_{\Omega} u(a, \omega) dP(\omega) \geq \int_{\Omega} u(b, \omega) dP(\omega)$ iff $\int_{\Omega} [\alpha \cdot u(a, \omega) + f(\omega)] dP(\omega) \geq \int_{\Omega} [\alpha \cdot u(b, \omega) + f(\omega)] dP(\omega)$ for all $\alpha > 0$ and functions f .

Proof: Easy. ■

Remember how you learned that Bernoulli utility functions were immune to multiplication by a positive number and the addition of a constant? Here the constant is being played by $\int_{\Omega} f_i(\omega) dP(\omega)$.

1.3 Behavior

The story so far has the joint realization of s and ω distributed according to the prior distribution $P \in \Delta(S \times \Omega)$, the observation of s , followed by the choice of $a \in a^*(s)$. Note that

$$a \in a^*(s) \text{ iff } \forall b \in A \sum_{\omega} u(a, \omega) \beta_s(\omega) \geq \sum_{\omega} u(b, \omega) \beta_s(\omega). \quad (1.1)$$

(1.1) can be expressed as $E^{\delta_a \times \beta_s} u \geq E^{\delta_b \times \beta_s} u$, which highlights the perspective that the person is choosing between different distributions. Notice that if $a, b \in a^*(s)$, then $E^{\delta_a \times \beta_s} u = E^{\delta_b \times \beta_s} u$, and both are equal to $E^{(\alpha \delta_a + (1-\alpha) \delta_b) \times \beta_s} u$. In words, if both a and b are optimal, then so is any distribution that puts mass α on a and $(1-\alpha)$ on b . Said yet another way, $\Delta(a^*(s))$ is the set of optimal probability distributions.³

(1.1) can also be expressed as $u_a \cdot \beta_s \geq u_b \cdot \beta_s$ where $u_a, u_b, \beta_s \in \mathbb{R}^\Omega$, which highlights the linear inequalities that must be satisfied by the beliefs. It also makes the shape of the optimal distributions clear, if $u_a \cdot \beta_s = u_b \cdot \beta_s = m$, then for all α , $[\alpha u_a + (1-\alpha) u_b] \cdot \beta_s = m$. Thus, if play of either a or b is optimal, then playing a the proportion α of the time and playing b the proportion $1-\alpha$ of the time is also optimal.

Changing perspective a little bit, regard S as the probability space, and a plan $a(\cdot) \in A^S$ as a random variable. Every random variable gives rise to an **outcome**, that is, to a distribution Q on A . Let $Q_P^* \subset \Delta(A)$ denote the set of outcomes that arise from optimal plans for a given P . Varying P and looking at the set of Q_P^* 's that arise gives the set of possible observable behaviors.

To be at all useful, this theory must rule out some kinds of behavior. At a very general level, not much is ruled out.

An action $a \in A$ is **potentially Rational** (pR) if there exists some β_s such that $a \in a^*(\beta_s)$. An action a **dominates action** b if $\forall \omega u(a, \omega) > u(b, \omega)$. The following example shows that an action b can be dominated by a random choice.

Example 1.5 $\Omega = \{L, R\}$, $A = \{a, b, c\}$, and $u(a, \omega)$ is given in the table

$A \downarrow, \Omega \rightarrow$	L	R
a	5	9
b	6	6
c	9	5

Whether or not a is better than c or vice versa depends on beliefs about ω , but $\frac{1}{2} \delta_a + \frac{1}{2} \delta_c$ dominates b . Indeed, for all $\alpha \in (\frac{1}{4}, \frac{3}{4})$, $\alpha \delta_a + (1-\alpha) \delta_c$ dominates b .

³I may slip and use the phrase “a mixture” for “a probability.” This is because there are (infinite) contexts where one wants to distinguish between mixture spaces and spaces of probabilities.

As a point of notation, keeping the δ 's around for point masses is a bit of clutter we can do without, so, when x and y are actions and $\alpha \in [0, 1]$, $\alpha x + (1 - \alpha)y$ denotes the probability that puts mass α on x and $1 - \alpha$ on y . In the same vein, for $\sigma \in \Delta(A)$, we'll use $u(\sigma, \omega)$ for $\sum_a u(a, \omega)\sigma(a)$.

Definition 1.6 An action b is **pure-strategy dominated** if there exists a $a \in A$ such that for all ω , $u(a, \omega) > u(b, \omega)$. An action b is **dominated** if there exists a $\sigma \in \Delta(A)$ such that for all ω , $u(\sigma, \omega) > u(b, \omega)$.

Lemma 1.7 a is pR iff a is not pure-strategy dominated, and every Q putting mass 1 on the pR points is of the form Q_P^* for some P .

Proof: Easy. ■

Limiting the set of β_s that are possible further restricts the set of actions that are pR. In game theory, ω will contain the actions of other people, and we will derive restrictions on β_s from our assumption that they too are optimizing.

1.4 Problems

Problem 1.1 (Product spaces and product measures) X is the two point space $\{x_1, x_2\}$, Y is the three point space $\{y_1, y_2, y_3\}$, and Z is the four point space $\{z_1, z_2, z_3, z_4\}$.

1. How many points are in the space $X \times Y \times Z$?
2. How many points are in the set $\pi_X^{-1}(x_1)$?
3. How many points are in the set $\pi_Y^{-1}(y_1)$?
4. How many points are in the set $\pi_Z^{-1}(z_1)$?
5. Let $E = \{y_1, y_2\} \subset Y$. How many points are in the set $\pi_Y^{-1}(E)$?
6. Let $F = \{z_1, z_2, z_3\} \subset Z$. How many points are in the set $\pi_Y^{-1}(E) \cap \pi_Z^{-1}(F)$? What about the set $\pi_Y^{-1}(E) \cup \pi_Z^{-1}(F)$?
7. Let P_X (resp. P_Y , P_Z) be the uniform distribution on X (resp. Y , Z), and let $Q = P_X \times P_Y \times P_Z$. Let G be the event that the random variables π_X , π_Y , and π_Z have the same index. What is $Q(G)$? Let H be the event that two or more of the random variable have the same index. What is $Q(H)$?

Problem 1.2 (The value of information) Fix a distribution $Q \in \Delta(\Omega)$ with $Q(\omega) > 0$ for all $\omega \in \Omega$. Let M_Q denote the set of signal structures $P \in \Delta(S \times \Omega)$ such that $\text{marg}_\Omega(P) = Q$. Signal structures are **conditionally determinate** if for all ω , $P_\omega = \delta_s$ for some $s \in S$. (Remember, $P_\omega(A) = P(A|\pi_\Omega^{-1}(\omega))$, so this is saying that for every ω there is only one signal that will be given.) For each $s \in S$, let $E_s = \{\omega \in \Omega : P_\omega = \delta_s\}$.

1. For any conditionally determinate P , the collection $\mathcal{E}_P = \{E_s : s \in S\}$ form a partition of Ω . [When a statement is given in the Problems, your job is to determine whether or not it is true, to prove that it's true if it is, and to give a counter-example if it is not. Some of the statements "If X then Y " are not true, but become true if you add interesting additional conditions, "If X and X' , then Y ." I'll try to (remember to) indicate which problems are so open-ended.]
2. For $P, P' \in M_Q$, we define $P \succeq P'$, read " P is at least as informative as P' ," if for all utility functions $(a, \omega) \mapsto u(a, \omega)$, the maximal ex ante expected utility is higher under P than it is under P' . As always, define $\succ$ by $P \succ P'$ if $P \succeq P'$ and $\neg(P' \succeq P)$.

A partition $\mathcal{E}$ is at least as fine as the partition $\mathcal{E}'$ if every $E' \in \mathcal{E}'$ is the union of elements of $\mathcal{E}$.

Prove **Blackwell's Theorem** (this is one of the many results with this name):

For conditionally determinate P, P' , $P \succeq P'$ iff $\mathcal{E}_P$ is at least as fine as $\mathcal{E}_{P'}$.

3. A signal space is **rich** if it has as many elements as Ω , written $\#S \geq \#\Omega$.
 - (a) For a rich signal space, give the set of $P \in M_Q$ that are at least as informative as all other $P' \in M_Q$.
 - (b) (Optional) Repeat the previous problem for signal spaces that are not rich.
4. If $\#S \geq 2$, then for all $q \in \Delta(\Omega)$, there is a signal structure P and an $s \in S$ such that $\beta_s = q$. [In words, Q does not determine the set of possible posterior beliefs.]
5. With $\Omega = \{\omega_1, \omega_2\}$, $Q = (\frac{1}{2}, \frac{1}{2})$, and $S = \{a, b\}$, find $P, P' \gg 0$ such that $P \succ P'$.

Problem 1.3 Define $a \succ b$ if a dominates b .

1. Give a reasonable definition of $a \succeq b$, which would be read as "a weakly dominates b."
2. Give a finite example of a choice problem where $\succeq$ is not complete.
3. Give an infinite example of a choice problem where for each action a there exists an action b such that $b \succ a$.

4. Prove that in every finite choice problem, there is an undominated action. Is there always a weakly undominated action?

Problem 1.4 We could have developed the theory of choice under uncertainty with signal structures $P \in \Delta(S \times \Omega)$, utility functions $v(a, s, \omega)$, and with people solving the maximization problem

$$\max_{a \in A} \sum_{\omega} v(a, s, \omega) \beta_s(\omega).$$

This seems more general since it allows utility to also depend on the signals.

Suppose we are given a problem where the utility function depends on s . We are going to define a new, related problem in which the utility function does not depend on the state.

Define $\Omega' = S \times \Omega$ and $S' = S$. Define P' by

$$P'(s', \omega') = P'(s', (s, \omega)) = \begin{cases} P(s, \omega) & \text{if } s' = s \\ 0 & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

Define $u(a, \omega') = u(a, (s, \omega)) = v(a, s, \omega)$.

Using the construction above, formalize and prove a result of the form “The extra generality in allowing utility to depend on signals is illusory.”

Problem 1.5 Prove Lemma 1.7.

Chapter 2

Correlated Equilibria in Static Games

In this Chapter, we're going to develop the parallels between the theory of choice under uncertainty and game theory. We start with static games, dominant strategies, and then proceed to rationalizable strategies and correlated equilibria.

Readings: In whatever text(s) you've chosen, look at the sections on static games, dominant strategies, rationalizable strategies, and correlated equilibria.

2.1 Generalities about static games

One specifies a **game** by specifying who is playing, what actions they can take, and their preferences. The set of players is I , with typical members i, j . The actions that $i \in I$ can take, are A_i . Preferences of the players are given by their von Neumann-Morgenstern (or Bernoulli) utility functions $u_i(\cdot)$. In general, each player i 's well-being is affected by the actions of players $j \neq i$. A vector of strategies $a = (a_i)_{i \in I}$ lists what each player is doing, the set of all such possible vectors of strategies is the set $A = \times_{i \in I} A_i$. We assume that i 's preferences over what others are doing can be represented by a bounded utility function $u_i : A \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$. Summarizing, game Γ is a collection $(A_i, u_i)_{i \in I}$. Γ is **finite** if A is.

The set A can be re-written as $A_i \times A_{I \setminus \{i\}}$, or, more compactly, as $A_i \times A_{-i}$. Letting $\Omega_i = A_{-i}$, each $i \in I$ faces the optimization problem

$$\max_{a \in A} u_i(a_i, \omega_i)$$

where they do not know ω_i . We assume that each i treats what others do as a (possibly degenerate) random variable,

At the risk of becoming overly repetitious, the players, $i \in I$, want to pick that action or strategy that maximizes u_i . However, since u_i may, and in the interesting cases, does, depend on the choices of other players, this is a very different kind of maximization than is

found in neoclassical microeconomics.

2.2 Dominant Strategies

In some games, some aspects of players' preferences do not depend on what others are doing. From the theory of choice under uncertainty, a probability $\sigma \in \Delta(A)$ **dominates action** b if $\forall \omega u(\sigma, \omega) > u(b, \omega)$. In game theory, we have the same definition – the probability $\sigma_i \in \Delta(A_i)$ **dominates** b_i if, $\forall a_{-i} \in A_{-i}$, $u_i(\sigma_i, a_{-i}) > u_i(b_i, a_{-i})$. The action b_i being dominated means that there are no beliefs about what others are doing that would make b_i an optimal choice.

There is a weaker version of domination, σ_i **weakly dominates** b_i if, $\forall a_{-i} \in A_{-i}$, $u_i(\sigma_i, a_{-i}) \geq u_i(b_i, a_{-i})$ and $\exists a_{-i} \in A_{-i}$ such that $u_i(\sigma_i, a_{-i}) > u_i(b_i, a_{-i})$. This means that a_i is always at least as good as b_i , and may be strictly better.

A strategy a_i is **dominant** in a game Γ if for all b_i , a_i dominates b_i , it is **weakly dominant** if for all b_i , a_i weakly dominates b_i .

2.3 Two classic games

These two classic games have dominant strategies for at least one player.

Prisoners' Dilemma			Rational Pigs		
	Squeal	Silent		Push	Wait
Squeal	$(-B + r, -B + r)$	$(-b + r, -B)$	Push	$(-c + e, b - e - c)$	$(-c, b)$
Silent	$(-B, -b + r)$	$(-b, -b)$	Wait	$(\alpha b, (1 - \alpha)b - c)$	$(0, 0)$

Both of these games are called 2×2 games because there are two players and each player has two actions. For the first game, $A_1 = \{\text{Squeal}_1, \text{Silent}_1\}$ and $A_2 = \{\text{Squeal}_2, \text{Silent}_2\}$.

Some conventions: The representation of the choices has player 1 choosing which row occurs and player 2 choosing which column; If common usage gives the same name to actions taken by different players, then we do not distinguish between the actions with the same name; each entry in the matrix is uniquely identified by the actions a_1 and a_2 of the two players, each has two numbers, (x, y) , these are $(u_1(a_1, a_2), u_2(a_1, a_2))$, so that x is the utility of player 1 and y the utility of player 2 when the vector $a = (a_1, a_2)$ is chosen.

There are stories behind both games. In the first, two criminals have been caught, but it is after they have destroyed the evidence of serious wrongdoing. Without further evidence, the prosecuting attorney can charge them both for an offense carrying a term of $b > 0$ years. However, if the prosecuting attorney gets either prisoner to give evidence on the

other (Squeal), they will get a term of $B > b$ years. The prosecuting attorney makes a deal with the judge to reduce any term given to a prisoner who squeals by an amount r , $b \geq r > 0$, $B - b > r$ (equivalent to $-b > -B + r$). With $B = 15$, $b = r = 1$, this gives

	Squeal	Silent
Squeal	$(-14, -14)$	$(0, -15)$
Silent	$(-15, 0)$	$(-1, -1)$

In the second game, there are two pigs, one big and one little, and each has two actions.¹ Little pig is player 1, Big pig player 2, the convention has 1's options being the rows, 2's the columns, payoffs (x, y) mean " x to 1, y to 2." The story is of two pigs in a long room, a lever at one end, when pushed, gives food at the other end, the Big pig can move the Little pig out of the way and take all the food if they are both at the food output together, the two pigs are equally fast getting across the room, but when they both rush, some of the food, e , is pushed out of the trough and onto the floor where the Little Pig can eat it, and during the time that it takes the Big pig to cross the room, the Little pig can eat α of the food. This story is interesting when $b > c - e > 0$, $c > e > 0$, $0 < \alpha < 1$, $(1 - \alpha)b - c > 0$. We think of b as the benefit of eating, c as the cost of pushing the lever and crossing the room. With $b = 6$, $c = 1$, $e = 0.1$, and $\alpha = \frac{1}{2}$, this gives

	Push	Wait
Push	$(-0.9, 4.9)$	$(-1, 6)$
Wait	$(3, 2)$	$(0, 0)$

In the Prisoners' Dilemma, Squeal dominates Silent for both players. Another way to put this, the only pR action for either player is Squeal. In the language developed above, the only possible outcome for either player puts probability 1 on the action $a_i = \text{Squeal}$. We might as well solve the optimization problems independently of each other. What makes it interesting is that when you put the two solutions together, you have a disaster from the point of view of the players. They are both spending 14 years in prison, and by cooperating with each other and being Silent, they could both spend only 1 year in prison.²

¹I first read this in [5].

²One useful way to view many economists is as apologists for the inequities of a moderately classist version of the political system called laissez faire capitalism. Perhaps this is the driving force behind the large literature trying to explain why we should expect cooperation in this situation. After all, if economists' models come to the conclusion that equilibria without outside intervention can be quite bad for all involved, they become an attack on the justifications for laissez faire capitalism. Another way to understand this literature is that we are, in many ways, a cooperative species, so a model predicting extremely harmful non-cooperation is very counter-intuitive.

In Rational Pigs, Wait dominates Push for the Little Pig, so Wait is the only pR for 1. Both Wait and Push are pR for the Big Pig, and the set of possible outcomes for Big Pig is $\Delta(A_2)$. If we were to put these two outcomes together, we'd get the set $\delta_{\text{Wait}} \times \Delta(A_2)$. (New notation there, you can figure out what it means.) However, some of those outcomes are inconsistent.

Wait is pR for Big Pig, but it optimal only for beliefs β putting mass of at least $\frac{2}{3}$ on the Little Pig Push'ing (you should do that algebra). But the Little Pig never Pushes. Therefore, the only beliefs for the Big Pig that are consistent with the Little Pig optimizing involve putting mass of at most 0 in the Little Pig pushing. This then reduces the outcome set to (Wait, Push), and the Little Pig makes out like a bandit.

2.4 Signals and Rationalizability

Games are models of strategic behavior. We believe that the people being modeled have all kinds of information about the world, and about the strategic situation they are in. Fortunately, at this level of abstraction, we need not be at all specific about what they know beyond the assumption that player i 's information is encoded in a signal s_i taking its values in some set S_i . If you want to think of S_i as containing a complete description of the physical/electrical state of i 's brain, you can, but that's going further than I'm comfortable. After all, we need a tractable model of behavior.³

Let $R_i^0 = \text{pR}_i \subset A_i$ denote the set of potentially rational actions for i . Define $R^0 := \times_{i \in I} R_i^0$ so that $\Delta(R^0)$ is the largest possible set of outcomes that are at all consistent with rationality. (In Rational Pigs, this is the set $\delta_{\text{Wait}} \times \Delta(A_2)$.) As we argued above, it is too large a set. Now we'll start to whittle it down.

Define R_i^1 to be the set of maximizers for i when i 's beliefs β_i have the property that $\beta_i(\times_{j \neq i} R_j^0) = 1$. Since R_i^1 is the set of maximizers against a smaller set of possible beliefs, $R_i^1 \subset R_i^0$. Define $R^1 = \times_{i \in I} R_i^1$, so that $\Delta(R^1)$ is a candidate for the set of outcomes consistent with rationality. (In Rational Pigs, this set is $\{\delta_{(\text{Wait}, \text{Push})}\}$).

Given R_i^n has been define, inductively, define R_i^{n+1} to be the set of maximizers for i when i 's beliefs β_i have the property that $\beta_i(\times_{j \neq i} R_j^n) = 1$. Since R_i^n is the set of maximizers against a smaller set of possible beliefs, $R_i^{n+1} \subset R_i^n$. Define $R^{n+1} = \times_{i \in I} R_i^{n+1}$, so that $\Delta(R^n)$ is a candidate for the set of outcomes consistent with rationality.

Lemma 2.1 *For finite games, $\exists N \forall n \geq N R^n = R^N$.*

We call $R^\infty := \bigcap_{n \in \mathbb{N}} R^n$ the set of **rationalizable strategies**. $\Delta(R^\infty)$ is then the set

³See the NYT article about brain blood flow during play of the repeated Prisoners' Dilemma.

of **signal rationalizable outcomes**.⁴

There is (at least) one odd thing to note about $\Delta(R^\infty)$ — suppose the game has more than one player, player i can be optimizing given their beliefs about what player $j \neq i$ is doing, so long as the beliefs put mass 1 on R_j^∞ . There is no assumption that this is actually what j is doing. In Rational Pigs, this was not an issue because R_j^∞ had only one point, and there is only one probability on a one point space. The next pair of games illustrate the problem.

2.5 Two classic coordination games

These two games have no dominant strategies for either player.

Stag Hunt			Battle of the Partners		
	Stag	Rabbit		Dance	Picnic
Stag	(S, S)	$(0, R)$	Dance	$(F + B, B)$	(F, F)
Rabbit	$(R, 0)$	(R, R)	Picnic	$(0, 0)$	$(B, F + B)$

As before, there are stories for these games. For the Stag Hunt, there are two hunters who live in villages at some distance from each other in the era before telephones. They need to decide whether to hunt for Stag or for Rabbit. Hunting a stag requires that both hunters have their stag equipment with them, and one hunter with stag equipment will not catch anything. Hunting for rabbits requires only one hunter with rabbit hunting equipment. The payoffs have $S > R > 0$. This game is a **coordination game**, if the players' coordinate their actions they can both achieve higher payoffs. There is a role then, for some agent to act as a coordinator. Sometimes we might imagine a tradition that serves as coordinator — something like we hunt stags on days following full moons except during the spring time. Macroeconomists, well, some macroeconomists anyway, tell stories like this but use the code word “sunspots” to talk about coordination. Any signals that are correlated and observed by the agents can serve to coordinate their actions.

The story for the Battle of the Partners game involves two partners who are either going to the (loud) Dance club or to a (quiet) romantic evening Picnic on Friday after work. Unfortunately, they work at different ends of town and their cell phones have broken so they cannot talk about which they are going to do. Each faces the decision of whether to drive to the Dance club or to the Picnic spot not knowing what the other is going to do. The payoffs have $B \gg F > 0$ (the “ $\gg$ ” arises because I am a romantic). The idea is that

⁴I say “signal rationalizable” advisedly. **Rationalizable outcomes** involve play of rationalizable strategies, just as above, but the randomization by the players is assumed to be stochastically independent.

the two derive utility B from *Being* together, utility F from their *Favorite* activity, and that utilities are additive.

For both of these games, $A = R^0 = R^1 = \dots = R^n = R^{n+1} = \dots$. Therefore, $\Delta(A)$ is the set of signal rationalizable outcomes. Included in $\Delta(A)$ are the point masses on the off-diagonal actions. These do not seem sensible. They involve both players taking an action that is optimal only if they believe something that is not true.

2.6 Signals and Correlated Equilibria

We objected to anything other than (Wait, Push) in Rational Pigs because anything other than (Wait, Push) being an optimum involved Big Pig thinking that Little Pig was doing something other than what he was doing. This was captured by rationalizability for the game Rational Pigs. As we just saw, rationalizability does not capture everything about this objection for all games. That's the aim of this section.

When i sees s_i and forms beliefs β_{s_i} , β_{s_i} should be the “true” distribution over what the player(s) $j \neq i$ is(are) doing, and what they are doing should be optimal for them. The way that we get at these two simultaneous requirements is to start by the observation that there is some true $P \in \Delta(S \times A)$. Then all we need to do is to write down (and interpret) two conditions:

1. each β_{s_i} is the correct conditional distribution, and
2. everyone is optimizing given their beliefs.

2.6.1 The common prior assumption

A **system of beliefs** is a set of mappings, one for each $i \in I$, $s_i \mapsto \beta_{s_i}$, from S_i to $\Delta(A_{-i})$. If we have a marginal distribution, Q_i , for the s_i , then, by Bayes' Law, any belief system arises from the distribution $P_i \in \Delta(S_i \times A_{-i})$ defined by $P_i(B) = \sum_{s_i} \beta_{s_i}(B) \cdot Q_i(s_i)$. In this sense, i 's beliefs are generated by P_i . For each player's belief system to be correct requires that it be generated by the true distribution.

Definition 2.2 *A system of beliefs $s_i \mapsto \beta_{s_i}$, $i \in I$, is generated by $P \in \Delta(S \times A)$ if*

$$\forall i \in I \forall s_i \in S_i \forall E_{-i} \subset A_{-i} \beta_{s_i}(E_{-i}) = P(\pi_{A_{-i}}^{-1}(E_{-i}) | \pi_{S_i}^{-1}(s_i)). \quad (2.1)$$

A system of beliefs has the common prior property if it is generated by some $P \in \Delta(S \times A)$.

On the left-hand side of the equality in (2.1) are i 's beliefs after seeing s_i . As we have seen (Problem 1.2.4), without restrictions on P , β_{s_i} can be any probability on A_{-i} . We

now limit that freedom by an assumption that we will maintain whenever we are analyzing a strategic situation.

Assumption 2.3 *Beliefs have the common prior property.*

The restriction is that there is a single, common P that gives everyone's beliefs when they condition on their signals. Put in slightly different words, the prior distribution is common amongst the people involved in the strategic situation. Everyone understands the probabilistic structure of what is going on.

It's worth being very explicit about the conditional probability on the right-hand side of (2.1). Define $F = \pi_{A_{-i}}^{-1}(E_{-i}) = S \times A_i \times E_{-i}$, and $G = \pi_{S_i}^{-1}(s_i) = \{s_i\} \times S_{-i} \times A$, so that $F \cap G = \{s_i\} \times S_{-i} \times A_i \times E_{-i}$. Therefore,

$$P(F|G) = P(\pi_{A_{-i}}^{-1}(E_{-i})|\pi_{S_i}^{-1}(s_i)) = \frac{P(\{s_i\} \times S_{-i} \times A_i \times E_{-i})}{P(\{s_i\} \times S_{-i} \times A_i \times A_{-i})}.$$

It's important to note that β_{s_i} contains no information about S_{-i} , only about A_{-i} , what i thinks that $-i$ is doing. It is also important to note that conditional probabilities are not defined when the denominator is 0, so beliefs are not at all pinned down at s_i 's that have probability 0. From a classical optimization point of view, that is because actions taken after impossible events have no implications. In dynamic games, people decide whether or not to make a decision based on what they think others' reactions will be. Others' reactions to a choice may make it that choice a bad idea, in which case the choice will not be made. But then you are calculating based on their reactions to a choice that will not happen, that is, you are calculating based on others' reactions to a probability 0 event.

2.6.2 The optimization assumption

Conditioning on s_i gives beliefs β_{s_i} . Conditioning on s_i also gives information about A_i , what i is doing. One calls the distribution over A_i i 's **strategy**. The distribution on A_i , that is, the strategy, should be optimal from i 's point of view.

A **strategy** σ is a set of mappings, one for each $i \in I$, $s_i \mapsto \sigma_{s_i}$, from S_i to $\Delta(A_i)$. σ is **optimal for the beliefs** $s_i \mapsto \beta_{s_i}$, $i \in I$ if for all $i \in I$, $\sigma_{s_i}(a_i^*(\beta_{s_i})) = 1$.

Definition 2.4 *A strategy $s_i \mapsto \sigma_{s_i}$, $i \in I$, is **generated by** $P \in \Delta(S \times A)$ if*

$$\forall i \in I \forall s_i \in S_i \forall E_i \subset A_i \sigma_{s_i}(E_i) = P(\pi_{A_i}^{-1}(E_i)|\pi_{S_i}^{-1}(s_i)). \quad (2.2)$$

*A $P \in \Delta(S \times A)$ has the **(Bayesian) optimality property** if the strategy it generates is optimal for the belief system it generates.*

2.6.3 Correlated equilibria

The roots of the word “equilibrium” are “equal” and “weight,” the appropriate image is of a pole scale, which reaches equilibrium when the weights on both sides are equal. That is, following the Merriam-Webster dictionary, *a state of balance between opposing forces or actions that is static (as in a body acted on by forces whose resultant is zero)*.⁵

If a distribution $P \in \Delta(S \times A)$ satisfies Bayesian optimality, then none of the people involved have an incentive to change what they’re doing. Here we are thinking of peoples’ desires to play better strategies as a force pushing on the probabilities. The system of forces is in equilibrium when all of the forces are 0 or up against the boundary of the space of probabilities.

One problem with looking for P that satisfy the Bayesian optimality property is that we haven’t specified the signals $S = \times_{i \in I} S_i$. Indeed, they were not part of the description of a game, and I’ve been quite vague about them. This vagueness was on purpose. I’m now going to make them disappear in two different ways.

Definition 2.5 *A $\mu \in \Delta(A)$ is a **correlated equilibrium** if there exists a signal space $S = \times_{i \in I} S_i$ and a $P \in \Delta(S \times A)$ having the Bayesian optimality property such that $\mu = \text{marg}_A(P)$.*

This piece of sneakiness means that no particular signal space enters. The reason that this is a good definition can be seen in the proof of the following Lemma. Remember that $\mu \in \Delta(A)$ is a vector in $\mathbb{R}_+^A$ such that $\sum_a \mu(a) = 1$.

Lemma 2.6 *$\mu \in \Delta(A)$ is a correlated equilibrium iff*

$$\forall i \in I \forall a_i, b_i \in A_i \sum_{a_{-i}} u_i(a_i, a_{-i}) \mu(a_i, a_{-i}) \geq \sum_{a_{-i}} u_i(b_i, a_{-i}) \mu(a_i, a_{-i}).$$

Proof: Not easy, using the A_i as the canonical signal spaces. ■

What the construction in the proof tells us is that we can always take $S_i = A_i$, and have the signal “tell” the player what to do, or maybe “suggest” to the player what to do. This is a very helpful fiction for remembering how to easily define and check that a distribution μ is a correlated equilibrium. Personally, I find it a bit too slick. I’d rather imagine there is some complicated world out there generating random signals, that people are doing the best they can from the information they have, and that an equilibrium is a probabilistic description of a situation in which people have no incentive to change what they’re doing.

⁵There are also “dynamic” equilibria *as in a reversible chemical reaction when the rates of reaction in both directions are equal*. We will see these when we look at evolutionary arguments later.

2.6.4 Existence

There is some question about whether all of these linear inequalities can be simultaneously satisfied. We will see below that every finite game has a Nash equilibrium. A Nash equilibrium is a correlated equilibrium with stochastically independent signals. That implies that the set of correlated equilibria is not empty, so correlated equilibria exist. That's fancy and hard, and relies on a result called a fixed point theorem. There is a simpler way.

The set of correlated equilibria is the set μ that satisfy a finite collection of linear inequalities. This suggests that it may be possible to express the set of correlated equilibria as the solutions to a linear programming problem, one that we know has a solution. This can be done.

Details here (depending on time).

2.7 Rescaling and equilibrium

One of the important results in the theory of choice under uncertainty is Lemma 1.4. It says that the problem $\max_{a \in A} \int u(a, \omega) d\beta_s(\omega)$ is the same as the problem $\max_{a \in A} \int [\alpha u(a, \omega) + f(\omega)] d\beta_s(\omega)$ for all $\alpha > 0$ and functions f that do not depend on a . Now ω is being identified with the actions of others. The Lemma still holds.

Fix a finite game $\Gamma(u) = (A_i, u_i)_{i \in I}$. For each $i \in I$, let $\alpha_i > 0$, let $f_i : A_{-i} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$, and define $v_i = \alpha_i \cdot u_i + f_i$ so that $\Gamma(v) = (A_i, \alpha_i \cdot u_i + f_i)_{i \in I}$.

Lemma 2.7 $\text{CEq}(\Gamma(u)) = \text{CEq}(\Gamma(v))$.

Proof: $\mu \in \text{CEq}(\Gamma(u))$ iff $\forall i \in I \forall a_i, b_i \in A_i$,

$$\sum_{a_{-i}} u_i(a_i, a_{-i}) \mu(a_i, a_{-i}) \geq \sum_{a_{-i}} u_i(b_i, a_{-i}) \mu(a_i, a_{-i}). \quad (2.3)$$

Similarly, $\mu \in \text{CEq}(\Gamma(v))$ iff $\forall i \in I \forall a_i, b_i \in A_i$,

$$\sum_{a_{-i}} [\alpha_i u_i(a_i, a_{-i}) + f_i(a_{-i})] \mu(a_i, a_{-i}) \geq \sum_{a_{-i}} [\alpha_i u_i(b_i, a_{-i}) + f_i(a_{-i})] \mu(a_i, a_{-i}). \quad (2.4)$$

Since $\alpha_i > 0$, (2.3) holds iff (2.4) holds. ■

Remember how you learned that Bernoulli utility functions were immune to multiplication by a positive number and the addition of a constant? Here the constant is being played by $\int_{A_{-i}} f_i(a_{-i}) d\beta_s(a_{-i})$.

2.8 How correlated equilibria might arise

There are several adaptive procedures that converge to the set of equilibria for every finite game. The simplest is due to Hart and Mas-Colell (E'trica 68 (5) 1127-1150). They give an informal description of the procedure:

Player i starts from a “reference point”: his current actual play. His choice next period is governed by propensities to depart from it. ... if a change occurs, it should be to actions that are perceived as being better, relative to the current choice. In addition, and in the spirit of adaptive behavior, we assume that all such better choices get positive probabilities; also, the better an alternative action seems, the higher the probability of choosing it next time. Further, there is also inertia: the probability of staying put (and playing the same action as in the last period) is always positive.

The idea is that players simultaneously choose actions $a_{i,t}$ at each time t , $t = 1, 2, \dots$. After all have made a choice, each $i \in I$ learns the choices of the others and receives their payoff, $u_{i,t}(a_t)$, $a_t = (a_{i,t}, a_{-i,t})$. They then repeat this procedure. Suppose that $h_t = (a_\tau)_{\tau=1}^t$ has been played. At time $t + 1$ each player picks an action $a_{i,t+1}$ according to a probability distribution $p_{i,t+1}$ which is defined in a couple of steps. We assume that the choices are independent across periods.

1. For every $a \neq b$ in A_i and $\tau \leq t$, define

$$W_{i,\tau}(a, b) = \begin{cases} u_i(b, a_{-i,\tau}) & \text{if } a_{i,\tau} = a \\ u_i(a_\tau) & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

This gives the stream of payoffs that would have arisen if b were substituted for a at each point in the past where a was played.

2. Define the average difference as

$$D_{i,t}(a, b) = \frac{1}{t} \sum_{\tau \leq t} W_{i,\tau}(a, b) - \frac{1}{t} \sum_{\tau \leq t} u_{i,\tau}(a_\tau).$$

3. Define the average regret at time t for not having played b instead of a by

$$R_{i,t}(a, b) = \max\{D_{i,t}(a, b), 0\}.$$

4. For each $i \in I$, fix a moderately large μ (see below), and suppose that a was played at time t . Then $p_{i,t+1}$ is defined as

$$\begin{cases} p_{i,t+1}(b) = \frac{1}{\mu_i} R_{i,t}(a, b) & \text{for all } b \neq a \\ p_{i,t+1}(a) = 1 - \sum_{b \neq a} p_{i,t+1}(b) \end{cases}$$

The detail about μ_i — pick it sufficiently large that $p_{i,t+1}(a) > 0$.

An infinite length history h is a sequence $(a_t)_{t=1}^{\infty}$. For each h , define $\mu_{t,h}$ as the empirical distribution of play after t periods, along history h , that is, $\mu_{t,h}(a) = \frac{1}{t} \# \{ \tau \leq t : a_{\tau} = a \}$.

Theorem 2.8 *If players start arbitrarily for any finite number of periods, and then play according to the procedure just outlined, then for every h in a set of histories having probability 1, $d(\mu_{t,h}, \text{CEq}) \rightarrow 0$ where CEq is the set of correlated equilibria.*

Proof: Not at all easy. ■

This procedure has no “strategic reasoning” feel to it. The players calculate which action is better by looking at their average regret for not having played an action in the past. That is, they look through the past history, and everywhere they played action a , they consider what their payoffs would have happened if they had instead played action b . This regret is calculated *without* thinking about how others might have reacted to the change from a to b . In other words, this procedure gives a simple model of behavior that leads to what looks like a very sophisticated understanding of the strategic situation.

A final pair of notes: (1) It is possible to get the same kind of convergence even if the people do not observe what the others are doing. What one does is to estimate the regret statistically. This is (a good bit) more difficult, but it is reassuring that people can “learn” their way to an equilibrium even without knowing what everyone else is up to. (2) The dynamic is almost unchanged if we rescale using Lemma 2.7, that is, changing $u_i(a)$ to $\alpha_i u_i(a) + f_i(a_{-i})$. I say almost because the μ_i and α_i can substitute for each other — look at the definition of $D_{i,t}(a, b)$, the $f_i(a_{-i})$ part disappears, but the α_i comes through, giving the $p_{i,t}$ a $\frac{\alpha_i}{\mu_i}$ multiplier.

2.9 Problems

The results of problems with *’s before them will be used later.

Problem 2.1 *For every $N \in \mathbb{N}$, there is a finite game such that $R^n \subsetneq R^{n-1}$ for all $2 \leq n \leq N$, and $R^n = R^N$ for all $n \geq N$.*

Problem 2.2 Find the set of correlated equilibria for the Prisoners' Dilemma and for Rational Pigs. Prove your answers (i.e. write out the inequalities that must be satisfied and show that you've found all of the solutions to these inequalities).

***Problem 2.3** Two players have identical gold coins with a Heads and a Tails side. They simultaneously reveal either H or T . If the gold coins match, player 1 takes both, if they mismatch, player 2 takes both. This is called a 0-sum game because the sum of the winnings of the two players in this interaction is 0. The game is called "Matching Coins" ("Matching Pennies" historically), and has the matrix representation

	H	T
H	$(+1, -1)$	$(-1, +1)$
T	$(-1, +1)$	$(+1, -1)$

Find the set of correlated equilibria for this game, proving your answer.

***Problem 2.4** Take $B = 10$, $F = 2$ in the Battle of the Partners game so that the payoff matrix is

	$Dance$	$Picnic$
$Dance$	$(12, 10)$	$(2, 2)$
$Picnic$	$(0, 0)$	$(10, 12)$

1. Explicitly give all of the inequalities that must be satisfied by a correlated equilibrium.
2. Show that the μ putting mass $\frac{1}{2}$ each on $(Dance, Dance)$ and $(Picnic, Picnic)$ is a correlated equilibrium.
3. Find the set of correlated equilibria with stochastically independent signals.
4. Find the maximum probability that the Partners do not meet each other, that is, maximize $\mu(Dance, Picnic) + \mu(Picnic, Dance)$ subject to the constraint that μ be a correlated equilibrium.

***Problem 2.5** Take $S = 10$ and $R = 1$ in the Stag Hunt game so that the payoff matrix is

	$Stag$	$Rabbit$
$Stag$	$(10, 10)$	$(0, 1)$
$Rabbit$	$(1, 0)$	$(1, 1)$

1. Explicitly give all of the inequalities that must be satisfied by a correlated equilibrium.
2. Find the set of correlated equilibria with stochastically independent signals.
3. Give three different correlated equilibria in which the hunters' actions are **not** stochastically independent.
4. Find the maximum probability that one or the other hunter goes home with nothing.

***Problem 2.6** Apply Lemma 2.7 to the numerical versions of the Prisoners' Dilemma, Rational Pigs, Battle of the Partners, and the Stag Hunt given above so as to find games with the same set of equilibria and having $(0, 0)$ as the off-diagonal utilities.

Problem 2.7 (Requires real analysis) For all infinite length histories h , $d(\mu_{t,h}, \text{CEq}) \rightarrow 0$ iff for all $i \in I$ and all $a \neq b \in A_i$, $R_{i,t}(a, b) \rightarrow 0$. In words, regrets converging to 0 is the same as the empirical distribution converging to the set of correlated equilibria.

Chapter 3

Nash Equilibria in Static Games

A Nash equilibrium is a special kind of correlated equilibrium, it is the single most used solution concept presently used in economics. The examples are the main point of this chapter. They cover a range of the situations studied by economists that I've found interesting, or striking, or informative. Hopefully, study of the examples will lead to broad, generalizable skills in analysis in the style of modern economics.

3.1 Nash equilibria are uncorrelated equilibria

A **solution concept** is a mapping from games $\Gamma = (A_i, u_i)_{i \in I}$, to sets of outcomes, that is, to subsets of $\Delta(A)$. The previous chapter dealt with the solution concept “correlated equilibrium,” $\text{CEq}(\Gamma) \subset \Delta(A)$ being defined by a finite set of inequalities.

A correlated equilibrium is a **Nash equilibrium** if the signals s_i are stochastically independent. Thus, all Nash equilibria are correlated equilibria, but the reverse is not true. This solution concept is so now so prevalent in economics that the name “Nash” is often omitted, and we'll feel free to omit it too, as in $\text{Eq}(\Gamma)$ being the set of equilibria from the game Γ .

Remember that functions of independent random variables are themselves independent. Therefore, a Nash equilibrium, $\mu \in \Delta(A)$, is a correlated equilibrium having $\mu = \times_{i \in I} \text{marg}_{A_i}(\mu)$. This implies that, if we were to pay attention to the signals in the canonical version of the correlated equilibrium, β_{s_i} would always be equal to $\times_{j \neq i} \mu_j$. From this and the optimality condition of correlated equilibria, we have

Lemma 3.1 $\mu \in \text{Eq}(\Gamma)$ iff $\mu = \times_{i \in I} \text{marg}_{A_i}(\mu)$ and $\forall i \in I \mu_i(a_i^*(\times_{j \neq i} \text{marg}_{A_j}(\mu))) = 1$.

In a 2×2 example where $A_1 = \{T, B\}$ (top and bottom) and $A_2 = \{L, R\}$ (left and right), if $\mu_1 = (1/3, 2/3)$ and $\mu_2 = (3/4, 1/4)$ then $\mu = (\mu_1, \mu_2)$ denotes the probability distribution

	$\mu_2(L) = 3/4$	$\mu_2(R) = 1/4$
$\mu_1(T) = 1/3$	1/4	1/12
$\mu_1(B) = 2/3$	1/2	1/6

The marginal distributions are μ_1 and μ_2 , and for any $a = (a_1, a_2) \in A$, $\mu(a) = \mu_1(a_1) \cdot \mu_2(a_2)$. Yet another way to look at what is happening is to say that if we pick $a \in A$ according to μ , then the random variables $\pi_{A_i}(a) = a_i$ are stochastically independent.

Just as not all collections of random variables are independent, not all distributions on A are product distributions. For example, the following distribution has strong correlation between the two players' choices,

	L	R
T	1/4	0
B	0	3/4

Pure strategies are simply special cases of mixed strategies, cases in which for each $i \in I$, each $a_i \in A_i$, $\mu_i(a_i)$ is equal either to 0 or to 1. If $\mu_1 = (0, 1)$ and $\mu_2 = (1, 0)$ in a 2×2 example, then μ is the distribution

	$\sigma_2(L) = 1$	$\sigma_2(R) = 0$
$\sigma_1(T) = 0$	0	0
$\sigma_1(B) = 1$	1	0

We will give a proof of the following result later.

Theorem 3.2 (Nash) *If Γ is finite, then $\text{Eq}(\Gamma)$ is a closed, non-empty subset of $\Delta(A)$.*

Corollary 3.3 *If Γ is finite, then $\text{CEq}(\Gamma)$ is a closed, non-empty, convex polytope in $\Delta(A)$.*

Corollary 3.4 *If $\#\text{CEq}(\Gamma) = 1$, then $\text{CEq}(\Gamma) = \text{Eq}(\Gamma)$.*

A **pure strategy equilibrium** is an equilibrium¹ with $\mu_i = \delta_{a_i}$ for some $a_i \in A_i$ for each $i \in I$. This would be point mass on a vector $a = (a_i)_{i \in I}$ with the property that $a_i \in a_i^*(a_{-i})$.

Notation: For a vector $b \in A$ and $a_i \in A_i$, we define

$$b \setminus a_i = (b_1, \dots, b_{i-1}, a_i, b_{i+1}, \dots, b_I).$$

¹Note how I've already dropped the 'Nash' in "Nash equilibrium?"

We will sometimes use this notation, and sometimes use the notation (a_i, b_{-i}) . For $a \in A$, define

$$Br_i^P(b) = \arg \max u_i(b \setminus \cdot) = \{a_i \in A_i : (\forall t_i \in A_i)[u_i(b \setminus a_i) \geq u_i(b \setminus t_i)]\}.$$

“ $Br_i^P(b)$ ” is read as “ i ’s set of pure strategy best responses to b .” This is the same as $a_i^*(b_{-i})$. Notice the redundancy built into this new notation.

$a^* = (a_i^*)_{i \in I}$ is a pure strategy equilibrium for Γ iff

$$(\forall i \in I)(\forall a_i \in A_i)[u_i(a^*) \geq u_i(a^* \setminus a_i)].$$

The set of pure strategy equilibria for Γ is denoted $Eq^P(\Gamma)$.

Think of a $\mu \in \Delta(A)$ that is not an equilibrium. The definition implies

$$(\exists i \in I)(\exists a_i \in A_i)[u_i(\mu \setminus a_i) > u_i(\mu)].$$

In other words, at a non-equilibrium μ , at least one of the players has an incentive to change her action. This makes the definition of equilibrium seem like a minimal kind of idea.

Equilibrium is a minimal kind of answer to the question, “Where might best responses dynamics stay put?” It is a very strong kind of answer to the question, “What do we expect to happen?” We saw a kind of dynamic system that settles down to the *set* of correlated equilibria. We will come back to the question of what kinds of dynamics settle down to Nash equilibria later, and perhaps we will like Nash equilibria better for that reason. For right now, let us examine why equilibrium is much too strong an assumption.

Lemma 3.5 $\mu \in Eq(\Gamma)$ if and only if $\forall i \in I \mu_i(Br_i^P(\mu)) = 1$.

In other words, any convincing arguments for i playing μ_i involve i acting as if they are solving the problem

$$\max_{a_i \in A_i} u_i(\mu \setminus a_i),$$

that is, acting as if they know that everyone else is playing their part of the vector μ , and that they solve the implied maximization problem, and if there are many pure strategy solutions to their problem, they are randomizing over these strategies in the correct fashion.

Part of the function of this course is to remove your resistance to the assumption that equilibrium is descriptive of behavior. Some examples showing that we can tell a wonderful variety of stories will help in this project.²

²I will take you to the top of the mountain and show you the wonders of games in economic theory. They can be yours, if only you will promise yourself to equilibrium.

3.2 2×2 games

We are going to focus on games where there are no ties — for each $i \in I$ and a_{-i} , $u_i(a_i, a_{-i}) \neq u_i(b_i, a_{-i})$ for $a_i \neq b_i$. Within this class of 2×2 games, we've seen four types:

1. Games in which both players have a dominant strategy, e.g. Prisoners' Dilemma;
2. Games in which exactly one player has a dominant strategy, e.g. Rational Pigs;
3. Games in which neither player has a dominant strategy and there are three equilibria, e.g. Stag Hunt and Battle of the Partners;
4. Games in which neither player has a dominant strategy and there is only a mixed strategy equilibrium, e.g. Matching Pennies.

We're going to give three more stories for 2×2 games, and see that they each fit into one of the categories above. We'll then use Lemma 1.4 and a definition of strategically equivalent games to partition the set of all 2×2 games (with no ties) into these four categories. In the process, we'll see that Pareto rankings of equilibria mean less than we might have hoped.

3.2.1 Three more stories

There are Inspection games, games of Chicken, and Hawk-Dove conflicts. All of them fit into one of the four categories above.

Inspection games

The idea in inspection games is that keeping someone honest is costly, so you don't want to spend effort monitoring their behavior. But if you don't monitor their behavior, they'll want to slack off. The mixed strategy equilibria that we find balance these forces. We'll give two versions of this game, a very basic one, and a more complicated one.

The basic version: In this game, there is a worker who can either Shirk, or put in an Effort. The boss can either inspect or not. Inspecting someone who is working has an opportunity cost, $c > 0$, finding a Shirker has a benefit b . The worker receives w if they Shirk and are not found out, 0 if they Shirk and are Inspected, and $w - e$ if they put in the effort, whether or not they are Inspected. We assume that $w > e > 0$ so that $w - e > 0$. In matrix form, the game is

	Inspect	Don't inspect
Shirk	$(0, b)$	$(w, 0)$
Effort	$(w - e, -c)$	$(w - e, 0)$

Neither player has a dominant strategy, find the unique correlated equilibrium. This game fits into the same category as Matching Coins.

Another, more heavily parametrized version: If a chicken packing firm leaves the fire escape doors operable, they will lose c in chickens that disappear to the families and friends of the chicken packers. If they nail or bolt the doors shut, which is highly illegal, they will no longer lose the c , but, if they are inspected (by say OSHA), they will be fined f . Further, if the fire door is locked, there is a risk, ρ , that they will face civil fines or criminal worth F if there is a fire in the plant that kills many of the workers because they cannot escape.³ Inspecting a plant costs the inspectors k , not inspecting an unsafe plant costs B in terms of damage done to the inspectors' reputations and careers. Filling in the other terms, we get the game

		Inspectors	
		Inspect	Not inspect
Imperial	unlocked	$(\pi - c, -k)$	$(\pi - c, 0)$
	locked	$(\pi - f - \rho F, f - k)$	$(\pi - \rho F, -B)$

If f and ρF are too low, specifically, if $c > f + \rho F$, then Imperial has a dominant strategy, and the game is, strategically, another version of Rational Pigs.

If $f + \rho F > c > \rho F$ and $f - k > -B$, neither player has a dominant strategy, and there is only a mixed strategy equilibrium. In this case, we have another instance of a game like Matching Coins.

Games of chicken

Think testosterone poisoning for this one — two adolescent boys run toward each other along a slippery pier over the ocean, at pre-determined points, they jump onto their boogie boards, each has the option of “chickening out” and ending up in the ocean, or going through, since they are going headfirst at full running speed, if they both decide to go through, they both end up with concussions, since chickening out loses face (the other boys on the beach laugh at them), the payoffs are

	Chicken	Thru
Chicken	$(0, 0)$	$(-2, 10)$
Thru	$(10, -2)$	$(-9, -9)$

³White collar decisions that kill blue collar workers rarely result in criminal prosecutions, and much more rarely in criminal convictions. See [6] for some rather depressing statistics. Emmett Roe, the owner of the Imperial chicken processing plant that locked the doors killed 20 workers and injured 56 more, plea-bargained to 20 counts of involuntary manslaughter, and was eligible for early release after 3 years. I do not know when/if he was released.

Sometimes, one thinks about lockout/agreement and strike/agreement problems using a game of chicken.

There are no dominant strategies for this game. There are two pure strategy equilibria, and one, rather disastrous mixed strategy equilibrium. There is an interesting correlated equilibrium in this game, $(\frac{1}{2}, \frac{1}{2})$ on $((\text{Thru}, \text{Chicken}), (\text{Chicken}, \text{Thru}))$. This corresponds to taking turns, and gives each an expected utility of 4 apiece. If these were boxing matches, another testosterone poisoned activity, the ticket buyers would be shouting “Fix!!” In any case, these games fit into the same category as the Stag Hunt and the Battle of the Partners.

Hawk-Dove games, the use of deadly force

One of the puzzles about competition between animals over resources is the rarity of the use of deadly force — poisonous snakes wrestle for mates but rarely bite each other, wolves typically end their fights with both alive and almost uninjured after the beaten wolf has exposed their throat, male caribou struggle for mates by locking antlers and trying to push each other around but rarely gouge each other. The puzzle is that the use of deadly force against a rival who is not using it rather thoroughly removes that rival from the gene pool, thereby giving an immediate selective advantage to the user of deadly force. The problem with this argument is that it is only selectively advantageous to use deadly force in a population full of non-users of deadly force.

Suppose that there is a prize at stake worth $50x$ (in utility terms) to each of two contestants, where $x \in (0, 2)$. The contestants have two options, aggressive Display or deadly Force. Display immediately runs away from Force. The utility of being seriously injured, which happens $\frac{1}{2}$ of the time if both use deadly Force, is -100 . Finally, the loss of time in a long mutual display of aggression has a utility of -10 . With payoffs, the game, $\Gamma(x)$, is

	Display	Force
Display	$(-10, -10)$	$(0, 50x)$
Force	$(50x, 0)$	$(50(\frac{1}{2}x - 1), 50(\frac{1}{2}x - 1))$

Strategically, this is the same as Chicken so long as $x \in (0, 2)$.

The mixed strategy equilibrium is interesting from an evolutionary point of view — if we thought of behavior as being genetically determined, then a population consisting of mostly Display (resp. Force) users would give selective advantage to Force (resp. Display) users, and this balancing pattern would be at work unless the population proportions matched the mixed equilibrium probabilities.

Let $\alpha(x)$ be the probability that Display is used in the mixed equilibrium (or, in the evolutionary story, the proportion of the population using Display). The formula is

$$\alpha(x) = \frac{2 - x}{2.4 - x}, \text{ so that } \frac{d\alpha(x)}{dx} = -\frac{0.4}{(2.4 - x)^2} < 0.$$

The derivative being less than 0 means that the more valuable the prize is, the higher the proportion of the time one would expect to see the use of deadly Force.

Note that $\alpha(2) = 0$ so that Force is used all of the time. If $x > 2$, the formula for $\alpha(x)$ breaks down (negative probabilities are no-no's). For these values of x , Force is a dominant strategy for both, and the game is, strategically, just like the Prisoners' Dilemma game.

3.2.2 Rescaling and the strategic equivalence of games

Consider the 2×2 game

	Left	Right
Up	$(\mathbf{a}, e)$	$(\mathbf{b}, f)$
Down	$(\mathbf{c}, g)$	$(\mathbf{d}, h)$

where we've put 1's payoffs in bold for emphasis. Since we're assuming there are no ties for player 1, $\mathbf{a} \neq \mathbf{c}$ and $\mathbf{b} \neq \mathbf{d}$. Consider the function $f_1(a_2)$ given by $f_1(\text{Left}) = -\mathbf{c}$ and $f_1(\text{Right}) = -\mathbf{b}$. Lemma 1.4 tells us that adding f_1 to 1's payoffs cannot change either CEq or Eq. When we do this we get the game

	Left	Right
Up	$(a - c, \mathbf{e})$	$(0, \mathbf{f})$
Down	$(0, \mathbf{g})$	$(d - b, \mathbf{h})$

where we've now put 2's payoffs in bold for emphasis. Since we're assuming there are no ties for player 2, $\mathbf{e} \neq \mathbf{f}$ and $\mathbf{g} \neq \mathbf{h}$. Consider the function $f_2(a_1)$ given by $f_2(\text{Up}) = -\mathbf{f}$ and $f_2(\text{Down}) = -\mathbf{g}$. Lemma 1.4 tells us that adding f_2 to 2's payoffs cannot change either CEq or Eq. When we do this we get the game

	Left	Right
Up	(x, y)	$(0, 0)$
Down	$(0, 0)$	(r, s)

where $x = a - c$, $y = e - f$, $r = d - b$, $s = h - g$, and $x, y, r, s \neq 0$. We've just proved that all 2×2 games with no ties are equivalent to 2×2 games with $(0, 0)$'s in the off-diagonal positions.

Applying this procedure to the six of the 2×2 games we've seen yields

Prisoners' Dilemma

	Squeal	Silent
Squeal	(1, 1)	(0, 0)
Silent	(0, 0)	(-1, -1)

Rational Pigs

	Push	Wait
Push	(-3.9, -1.1)	(0, 0)
Wait	(0, 0)	(1, -2)

Matching Coins

	H	T
H	(2, -2)	(0, 0)
T	(0, 0)	(2, -2)

Stag Hunt

	Stag	Rabbit
Stag	(9, 9)	(0, 0)
Rabbit	(0, 0)	(1, 1)

Battle of the Partners

	Dance	Picnic
Dance	(12, 8)	(0, 0)
Picnic	(0, 0)	(8, 12)

Chicken

	Chicken	Thru
Chicken	(-10, -10)	(0, 0)
Thru	(0, 0)	(-7, -7)

Once games are in this form, what matters for strategic analysis are the signs of the utilities x, y, r, s , e.g. the sign patterns for the first two games are

Prisoners' Dilemma

	Squeal	Silent
Squeal	(+, +)	(0, 0)
Silent	(0, 0)	(-, -)

Rational Pigs

	Push	Wait
Push	(-, -)	(0, 0)
Wait	(0, 0)	(+, -)

There are 2^4 possible sign patterns, but there are not 2^4 strategically distinct 2×2 games. We're going to say that two games are strategically equivalent if they have the same sign pattern after any finite sequence of (1) applying Lemma 1.4 to arrive at 0's off the diagonal, (2) relabeling a player's actions, or (3) relabeling the players.

For example, in Rational Pigs, Little Pig was player 1 and Big Pig was player 2. If we relabeled them as 2 and 1 respectively, we would not have changed the strategic situation at all. We would have changed how we represent the game, but that should make no difference to the pigs. This would give a game with the sign pattern

	Push	Wait
Push	(-, -)	(0, 0)
Wait	(0, 0)	(-, +)

If we were to relabel the actions of one player in Chicken, we'd have the game

	a_2	b_2
a_1	(0, 0)	(-10, -10)
b_1	(-7, -7)	(0, 0)

which is equivalent, via Lemma 1.4, to a game with the sign pattern

	a_2	b_2
a_1	$(+, +)$	$(0, 0)$
b_1	$(0, 0)$	$(+, +)$

In just the same way, the following two sign patterns, from games like Matching Coins are equivalent,

Matching Coins			Coins Matching		
	H	T		H	T
H	$(+, -)$	$(0, 0)$	H	$(-, +)$	$(0, 0)$
T	$(0, 0)$	$(+, -)$	T	$(0, 0)$	$(-, +)$

It is left as an exercise to show that all 2×2 games are equivalent to one of the four categories identified at the beginning of this section.

3.3 The gap between equilibrium and Pareto rankings

The defining characteristic of an equilibrium is the mutual best response property. Pareto optimality arguments are very peculiar from the mutual best response point of view.

3.3.1 Stag Hunt reconsidered

An implication of Lemma 1.4 is that the following two versions of the Stag Hunt are strategically equivalent.

Stag Hunt			Hunting Stag		
	Stag	Rabbit		Stag	Rabbit
Stag	(S, S)	$(0, R)$	Stag	$(S - R, S - R)$	$(0, 0)$
Rabbit	$(R, 0)$	(R, R)	Rabbit	$(0, 0)$	(R, R)

Remember that $S > R > 0$, which makes the Pareto ranking of the pure strategy equilibria in the first version of the game easy and clear. However, the Pareto rankings of the two pure strategy equilibria agree across the two versions of the game only if $S > 2R$. If $R < S < 2R$, then the Pareto criterion would pick differently between the equilibria in the two strategically equivalent games.

3.3.2 Prisoners' Dilemma reconsidered

An implication of Lemma 1.4 is that the following two versions of the Prisoners' Dilemma are strategically equivalent.

Prisoners' Dilemma			Dilemma of the Prisoners		
	Squeal	Silent		Squeal	Silent
Squeal	(1, 1)	(0, 0)	Squeal	(-14, -14)	(0, -15)
Silent	(0, 0)	(-1, -1)	Silent	(-15, 0)	(-1, -1)

If we take the Pareto criterion seriously, we feel very differently about the equilibria of these two games. In the first one, the unique equilibrium is the Pareto optimal feasible point, in the second, the unique equilibrium is (very) Pareto dominated.

3.3.3 Conclusions about Equilibrium and Pareto rankings

From these examples, we should conclude that the Pareto criterion and equilibrium have little to do with each other. This does not mean that we should abandon the Pareto criterion — the two versions of the Prisoners' Dilemma are equivalent only if we allow player i 's choice to add 15 years of freedom to player $j \neq i$. Such a change does not change the strategic considerations, but it drastically changes the social situation being analyzed.

In other words: the difference between the two versions of the Prisoners' Dilemma is that we have stopped making one person's action, Squeal, have so bad an effect on the other person's welfare. One might argue that we have made the game less interesting by doing this. In particular, if you are interested in (say) understanding how people become socialized to pick the cooperative action when non-cooperation is individually rational but socially disastrous, the new version of the Prisoners' Dilemma seems to be no help whatsoever. The new version has synchronized social welfare (in the Pareto sense) and individual optimization.

My argument about socialization would be phrased in terms of changes to the utility functions, though not necessarily the changes given in Lemma 1.4. Utility functions are meant to represent preferences, and preferences are essentially indistinguishable from revealed preferences, that is, from choice behavior. If one thinks that both being Silent is the right outcome, then you need to change the preferences so that the players prefer being Silent. Socialization is one very effective way to change preferences. Many people feel badly if their actions harm others, even others they do not personally know. I take it that they have preferences that include consequences to others. To study socialization to cooperative actions, one needs to study how preferences are changed. Once again, much of the mileage in game theory arises from the contrast between different games.⁴

⁴The NYT article covering blood flows in the brain.

3.3.4 Risk dominance and Pareto rankings

One possible reaction to the previous section is “Yeah, yeah, that’s all fine so far as the mathematics of equilibrium is concerned, but when I write down a game with specified payoffs, I really mean that those payoffs represent preferences, they are not merely devices for specifying best responses.” If you take this point of view (or many points of view like it), analyzing Pareto optimality again makes sense.⁵ However, if you take this point of view, you are stuck when you come to games in which the players disagree about which equilibrium is better. One way to try to resolve this is using the idea of risk dominance.

In some coordination games, we (might have) favored one equilibrium outcome over another because it was better for everyone. In the following game (with the same best response pattern as the Stag Hunt), Pareto ranking does not work,

	L	R
T	$(5, 6)$	$(3, 2)$
B	$(0, 2)$	$(6, 4)$

One idea that does work to pick a unique equilibrium for this game is called **risk dominance**. The two pure strategy equilibria for this game are $e^1 = (T, L)$ and $e^2 = (B, R)$. The set of σ_2 for which T , 1’s part of e^1 , is a best response for player 1 is $S_1^{e^1} = \{\sigma_2 : \sigma_2(L) \geq 3/8\}$. The set of σ_2 for which B , 1’s part of e^2 , is a best response for player 1 is $S_1^{e^2} = \{\sigma_2 : \sigma_2(L) \leq 3/8\}$. Geometrically, $S_1^{e^1}$ is a larger set than $S_1^{e^2}$. One way to interpret this is to say that the set of beliefs that 1 might hold that make 1’s part of e^1 a best response is larger than the set that make 1’s part of e^2 a best response. In this sense, it is “more likely” that 1 plays his/her part of e^1 than his/her part of e^2 . Similarly, $S_2^{e^1} = \{\sigma_1 : \sigma_1(T) \geq 1/3\}$ is geometrically larger than the set $S_2^{e^2} = \{\sigma_1 : \sigma_1(B) \leq 1/3\}$, so that it is “more likely” that 2 plays his/her part of e^1 than his/her part of e^2 . This serves as a definition of **risk dominance**, e^1 risk dominates e^2 .

What we have just seen is that it is possible to invent a principle that takes over when Pareto ranking does not pick between equilibria. There are at least two more problems to overcome before we can reach an argument for systematically picking a single equilibrium, even in the set of 2×2 games that we have been looking at.

1. The two players may disagree about which equilibrium risk dominates as in

	L	R
T	$(5, 6)$	$(3, 5)$
B	$(0, 2)$	$(6, 4)$

⁵The previous section is just a bad dream to be ignored while you get on with the serious business of proving that all works out for the best in this best of all possible worlds.

which is the same as the previous game, except that 2's payoff to (T, R) has been changed from 2 to 5. The sets $S_1^{e^1}$ and $S_1^{e^2}$ are unchanged, but $S_2^{e^1} = \{\sigma_1 : \sigma_1(T) \geq 2/3\}$ and $S_2^{e^2} = \{\sigma_1 : \sigma_1(B) \leq 2/3\}$. Now e^1 risk dominates e^2 for 1 but e^2 risk dominates e^1 for 2.

2. Risk dominance may disagree with the Pareto ranking, so we actually need to decide whether we believe more strongly in risk dominance than in Pareto ranking. Return to the Stag Hunt,

	Stag	Rabbit
Stag	(S, S)	$(0, R)$
Rabbit	$(R, 0)$	(R, R)

where $S > R > 0$. While $(S, S)^T \gg (R, R)^T$, making S look good, for each hunter the Rabbit strategy looks less 'risky' in the sense that they are less dependent on the actions of the other. Arguing directly in terms of the risk dominance criterion, the Stag equilibrium risk dominates if $S > 2R$, while Rabbit risk dominates if $2R > S > R$. However, Stag always Pareto dominates.

Even if Pareto rankings do not survive the utility transformations of Lemma 1.4, risk dominance rankings do.

Problem 3.1 Suppose that a 2×2 game without ties, $\Gamma = (A_i, u_i)$, has two pure strategy equilibria, e^1 and e^2 and that e^1 risk dominates e^2 . Suppose that $\Gamma' = (A_i, v_i)$ where the v_i are derived from the u_i using any of the transformations allowed in Lemma 1.4. We know that e^1 and e^2 are equilibria of Γ' . Show that e^1 risk dominates e^2 in Γ' .

3.4 Other static games

These will be divided into finite games and infinite games.

3.4.1 Infinite games

Infinite games are those in which the space $A = \times_{i \in I} A_i$ is infinite. This can happen if one or more of the A_i is infinite, or if I is infinite. Both are interesting, and sometimes both are interesting simultaneously.

Tragedy of the commons

There are I different countries that can put out fishing fleets to catch from pelagic schools of fish. Use the number $a_i \in \mathbb{R}_+ = A_i$ to represent the number of fishing boats in the fleet of country i , $i = 1, \dots, I$. To finish specifying the game, the utilities, $u_i : S \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ need to be specified.

The marginal cost of a boat is constant, and equal to c . For given $a \in A$, let $n = n(s) = \sum_{i \in I} a_i$ and $n_{-i}(s) = \sum_{j \neq i} a_j$. When the total number of boats is n , the **per boat** return is $v(n)$ where $v(0) > 0$, $v'(n) < 0$, $v'(0) < c$, and $v''(n) < 0$. For country i , the benefit to putting out a fleet depends on the size of their own fleet, a_i , and the size of the other countries' fleets, $n_{-i}(s)$,

$$u_i(a_i, n_{-i}(s)) = s_i v(s_i + n_{-i}(s)) - c s_i = a_i v(n(s)) - c s_i.$$

For fixed $n_{-i} = n_{-i}(s)$, $u_i(\cdot, n_{-i})$ is concave because $\frac{\partial u_i(a_i, n_{-i})}{\partial s_i} = v(n) + a_i v'(n) - c$, implying

$$\frac{\partial^2 u_i(a_i, n_{-i})}{\partial s_i^2} = v'(n) + a_i v''(n) + v'(n) < 0.$$

Let us imagine that time is indexed by $t \in \{0, 1, \dots\}$ and $a_{i,t}$ represents what player i is doing at time t . One possible dynamic process by which each country might adjust toward fleet sizes that are better for them is

$$a_{i,t+1} = s_{i,t} + \alpha_t \frac{\partial u_i(a_{i,t}, n_{-i,t})}{\partial s_i}$$

$\alpha_t > 0$, moves $a_{i,t+1}$ in the direction that increases u_i , larger steps for larger α_t and larger $\partial u_i(a_{i,t}, n_{-i,t}) / \partial s_i$. A variant of this kind of dynamic is

$$a_{i,t+1} = \alpha_t s_{i,t} + (1 - \alpha_t) s_i^*(n_{-i,t})$$

where $s_i^*(n_{-i,t})$ is i 's best response to a fleet size of $n_{-i,t}$ by the other countries. This moves $a_{i,t+1}$ α_t of the way from $a_{i,t}$ toward the best response. Given the concavity of $u_i(\cdot, n_{-i})$, we could, more generally, ask for a dynamic of the form

$$a_{i,t+1} - s_{i,t} = \psi_i(s_{i,t}, n_{-i,t})$$

with the property that

$$\text{sgn}(\psi_i(a_{i,t}, n_{-i,t})) = \text{sgn}(s_i^*(n_{-i,t}) - a_{i,t}).$$

For many variants of the above dynamics, the $a_{i,t}$ converge (i.e. settle down as t grows

large), for many others, they do not converge. We can ask: If such a dynamic process $\psi = (\psi_i)_{i \in I}$ has an equilibrium, $a^* = (s_i^*)_{i \in I}$, that is, a point at which $a_{i,t+1}^* = s_{i,t}^*$, what does it look like? Well, note that $a^* = 0$ is not possible because the dynamics would push all of the $a_{i,t+1}$ up, nor is an a^* with the property that $v(n(s^*)) \geq c$ because the dynamics would push all of the $a_{i,t+1}$ down. At an equilibrium of the dynamic process,

$$(\forall i \in I)[s_{i,t+1}^* - s_{i,t}^* = \psi_i(s_{i,t}^*, n_{-i}(s^*)) = 0]$$

so that

$$s_{i,t}^* = s_i^*(n_{-i,t}^*),$$

which, given the differentiability and concavity, is equivalent to

$$(\forall i \in I) \left[\frac{\partial u_i(s_i^*, n_{-i}^*)}{\partial a_i} = 0 \right]. \quad (3.1)$$

The simultaneous satisfaction of the best response conditions gives the Nash equilibrium. In this game, the Nash equilibrium is inefficient compared to binding agreements to limit fleet size, and the inefficiency grows with I . Strategic considerations do not lead to socially optimal solutions.

Cournot competition

Two firms compete by producing quantities q_i and q_j of a homogeneous good, and receiving profits of the form

$$\pi_i(q_i, q_j) = [p(q_i + q_j) - c]q_i,$$

where $p(\cdot)$ is the inverse market demand function for the good in question. Assume that $p(q) = 1 - q$ and that $0 \leq c \ll 1$, work out the linear best response functions $Br_i(q_j)$, and examine the dynamics

$$q_{1,t+1} = Br_1(q_t), \quad t \text{ odd}, \quad q_{2,t+1} = Br_2(q_t), \quad t \text{ even}.$$

Note the global asymptotic stability.

Calculate the equilibrium $q^* = q_i^* + q_j^*$ and $p^* = p(q^*)$. If we increase the number of firms, I , $\lim_{I \rightarrow \infty} p_I^* = c$, a pleasing convergence to the competitive case.

Returning to cartels, suppose that firm 1 has a large capacity, but that the other firms, the little pigs, have capacities $\bar{q}_j$, $j \neq 1$, much less than q^*/I . More formally, $A_j = [0, \bar{q}_j]$ $j \neq i$, and $A_i = [0, q']$ for some large q' .

Problem 3.2 *Show that, in this case, the large firm acts as a monopolist for the residual market, that is, for the market left over after the little pigs have produced $\bar{q}_j$.*

Bertrand competition

Two firms compete by setting prices p_i, p_j , consumers go to the lower price supplier (because the goods are homogeneous), so that profits are

$$\pi_i(p_i, p_j) = \begin{cases} (p_i - c)q(p_i) & \text{if } p_i < p_j \\ \frac{1}{2}[(p_i - c)q(p_i)] & \text{if } p_i = p_j \\ 0 & \text{if } p_i > p_j \end{cases}$$

where $q(\cdot)$ is the market demand function. If p_j is less than or equal to the monopoly price for the market, then there is no best response for i in $[0, p_j)$. However, the intuition is that i undercuts j and *vice versa*. The only equilibrium of this kind of dynamic is $p_i = p_j = c$. Here 2 firms are enough to arrive at the competitive outcome.

Note that both firms are better off with Cournot competition, and both firms prefer half of the monopoly profits to the Cournot profits.

Cournot vs. Bertrand competition

Bertrand competition was invented as a criticism of Cournot competition. The argument is that, since Cournot assumed the good to be homogenous, it must be that consumers will only buy from the lowest price supplier, hence the above Bertrand dynamic. Comments:

1. In some industries, there is a long lag between production decisions and outputs (e.g. acres planted now only deliver a harvest months in the future), and once the quantity has been produced, it is individually better for each of the producers to sell all of their output. This is closer to the Cournot story.
2. In other industries, quantity is quickly adjustable and price competition results. This is closer to the Bertrand story.
3. Advertising textbooks stress the importance of not bringing price to the attention of the consumer, that price competition is horrible and dangerous. They suggest trying to distinguish the good from its competitors, a strategy not considered by either Cournot or Bertrand.
4. In industries where differentiation is quite hard, say milk, the producers are likely to form cartels to keep prices high and to coordinate advertising. Again, these considerations are in neither the Cournot nor Bertrand models.
5. One might believe that installing production capacity is a difficult operation, and that once it is installed, price competition emerges. Neither model is like this.

6. For some goods, firms can carry inventories. This allows a huge variety of dynamic strategies. Neither model is like this.

A larger point is that game models are ways of telling a variety of stories simultaneously — by not naming the good being produced, the models cover a large area that is not delineated except by the assumptions we bring to it. When is it that particular stories are useful guides? Well, reaching a conclusion favoring powerful interests or being consonant with widely held values means that the stories are more likely to be judged to be useful guides. I am carefully distinguishing between being a useful guide and being judged to be a useful guide.

Rather than analyze the political economy of intellectual work done in universities that are growing more corporatized, the profession adopts a variety of strategies that are not particularly convincing — refuge in a very conservative and well-refuted model of science as hypothesis testing, not thinking about the issue at all, sometimes by calling it “exemplifying theory.”

I want you to come out of this class able to reason using game theory models. I also want you to come out thinking that economics is dominated by analyses that function to support the status quo. One can use game theory in more interesting ways, and there are examples below.

Fable of the Bees

In the Stag Hunt, there is a productive role for a coordinator of actions. This coordinator can be a person, or it can be a tradition. In any case, what is required is a random signal. When the signal is commonly observed, economists often call it a “sunspot.” Coordination seems to be particularly important in macroeconomics. An extended version of coordination reasoning is in the Fable of the Bees, originally from Bernard Mandeville, but we mostly know it from John Maynard Keynes.

Here are two versions of the Fable. These contain almost everything I have retained from courses about macroeconomics.⁶ Both games will involve an infinite number of players, but neither depends on this particular technical device for anything but convenience.

Fable of the Bees #1: Each person ω in the set of people Ω chooses an action $a_\omega \in \mathbb{R}_+$ to solve

$$\max_{a_\omega \in \mathbb{R}_+} u_\omega(a_\omega, \bar{a}) - c_\omega a_\omega$$

where $c_\omega > 0$, u_ω is monotonic in both arguments, $\bar{a} = \int_\Omega a_\omega d\mu(\omega)$ for some (non-atomic) probability μ on Ω . We assume that there is a unique solution $a_\omega^*(\bar{a})$ exists and increases

⁶This reflects badly on me, not on my teachers.

with $\bar{a}$, as it would if, for example,

$$\frac{\partial^2 u_\omega(\cdot, \cdot)}{\partial a_\omega \partial \bar{a}} > 0.$$

We also assume that the mapping $\omega \mapsto a_\omega^*$ is measurable (as it would be if the mapping $\omega \mapsto u_\omega$ is measurable and μ is a complete probability measure, and any probability measure can be completed). Define

$$\alpha(\bar{a}) = \int_{\Omega} a_\omega^*(\bar{a}) d\mu(\omega).$$

Any $\bar{a}$ such that $\alpha(\bar{a}) = \bar{a}$ is an equilibrium aggregate level of activity. Note that $\alpha(\cdot)$ is increasing, in the differentiable case,

$$\frac{d\alpha(a)}{d\bar{a}} = \int_{\Omega} \frac{\partial a_\omega^*}{\partial \bar{a}} d\mu(\omega) > 0.$$

This suggests that it is possible, and it is, to arrange matters so that there are many different equilibrium $\bar{a}$'s. At any equilibrium, each person is choosing their own (unique) strict best response to the actions of others.

Problem 3.3 Suppose that $\bar{a}_1$ and $\bar{a}_2$ are both equilibrium aggregate levels of activity in **Fable of the Bees #1**. Show that if $\bar{a}_1 > \bar{a}_2$, then everyone strictly prefers the $\bar{a}_1$ equilibrium to the $\bar{a}_2$ equilibrium.

Fable of the Bees #2: With the same set of people as above, each person $\omega \in \Omega$ picks present demand, d_ω , and savings for future demand to maximize

$$u_\omega(d_\omega, (1+r)a_\omega) \text{ subject to } d_\omega + a_\omega = m_\omega, \quad d_\omega, s_\omega \geq 0,$$

where

$$r = r(\bar{d}), \quad r'(d) > 0, \quad \bar{d} = \int_{\Omega} d_\omega d\mu(\omega),$$

and the mapping $\omega \mapsto u_\omega(\cdot, \cdot)$ is measurable. In other words, the more people spend now, the higher the level of economic activity, $\bar{d}$, which leads to a higher return on capital, $r(\bar{d})$, which means more to spend next period for each unit saved. For any given $\bar{d}$, denote by (d_ω^*, s_ω^*) the solution to the problem

$$\max u_\omega(d_\omega, (1+r(\bar{d}))a_\omega) \text{ subject to } d_\omega + a_\omega = m_\omega, \quad d_\omega, s_\omega \geq 0.$$

For many reasonable specifications of $u_\omega(\cdot, \cdot)$, $d^*\omega(\cdot)$ is increasing in $\bar{d}$, for even more speci-

fictions,

$$\delta(\bar{d}) := \int_{\Omega} d_{\omega}^* d\mu(\omega)$$

is increasing in $\bar{d}$. Any $\bar{d}$ such that $\delta(\bar{d}) = \bar{d}$ is an equilibrium aggregate level of demand activity, and it can be arranged that there are many equilibria. Equilibria with higher $\bar{d}$'s are strictly preferred to equilibria with lower $\bar{d}$'s. An alternate version of this has r fixed but has each m_{ω} being an increasing function of $\bar{d}$, and, presuming the two consumption goods are normal, the same basic story goes through.

These stories can be re-cast as stories about people not internalizing the external effects that their own actions take.

3.4.2 Finite Games

Finite games are those in which the space $A = \times_{i \in I} A_i$ is finite. This requires both I and the A_i to be finite (modulo a non-triviality assumption that $\#A_i \geq 2$).

Trust in electronic commerce

The E-Bay auction for a Doggie-shaped vase of a particularly vile shade of green has just ended. Now the winner should send the seller the money and the seller should send the winner the vile vase. If both act honorably, the utilities are $(u_b, u_s) = (1, 1)$, if the buyer acts honorably and the seller dishonorably, the utilities are $(u_b, u_s) = (-2, 2)$, if the reverse, the utilities are $(u_b, u_s) = (2, -2)$, and if both act dishonorably, the utilities are $(u_b, u_s) = (-1, -1)$.

For a (utility) cost s , $0 < s < 1$, the buyer and the seller can mail their obligations to a third party intermediary that will hold the payment until the vase arrives or hold the vase until the payment arrives, mail them on to the correct parties if both arrive, and return the vase or the money to the correct party if one side acts dishonorably. Thus, each person has three choices, send to the intermediary, honorable, dishonorable. The payoff matrix for the symmetric, 3×3 game just described is

		Seller		
		Intermed.	Honorable	Dishonorable
Buyer	Intermed.	1-s , 1-s	1-s , 1	-s , 0
	Honorable	1 , 1-s	1 , 1	-2 , 2
	Dishonorable	0 , -s	2 , -2	-1 , -1

Problem 3.4 *The first three questions are about finding the unique equilibrium, the last two lead to interpretations.*

1. Show that there is no pure strategy equilibrium for this game.
2. Show that there is no mixed strategy equilibrium involving the seller playing exactly two strategies with strictly positive probability.
3. Find the unique mixed strategy equilibrium and its expected utility as a function of s .
4. For what values of s is the probability of dishonorable behavior lowest? Highest?
5. What is the equilibrium of this game without the existence of an intermediary? If the intermediary is a monopolist, what will they charge for their services?

One of the really perverse aspects of this situation is that the availability of an intermediary is what makes trade possible, but people are willing to incur the cost of the intermediary only because there continues to be cheating. This is much like the monitoring games.

It is the S.E.C. and honest accounting that has made the vigor of the U.S. stock market historically possible. We expect to have a positive frequency of cheating. The current levels of cheating seem higher than is consistent with continuing to receive the benefits of having a smoothly functioning stock market.

The sex lives of lizards

The males of the lizard species *Uta stansburiana* come in three distinct types: orange-throats, blue-throats, and yellow-striped.⁷ The orange are violently aggressive, and keep large (up to size 7) harems, and defend large territories. The blue are less aggressive, keep small (usually 3) harems, and defend small territories. The yellows are very docile, and look like females, so they can infiltrate another male's territory and secretly copulate with the females. The oranges have such large territories and harems that they cannot effectively guard against the yellows, though they can outcompete the blues. The blues, having smaller territories, can guard against the yellows, but lose to the oranges. With payoffs, one version of this game is

	Orange	Blue	Yellow
Orange	(0,0)	(+1,-1)	(-1,+1)
Blue	(-1,+1)	(0,0)	(+1,-1)
Yellow	(+1,-1)	(-1,+1)	(0,0)

There is only one equilibrium for this game, $(\frac{1}{3}, \frac{1}{3}, \frac{1}{3})$. It is a bit hard to think about this as the equilibrium of a two player game though — the lizards are not choosing what

⁷This is [3, Game 4.16, p. 67-8].

color to be born. However, if we imagine that there is a population story at work, we might get someplace. Loosely, suppose that there is a population of lizards in which the orange predominate. This means that the yellow will thrive, soon outbreeding the testosterone poisoned oranges. But once the yellows predominate, the blues will thrive, soon outbreeding those sly yellows. But once the blues predominate, the oranges will thrive by beating up those wimpy, second rate terretorialist blues. But once the orange predominate, ... We might expect, over time, to average out to $(\frac{1}{3}, \frac{1}{3}, \frac{1}{3})$ as the population proportions.

3.5 Harsanyi's interpretation of mixed strategies

It is perhaps not intuitive that people “flip coins,” that is, randomize, when making decisions. When we think of correlated equilibria, this is not a problem — the randomness can come from the signals. In some games, Matching Coins and the Inspection Games for example, there is a strategic purpose to being unpredictable. These games also illustrate that we need randomization for the existence of correlated equilibria. However, you do not actually need to be unpredictable in some absolute sense so long as you are unpredictable to the other player(s). This is what Harsanyi saw and proved.

Another intuitive way to understand mixed strategies is as follows: Everyone has little idiosyncracies, my belief that you are randomizing can be recast as my belief that you are not randomizing but that you yourself are random. More specifically, your choice depends on your idiosyncracies, and so far as I am concerned, your idiosyncracies are random.

Fix a finite collection $(A_i)_{i \in I}$. We will parametrize games $\Gamma(u)$ by $u \in \mathbb{R}^{\#S \times \#I}$. Harsanyi's theorem is a statement about the mixed equilibria of “most” $\Gamma(u)$. Define a set to be negligible in $\mathbb{R}^{\#S \times \#I}$ if its closure has no interior.

Let $(\theta_i^a)_{s \in A, i \in I}$ be an independent collection of $\#S \times \#I$ random variables on $[-1, +1]$ with smooth densities p_i^a . For $\epsilon > 0$, perturb the game Γ to $\tilde{\Gamma}_\epsilon(u)$ by setting the utilities to $\tilde{u}_{i,\epsilon} = u_i + \epsilon \theta_i^a$. In the game $\tilde{\Gamma}_\epsilon(u)$, the players are told their own utilities, $\tilde{u}_{i,\epsilon}$, but not the utilities of the other players. Given their own utilities, the players choose their actions and receive payoffs $\tilde{u}_i(a)$ if a occurs. A pure strategy equilibrium for $\tilde{\Gamma}_\epsilon(u)$ is an equilibrium in which the set of $\tilde{u}_{i,\epsilon}$ that are playing mixed strategies has probability 0. For a pure strategy equilibrium $\tilde{\sigma}_\epsilon$ of $\tilde{\Gamma}_\epsilon(u)$, let $D(\tilde{\sigma}_\epsilon)$ denote the distribution over S induced by play $\tilde{\sigma}_\epsilon$. Let $Eq(\tilde{\Gamma}_\epsilon(u))$ denote the set of pure strategy equilibria.

Theorem 3.6 (Harsanyi) *Outside a negligible set of u , $\lim_{\epsilon \rightarrow 0} D(Eq(\tilde{\Gamma}_\epsilon(u))) = Eq(\Gamma(u))$.*

In other words, little idiosyncracies can be used to interpret mixed strategy equilibria.

3.6 Problems on static games

There are problems are scattered through this chapter.

Problem 3.5 *Show that all 2×2 games with no ties have four strategic equivalence classes: Games in which both players have a dominant strategy; Games in which exactly one player has a dominant strategy; Games in which neither player has a dominant strategy and there are three equilibria; Games in which neither player has a dominant strategy and there is only a mixed strategy equilibrium.*

Problem 3.6 *Let $n^*(I)$ denote the equilibrium size of the fishing fleet in the Tragedy of the Commons model given above. Show that $n^*(I)$ and the loss of efficiency increases in I . [Hint: add the I FOC's in (3.1) and compare to the FOC for the social optimum.]*

Problem 3.7 *Suppose that Γ is a finite game. Show that the following are equivalent:*

- (1) μ^* is an equilibrium for Γ ,
- (2) $(\forall i \in I)(\forall a_i \in A_i)[u_i(\mu^*) \geq u_i(\mu^* \setminus a_i)]$, and
- (3) $(\forall i \in I)(\forall a_i \in A_i)[[\mu_i^*(a_i) > 0] \Rightarrow [a_i \in Br_i^P(\mu^*)]]$.

Further, show that if μ^* is an equilibrium for Γ and $\mu_i^*(a_i) > 0$ and $\mu_i^*(t_i) > 0$, then $u_i(\mu^* \setminus a_i) = u_i(\mu^* \setminus t_i)$.

Problem 3.8 [Optional] *Generalize the last problem to the case where each A_i is a compact metric space, each u_i is jointly continuous on S , and each Δ_i represents the set of countably additive, Borel probabilities on A_i .*

Problem 3.9 *Imagine that voters can be evenly spread out on an ideological spectrum from left to right, say on the interval $[-M, +M]$, $M > 0$. There are two candidates who are trying to get elected. The candidates announce positions someplace in the interval $[-M, +M]$, and the voters vote for the candidate whose announced position is closest to their own.*

1. *Find the equilibrium positions announced by the two candidates.*
2. *Suppose that voters are happiest if they can vote for someone who closely represents their point of view, whether or not that candidate wins. Specifically, suppose that the happiness of the voter at position $v \in [-M, +M]$ is $1 - |v - c|$ where c is the position announced by the nearest candidate. What pair of announcements makes voters happiest on average?*

Problem 3.10 *Radio stations choose the songs they play to attract the audience they are trying to sell to advertisers. The larger the audience, the higher the profits. Suppose that they divide songs along two dimensions, lyrics and energy. The lyrics range from thoughtful to*

stupid, and the energy level ranges from soothing to high voltage. The space of possible songs can be thought of as the rectangle running along the interval $[-L, +L]$ for the intelligence of the lyrics, and along the interval $[-E, +E]$ for level energy. Suppose that the most preferred type of song for radio listeners are evenly spread over the two dimensional space of song characteristics, and that they tune to that station with average songs closest to their most preferred type.

1. Two radio stations are competing for audience share in the space of songs described above. Find their equilibrium positions.
2. If there are three radio stations, show that there are no pure strategy equilibria.
3. (Hard!) Find or characterize the mixed strategy equilibrium for the case of three radio stations.

Problem 3.11 One could object to there being only four equivalence classes of 2×2 games with no ties — all of the coordination games are lumped together whether or not there is unanimity in the rankings of the two pure strategy equilibria. Such an argument would say that the Stag Hunt is a different kind of situation than the Battle of the Partners because the hunters agree which is the better equilibrium, but the partners do not. Comment.

Chapter 4

Extensive Form Games: The Basics and Dominance Arguments

Readings: These notes, Fudenberg & Tirole, Ch. 2 (especially about iterated dominance arguments), & Ch. 3. Gibbons Ch. 2 & 4.

The class of extensive form games contains the static games we looked at in the previous chapter. New to extensive form games are the informational and the dynamic issues. We'll begin by looking at a number of game trees, verbally describing the strategic situations they are meant to represent, and, in some cases, finding the Nash equilibria. After having done this often enough to see how useful a tool game trees are, the formal rules that game trees must satisfy will (hopefully) look sensible.

A strategy for an extensive form game identified as a complete contingent plan for the game tree. With this perspective, it is easy to go from game trees to static games. Going back in the other direction involves seeing static games as extensive form games. This opens a different, self-referentially justifying perspective on Nash equilibria. Iteratively applying this notion does most of the work that we'll do in shrinking the equilibrium set.


The next chapter will contain some of the mathematics we need to prove that equilibria exist, that some kinds of iterative procedures for shrinking the set of equilibria will always give a non-empty set of solutions, and that equilibrium sets depend, if not continuously on the game, then at least upper-hemicontinuously.

4.1 Examples of extensive form game trees

The first observation is that static games have game tree representations, they are special cases of extensive form games. After making this point and warning you that the formal stuff is looming in your future, we'll turn to a number of other classes of examples.

4.1.1 Simultaneous move games as extensive form games

The point of simultaneous move games is that the players take actions in ignorance of each others' choices, not necessarily that the actions take place at exactly the same time.¹ Remember “Stag Hunt”? This 2×2 game has two representations, one of which we used above:



The representation we used above is called the **normal form**, the new one is called an **extensive form**. This is the **canonical extensive form** of a normal form game. Verbally, the way to think of this new representation of the game is that player 1 is making a decision before player 2 will make a decision, but that 2 will be in ignorance of 1's decision in making her/his decision. This verbal description is represented as a tree with two branches (arrows) from the origin. The origin is the node labelled o . The label “1” next to the origin indicates that player 1 gets to choose at that first node. The choice of S_1 leads to node x , the choice of R_1 leads to node y . The nodes x and y are also **choice nodes**. The dotted line, labelled 2, connecting x and y indicates that player 2 cannot distinguish between x and y . The set of nodes, $\{x, y\}$ is an **information set**, and at this information set, player 2 has two choices. One requirement is that the choices cannot depend on whether x or y has been reached. This is because 2, the person making the decision, does not know which has been reached. The choices for 2 are labelled S_2 and R_2 , leading to terminal nodes r and s if taken at x , and leading to **terminal nodes** t and u if taken at y . The utilities are listed at the terminal nodes, with 1's utility being above 2's (numbers increase, by convention, we count from top to bottom and from left to right).

It should be pretty clear that we can do the above to any of the finite simultaneous move games we saw above. It should also be clear that we can reverse the order of the players, having 2 move first and 1 choose not knowing 2's choice has the same effect.


¹There surely exist people who will argue with you about the physics of whether simultaneity is “truly” possible. Personally, I really don't care.

4.1.2 Some games with “incredible” threats

In both of these games, there are Nash equilibria which involve one player believing that another player is planning to use a strategy, which, were they actually called on to use, they would avoid. That may sound garbled, let’s go to the games.

Atomic handgrenades

This is sometimes called the Chain Store paradox. You are approached by a fellow carrying a certified atomic handgrenade. He says, “Give me 20\$ or else I will explode this small thermo-nuclear device.” Your choice is whether or not to give him the 20\$. One (not the only) representation of this situation has your two strategies being “Give 20\$” and “Don’t Give 20\$”. The fellow’s strategies are “Blow up hand-held thermo-nuclear device if not given 20\$” and “Don’t blow up hand-held thermo-nuclear device if not given 20\$”. These are strategies that have conditional clauses in them. The extensive form and normal form representations of the game are (where $-y \ll -20$):



Atomic Handgrenades

	l	r
L	$(-20, -20)$	$(-20, -20)$
R	$(-y, -y)$	$(0, 0)$


There are a couple of points to note. The nodes are not labelled (been there, done that), there are two decision nodes and three terminal nodes, and the origin is still specially marked. More importantly, the normal form is not one we’ve seen before because it has ties, $-20 = -20$, so that 2 is indifferent between l and r if 1 plays L . Find the set of Nash equilibria as a function of y , of particular interest are the ones where 1 plays L with probability 1. In the extensive form, the indifference corresponds to 2 not caring about his/her action because L makes his/her choice moot. The equilibria involve 1 believing that 2 will do something (blow the two of them up), that he’d not do if his choice really mattered. These are the 0 probability events discussed in the theory of choice under uncertainty, but now the 0 probability is due to someone else’s strategic decision.

Compare the equilibrium sets when we do and when do not insist that people pick an action that is optimal for some beliefs at 0 probability events. If we insist, then 2 must play, or plan to play, r when they receive the signal that they should choose. This means

that 1's best reply is R . If we do not insist, then 1 can play L in equilibrium. 1 playing L corresponds to 1 believing 2's threat, so we are insisting that 1 not believe in any threat that 2 would be unwilling to carry out.

A Puccini opera

In Puccini's *Gianni Schicchi*, Buoso Donati has died and left his large estate to a monastery. Before the will is read by anyone else, the relatives call in a noted mimic, Gianni Schicchi, to play Buoso on his deathbed, re-write the will, and then convincingly die. The relatives explain, very carefully, to Gianni Schicchi, just how severe are the penalties for tampering with a will (at the time, they included having one's hand cut off). The plan is put into effect, but, on the deathbed, Gianni Schicchi, as Buoso Donati, rewrites the will leaving the entire estate to the noted mimic and great artist, Gianni Schicchi. The relatives can expose him, and thereby themselves too, or they can remain silent. With player 1 being Gianni Schicchi and player 2 being the relatives, and some utility numbers with $y \gg 200$ to make the point, with Gianni Schicchi being player 1, we have



Gianni Schicchi

	l	r
L	$(2, 200)$	$(2, 200)$
R	$(-y, -y)$	$(200, 0)$

Again, compare the equilibrium sets when we do and when do not insist that people pick an action that is optimal for some beliefs at 0 probability events. If we insist, then 2 must play, or plan to play, r when they receive the signal that they should choose. This means that 1's best reply is R . If we do not insist, then 1 can play L in equilibrium. Again, 1 playing L corresponds to 1 believing 2's threat, so we are insisting that 1 not believe in any threat that 2 would be unwilling to carry out.

4.1.3 Handling probability 0 events

The previous games showed that thinking about behavior after 0 probability events shrinks the set of Nash equilibria. We're going to go back to the single person theory of choice under uncertainty and introduce two ways of handling the 0 probability signals. They turn out

to be the same for one person games, and in many, but not all, games with more than one person. The terms we'll use are **perfect Bayesian equilibria** and **sequential equilibria**.

Keep clear the following: we're talking about putting limits on behavior that we're going to call "equilibrium behavior," we're asking for more than regular old expected utility maximization.

We've got $P \in \Delta(S \times \Omega)$, $\beta_s^P := \text{marg}_\Omega P(\cdot | \pi_S^{-1}(s))$, and the decision maker solves

$$\max_{a \in A} \sum_{\omega} u(a, \omega) \beta_s^P(\omega)$$

if $\text{marg}_S(P)(s) > 0$. We let $a^*(s)$ denote the solutions to that maximization problem. If $\text{marg}_S(P)(s^\circ) = 0$, then ex ante expected utility is unaffected by choices after s° . Let S_P° denote the set of s° having probability 0 under P .

The **perfect Bayesian** approach asks that $a_{PB}^*(s)$ be the solution set for

$$\max_{a \in A} \sum_{\omega} u(a, \omega) \beta_s^P(\omega)$$

when $s \notin S_P^\circ$, and $a_{PB}^*(s^\circ)$ be the solution set for

$$\max_{a \in A} \sum_{\omega} u(a, \omega) \beta_s^{Per}(\omega)$$

for some $\beta_{s^\circ}^{Per} \in \Delta(\Omega)$ when $s^\circ \in S_P^\circ$.

The **sequential** approach asks that $a_{seq}^*(s^\circ)$ be the solution set for

$$\max_{a \in A} \sum_{\omega} u(a, \omega) \beta_{s^\circ}^C(\omega)$$

for a **consistent** system of beliefs. Consistency asks that the beliefs at every s come from some strictly positive approximation to, or perturbation of, P .

For $P^n \gg 0$ a probability on $S \times \Omega$, let β_s^n be the beliefs at s that come from Bayes' Law, $\beta_s^n := \text{marg}_\Omega P^n(\cdot | \pi_S^{-1}(s))$. A system of beliefs $s \mapsto \beta_s^C$ is **consistent with P at s** if there exists a sequence $P^n \gg 0$ such that $P^n \rightarrow P$ and $\beta_s^n \rightarrow \beta_s^C$. It is **consistent with P** if it is consistent at all s . [Remember that " $P^n \rightarrow P$ " means " $\forall \epsilon > 0$ (no matter how tiny), $\exists N$ (probably very large), $\forall n \geq N$, $\|P^n - P\| < \epsilon$." The same definition applies to $\beta_s^n \rightarrow \beta_s^C$.]

Lemma 4.1 *For any system of beliefs, $s \mapsto \beta_s^C$, that is consistent with P , $\beta_s^C = \beta_s^P$ for all $s \notin S_P^\circ$.*

That is the first part of the observation that for single person decision theory, it turns

out not to make any difference whether we pick beliefs out of a hat, as in the perfect Bayesian approach, or ask that the beliefs arise from a perturbation of P , as in the sequential approach. The second part is


Lemma 4.2 *Any mapping from S_P° to $\Delta(\Omega)$ is consistent with P at every $s \in S_P^\circ$.*

Applying either the perfect Bayesian criterion or the sequential criterion to the previous two games, Atomic Handgrenades and Gianni Shicchi, gives the same answer, the threats (to either explode the two players or to do something that causes both to have a hand cut off) are not believed.

Important: When we apply the sequential criterion to games, we perturb the P for the players' optimization problem

1. in the same fashion for each person (this is consistent with the common prior assumption), and
2. by individually perturbing each player's strategy to be strictly positive, and then maintaining the assumption of stochastic independence.

In some games, there is a distinction between the two criteria. As a rule, we tend to opt for the the criterion that gives the smallest set of equilibria.² *Since picking arbitrary beliefs is less restrictive than using consistent beliefs, this means that sequential equilibria are always pbe's, but that the reverse is not necessarily true.* In the following game, there are perfect Bayesian equilibria that have 1 playing *out*, and other perfect Bayesian equilibria that have 1 playing *in*. Only the *in* equilibria are sequential. The reason that this is true is that when we approximate the P , we insist that the players' perturbations are stochastically independent, that is, when we perturb P to P^n , we do it by perturbing each player's mixed strategy, and then we then used the Nash independence of randomization.



	l	r
in	$(4, 1)$	$(6, 2)$
out	$(5, x)$	$(5, x)$

²This indicates that we're not proud.

The node, $\bullet$, starts the game. It is where Nature, or some other version of randomness, moves. Nature is sometimes called player 0, and has no strategic interests, that is, no utility function, and no assumption of optimization. In this game, it plays L or R with probability $\frac{1}{2}$ each. For the pbe's involving 1 playing *out*, note that if 1 plays *out*, then 2's signal to play is a probability 0 event, and if we pick beliefs that assign $\frac{2}{3}$ to the left node and $\frac{1}{3}$ to the right node in 2's information set, then 2 is indifferent. So long as 2 is playing l with probability greater than or equal to $\frac{1}{2}$, 1 is optimizing when playing *out*. When 1 plays *in*, 2's signal to play is a positive probability event, and Bayes' Law applies, so 2's beliefs should be $(\frac{1}{2}, \frac{1}{2})$, in which case r is the strict best response. This in turn makes *in* a strict best response for 1.

Now, to see that the *out* equilibria are not sequential, suppose that 1's strategy of $(1, 0)$ on (out, in) is perturbed to something strictly positive, say $\sigma^n = (1 - \epsilon_n, \epsilon_n)$. Combining this strategy with Nature's stochastically independent randomization, β^n for player 2 is $(\frac{1}{2}, \frac{1}{2})$, and $\beta^n \rightarrow (\frac{1}{2}, \frac{1}{2})$. Sequential equilibria require that 2 best respond to beliefs of this form, and the unique best response is r . But that makes *in*, rather than *out*, a best response for player 1.


4.1.4 Signaling games

These are an important class of games, and there are several examples here. Signaling games have the following common features: there are 2 players, the one who moves first, called the sender, knows something that the second, called the receiver, does not. Call that something private information. The receiver can observe what the first one does, which makes the action into a signal of sorts, but the receiver can not see the private information. The private information and the actions taken by both players typically affect the utilities of both. As we'll see, in these games there is no distinction between pbe's and sequential equilibria, and neither shrink the set of equilibria unless the receiver has a weakly dominated action.

A tale of poisoning

Felicia Casimirio worked for Acme. Acme had contracted with the defense department to clean parts for high tech weapons. Cleaning the parts involved soaking them in a number of solvents. The particularly dirty pieces also needed scrubbing. These were given to Felicia who was ambitious for a promotion. Also, she never complained of the headaches, skin and hair discoloration, dizziness, lethargy, or breathing problems that accompanied working closely with these solvents in under-ventilated areas. Felicia contracted a rare and usually lethal form of cancer. Acme claimed that it was a pre-existing condition, and would not pay her medical expenses. Acme then fired her because she would no longer show up for work on a regular basis. Fortunately, Felicia's heretofore estranged older sister, Caridad, was a lawyer, and Felicia asked for her help in suing Acme.

Caridad explained to Felicia that in Acme's experience, there was a 60% chance that Felicia's case, if taken to trial, would result in Acme paying high damages, 1000, and a 40% chance that the trial would result in Acme paying low damages, 10 (units are \$100,000). Because the break-in attempt at Felicia's doctor had failed, the sisters were sure that, while they knew whether or not Felicia's case was a high damage case, Acme did not. Caridad explained that Felicia could choose to offer to settle out of court for either 1000 or 10. Acme would then either accept the offer and pay, or reject it and go to trial, a rather long process. If Felicia's was the high damages kind of case, by the end of the trial she would be nearly dead, and this would prompt the jury to award double damages, 2000. If it was the low damages kind of case, Acme's private detectives would drag her name in the dirt so badly that the award would be only $\frac{1}{2}$ of the actual damages. Because of the effects on their aging mother and having a (much) higher discount factor if she was indeed one of the high damages cases, Felicia's expected utility preferences can be represented by the numbers given in the game tree given below.



The node, $\circ$, starts the game. It is where Nature, or some other version of randomness, moves. Nature is sometimes called player 0, and has no strategic interests, that is, no utility function, and no assumption of optimization. If Nature “chooses” high (low), Felicia has the high (low) damages kind of cancer. This is the private information that Felicia has and that player 2, Acme in this case, does not have. Another way to phrase this is that Felicia receives a signal, h or l , and the signal affects her utility.

One could regard Felicia as being different people in the two different cases, Felicia_l and Felicia_h. By the bridge crossing lemma, if she optimally decides at each node, she maximizes her ex ante expected utility. Knowing her type of cancer, she has to decide on a court strategy, asking for D_H or asking for D_L .

Acme sees her court strategy, but not her type of cancer, hence the pair of dotted lines, one joining the nodes that follow the D_H decisions, one joining the nodes that follow the D_L decisions. In terms of signals, Acme sees either D_H or D_L , and here the distribution over signals is a compound of Nature's and Felicia's choice, one non-strategic and one strategic.

After seeing the strategy/signal D_H , Acme chooses between a_H and r_H , accepting and rejecting the H settlement offer. After seeing the strategy/signal D_L , Acme chooses between a_L and r_L , accepting and rejecting the L settlement offer. Acme could also be regarded as being a different economic actor in the two cases, one after seeing D_H , and a different one after seeing D_L . These last choices lead to the terminal nodes, and the utility of player 1, that is, Felicia, is given as the top of the two numbers.

There are a couple versions of the normal form for this game, depending on whether you treat the players as being different. If you maximally differentiate, going with the notion that people are the sum of their experiences and different experiences make you into different people, you have four players, Felicia_h, Felicia_l, Acme_H, and Acme_L. This four person game is called the **agent normal form** of the game. By bridge crossing, if the agents maximize after forming signal-based beliefs using Bayes' Law, they are maximizing their ex ante expected utility.

The (standard) two person normal form for this game treats Felicia as the same person thinking about her complete contingent plan. In this case, she has 4 (four, IV, that's FOUR) strategies, (D_H, D_H) , (D_H, D_L) , (D_L, D_H) , and (D_L, D_L) where the ordered pair (a_1, a_2) is the strategy of playing a_1 after seeing the signal h and playing a_2 after seeing the signal l . To be really explicit here,

$$A_1 = \{(D_H, D_H), (D_H, D_L), (D_L, D_H), (D_L, D_L)\}.$$

By this same logic, Acme has four strategies, (a_H, a_L) , (a_H, r_L) , (r_H, a_L) , and (r_H, r_L) ,

$$A_2 = \{(a_H, a_L), (a_H, r_L), (r_H, a_L), (r_H, r_L)\}.$$

Each choice of $a \in A = A_1 \times A_2$ gives rise to an **outcome**, that is, to a distribution over terminal nodes.³ All that is left is to give the expected utilities associated with the different outcomes.

³We previously used the word "outcome" as the distribution over A , the present usage as the distribution over terminal nodes is consistent with the previous usage if we think about the canonical extensive form of a normal form game.

$A_1 \downarrow / A_2 \rightarrow$	(a_H, a_L)	(a_H, r_L)	(r_H, a_L)	(r_H, r_L)
(D_H, D_H)	$(5.0^*, -1000^*)$	$(5.0^*, -1000^*)$	$(2.4, -1202)$	$(2.4^*, -1202)$
(D_H, D_L)	$(4.6, -604)$	$(3.8, -602^*)$	$(2.8, -1204)$	$(2.0, -1202)$
(D_L, D_H)	$(3.8, -406)$	$(2.0, -1600)$	$(3.0, -8^*)$	$(1.2, -1202)$
(D_L, D_L)	$(3.4, -10^*)$	$(0.8, -1202)$	$(3.4^*, -10^*)$	$(0.8, -1202)$

I've put stars, that is, $*$'s, next to the pure strategy best responses to pure strategies. Thus, (D_H, D_H) is Felicia's pure strategy best response to both (a_H, a_L) and (a_H, r_L) , while either (a_H, a_L) or (a_H, r_L) are best responses for Acme to Felicia's pure strategy of (D_H, D_H) . The mixed strategy $\beta(a_H, a_L) + (1 - \beta)(a_H, r_L)$ corresponds to always accepting high settlement offers while accepting β of the low settlement offers. These are all best responses since they differ only on a signal having probability 0 given what Felicia is playing. These are all Nash equilibria, the whole infinite set

$$E_1 = \{((D_H, D_H), \beta(a_H, a_L) + (1 - \beta)(a_H, r_L)) : \beta \in [0, 1]\}.$$

This normal form game has ties, and it is not the case that there are an odd number of equilibria.

The other pure strategy box with two $*$'s in it is $((D_L, D_L), (r_H, a_L))$. Note that Acme has two pure strategy best responses to Felicia playing (D_L, D_L) , the one we've noted, (r_H, a_L) , and the strategy (a_H, a_L) . The mixture $\beta(a_H, a_L) + (1 - \beta)(r_H, a_L)$ corresponds to accepting all low settlement offers and accepting β of the high settlement offers. These are all best response for Acme to Felicia's play of (D_L, D_L) , but for some values of β , (D_L, D_L) is not a best response for Felicia. Specifically, for (D_L, D_L) to be a best response, the inequalities

$$3.4 \geq 5.0\beta + 2.4(1 - \beta), \quad 3.4 \geq 4.6\beta + 2.8(1 - \beta), \quad \text{and} \quad 3.4 \geq 3.8\beta + 3.0(1 - \beta)$$

must be satisfied. Doing the algebra, these are the inequalities

$$\beta \leq 5/13, \quad \beta \leq 1/3 \quad \text{and} \quad \beta \leq 1/2,$$

so that only the $\beta \in [0, \frac{1}{3}]$ satisfy all the inequalities. This gives a second set of Nash equilibria, the set

$$E_2 = \{((D_L, D_L), \beta(a_H, a_L) + (1 - \beta)(r_H, a_L)) : \beta \in [0, \frac{1}{3}]\}.$$


Bridge crossing delivers this set of equilibria in a simpler fashion. Felicia's signals happen with positive probability. For (D_L, D_L) to be a best response, D_L must be optimal after both signals. For Felicia_h, that is, for Felicia after she sees the high signal, this depends on whether or not her payoff to D_L is greater than her payoff to D_H , $3 \geq 5\beta + 2(1 - \beta)$, that

is, $\beta \leq \frac{1}{3}$. For Felicia_l, this is the inequality $4 \geq 5\beta + 3(1 - \beta)$, that is, $\beta \leq \frac{1}{2}$. Only the $\beta \in [0, \frac{1}{3}]$ satisfy both inequalities.

Okay, that worked, but why did we have only two inequalities rather than the three we had before? The answer comes out of the bridge crossing lemma, the inequality that was not reproduced involved changing what Felicia was doing from (D_L, D_L) to (D_H, D_H) , that is, changing her action after both signals. Bridge crossing says that it's enough to check one signal at a time, and what we saw was that checking the double change gave rise to a redundant inequality. To be really really really specific here, changing from (D_L, D_L) to (D_H, D_H) gave rise to the inequality $\beta \leq \frac{5}{13}$, and since $\frac{1}{3} < \frac{5}{13}$, this means that $\beta \leq \frac{1}{3}$ makes the inequality $\beta \leq \frac{5}{13}$ redundant.

Will that be beer, or quiche for breakfast?

This game is due to Cho and Kreps (1987), who tell a version of the following story: There is a fellow who, on 9 out of every 10 days on average, rolls out of bed like Popeye on spinach. When he does this we call him “strong.” When strong, this fellow likes nothing better than Beer for breakfast. On the other days he rolls out of bed like a graduate student recovering from a comprehensive exam. When he does this we call him “weak.” When weak, this fellow likes nothing better than Quiche for breakfast. In the town where this schizoid personality lives, there is also a swaggering bully. Swaggering bullies are cowards who, as a result of deep childhood traumas, need to impress their peers by picking on others. Being a coward, he would rather pick on someone weak. He makes his decision about whether to pick, p , or not, n , after having observed what the schizoid had for breakfast. With payoffs, the game tree is




This is not only a psycho-drama, it's also a story about entry-deterrence. To get to that story, re-interpret the schizoid as an incumbent who may or may not have found a cost-saving technology change. If they have, it makes them a stronger competitor. This private information is not known to player 2, the potential entrant. The incumbent can start an aggressive advertising campaign, something they'd like better if they were strong, that is, if they have found the cost-saving change to their technology. The potential entrant would rather compete against a weak incumbent than a strong incumbent, but can condition their entry decision only on whether or not they see the aggressive advertising campaign.

Problem 4.1 Give the 4×4 normal form for this game and find the two set of equilibria.

Two other variants of entry-deterrence


Consider a market with one incumbent firm and a potential entrant. The potential entrant has low costs with probability 0.2, and has high costs with probability 0.8. The actual costs (low or high) of the entrant are private information to the entrant, who decides whether to stay “out” or “enter.” The outside option for the low cost entrant has an expected utility of 25, while the outside option for the high cost entrant has an expected utility of 0. If the potential entrant stays out, then the incumbent has an expected utility of 25. If the potential entrant enters, then the incumbent decides whether to “fight” or “acquiesce.” If the incumbent fights, then the payoffs for the entrant and incumbent respectively are $(20, -25)$ when the entrant is low cost, and $(-10, 40)$ when the entrant is high cost. If the incumbent acquiesces, then the payoffs are $(40, 10)$ when the entrant is low cost, and $(20, 36)$ when the entrant is high cost.

One version of the game tree for this game is




A **separating equilibrium** is one in which all the different types of Senders take different actions, thereby separating themselves from each other. A **pooling equilibrium** is one in which all the different types of Senders take the same action. The only Nash equilibria of the game just given are pooling equilibria, and all of them are sequential.

One of the sequential equilibria of the previous game is still a Nash equilibrium, but is not a pbe (therefore not sequential) in the following, changed version of the above game.



Same structure, less story



The previous signaling game, Γ_x , depends on x Nature picks player 1's type to be either θ_1 or θ_2 with equal probability. Player 1 then picks either up or down. If 1 picks up after


either θ , the game is over with payoffs $(x, 20)$ and $(3, 15)$. If 1 every plays down, 2 picks between a , b , and c without knowing which θ occurred. The rest of the payoffs for Γ_x are as given in the following extensive form.

4.1.5 Spying games


One of the interesting aspects of information is who has it.

A simple case

Achieving coordination is often crucial. One way to achieve coordination in two person strategic situations is to have one player “spy” on the other. This pair of games is designed to get some of the simple implications of the possibility that one player may choose to expend the effort to spy on the other in a two person coordination game. The specific coordination game to be considered is



With the spying option, the game is altered so that player 2 can, before making their choice, pay a utility cost of $s > 0$ and learn what 1 has done. Specifically, the game is




Okay, time for a trick question — how many strategies does 2 have in the canonical normal form version of the previous game? To figure this out, note that 2 has three information sets, and has 2 choices at the left one, 3 choices at the middle one, and 2 at the right one. This means that 2 has $2 \cdot 3 \cdot 2 = 12$ complete contingent plans.

Exercise: write out the 2×12 canonical normal form, notice that there are a lot of duplicate strategies, call any pair of strategies that give everyone the same payoffs equivalent, and find the equivalence classes. Count equivalence classes as single strategies, and give an extensive form game having the resulting, smaller, normal form game as its canonical form.

Going to war as a signal


With probability $2/3$, country 1's secret military research program makes their armies deadlier (i.e. giving higher expected utility in case of war through higher probability of winning and lower losses), and with probability $1/3$ the research project is a dud (i.e. making no change in the army's capacities). Knowing whether or not the research program has succeeded, country 1 decides whether or not to declare war on or to remain at peace with country 2. Country 2 must decide how to respond to war, either *fighting* or *ceding* territory, all of this without knowing the outcome of 1's research program. With payoffs, one version of the game tree is:



	f	c
(p, p)	(9, 6)	(9, 6)
(p, w)	(4, 6)	(10, 4)
(w, p)	(7, -2)	(11, 2)
(w, w)	(2, -2)	(12, 0)

Let us modify the previous game by adding an earlier move for country 2. Before country 1 starts its research, country 2 can, at a cost $s > 0$, insert sleepers (spies who will not act for

years) into country 1. Country 1 does not know whether or not sleepers have been inserted, and if sleepers are inserted, country 2 will know whether or not 1's military research has made them deadlier. One version of the game tree is:




Later, we will evaluate, in the context of these two versions of this game, the statement, “When spying is cheap, it lowers the probability of war.”

Once again, you should know how to find the canonical, normal form strategy sets for this game. Player 1 has to make decisions at two information sets, and has two actions available at each one, meaning 4 strategies. Player 2 has to make decisions at four information sets, and has two actions available at each, therefore has $2^4 = 16$ complete contingent plans. Notice that many of them are redundant — if 2 decides not to spy, then all of the decisions on the left side of the tree do not matter to anyone's utility. The decisions that would be made there matter to the equilibrium, but not to the utilities in the normal form.

4.1.6 Other extensive form games that I like

The first two games are called “horse games” because the game tree looks like a stick figure horse,⁴ not because it was inspired by stories about the Wild West.


⁴As drawn by a theoretical economist to be sure.

A horse game

Imagine that 1 and 2 are lawyers in a law firm. 1 must decide whether to hand the case over to 2, the action A_1 , or to prepare it themselves, D_1 . If the case is handed to 2, she must decide whether to go forward, D_2 , or leave the case alone, A_2 . The differing competences of lawyers 1 and 2 leave 3 having different opinions about their options, say fighting or settling, L_3 and R_3 . 3 is happiest if both 1 and 2 opt out, 2 would most like to prepare the case herself and have 3 settle, etc.

The 3-person normal form representation of this game has two matrixes. 1 picks the rows, 2 picks the columns, and 3 picks the matrix.


Exercise: Find the equilibria for this game.

Another horse game

Exercise: Fill in the payoffs for the normal form representation of this game, find the equilibria, and figure out which of them are sequential.

A money-burning game

Here, player 1 can either opt out or play a coordination game. When player 1 lets player 2's choice matter, this means that 1 has given up a sure payoff of 2. Following Dekel's insights, we sometimes think of that as burning money.



	<i>l</i>	<i>r</i>
<i>Out</i>	(2, 9)	(2, 9)
<i>L</i>	(5, 1)	(0, 0)
<i>R</i>	(0, 0)	(1, 5)

Two of the equilibria in the coordination game are worse than opting out. Thus, when 1 gives to 2 the opportunity to move, 1 has publicly given up the worth of the outside option, they have, in other words, burned some money. If you were 2 and knew that 1 had given up the safe outside option, you might conclude something about what 1 must have done in giving you the choice.⁵


Two games without clocks

The following is a tale of envy and spite. In it, neither can have a clock. That should sound a bit surprising, no mention of clocks was made in the previous games. Read on.

A Tale of Envy and Spite. In it, neither can have a clock. That should sound a bit surprising, Two people, Bertrand and Cournot, who dislike each other rather strongly, are in the habit of taking an evening stroll through the local marketplace. When approached by a vendor selling a unique, one-of-a-kind silk tie, they may either accept or reject the offer. In making this decision, they do not know whether or not the vendor has already approached the other and been rejected. However, they do know that it is equally likely that they are the first to be approached, and that, if they are first and reject the tie, the other will be approached.

Both like the tie, but both dislike accepting a tie the other has rejected, and both dislike having the other also reject a tie they have rejected (such is envy and spite). With payoffs, one game tree for this situation is, with N being Nature, or Chance,

⁵I don't entirely agree with this logic, but it is very popular.



Problem 4.2 Give the normal form for this game, find all the equilibria for this game, and find the set of normal form correlated equilibria.

The correlating device is, by assumption, independent of Nature's move. Suppose instead that the recommendation made by the correlation device can be dependent on Nature's choice. Formulate and solve for the equilibrium outcomes of resulting game. (Hint: The equilibria of games with this kind of extensive form correlation are called 'communication equilibria' by Forges and Myerson.)

So, why might this be called a game without a clock? One way to answer is to suppose that both Cournot and Bertrand start their evening stroll at 6:30 p.m. every evening. If they are approached at 6:31, then they are pretty sure that they are the first to be approached. If they know something about the arrival time and the degree of hustle of the vendor, then not being approached until 7:30 might be a pretty clear indication that they are the second to be approached. In either of those cases, the description of the uncertainty given in the game tree is no longer correct.

A New Chair. The Department of Economics at Moo U. needs a new chair. The Dean has narrowed her choices down to two possibilities, Professor BillyBob and Professor Cuthbert.

The existence of a chair is a public good. The benefits to both professors of having a chair are normalized to 1, so that both receive utility $b = 1$ if either becomes chair. The costs to the Professors are private information, independently distributed, and taking the values $c = 1/3$ and $c = 2/3$ with probability $\frac{1}{2}$ each. Costs are borne only by the Professor who becomes chair so that if, say, BillyBob becomes chair, the utilities to BillyBob and Cuthbert are $(1 - c_{\text{BillyBob}}, 1)$. If neither becomes chair, both receive utility of 0.

The Dean picks one of the two professors at random and offers them the chance to do the chore of being chair. If the first professor turns the job down, the Dean offers it to the second professor. If the second professor turns them down, the Dean loses patience and appoints an incompetent third professor who gives benefits $b = 0$ to both BillyBob and Cuthbert. A striking aspect of this game is that, in making their decision of whether or not to accept, neither BillyBob nor Cuthbert know if they are the Dean's first choice, or if the Dean has already been refused once.

Problem 4.3 *Carefully draw a tree representing the game between BillyBob and Cuthbert. [This could get a little tricky. There are 8 equally likely choices for Nature/Mysterio, each choice can be represented as a vector (c_B, c_C, i) where $c_B \in \{L, H\}$ is BillyBob's costs, $c_C \in \{L, H\}$ is Cuthbert's, and $i \in \{B, C\}$ is the Professor who is offered the job first. Also, each information set for each player should contain 4 nodes.]*

Solve for all of the pure strategy equilibria of the game you just gave.

Which, if any, of the pure strategy equilibria are sequential?

4.2 Formalities of extensive form games

Here they are, we've now seen many extensive form games and have a sense of the kinds of things they model. Now we need to give the rules we've been living by.

1. Nodes: These are the places in game trees where "things happen," either someone (including Nature) makes a choice, or the game ends. Nodes are either the heads or tails of vectors in the pictures above (and below). The nodes that are only at the tails of vectors are called **terminal nodes**, these are the ones where games end. $\mathfrak{X}$ will be used to denote the set of nodes for a game.
2. Arrows: The possibility of moving from one node to another node is represented by arrows in the diagram. There are at least two ways to represent these arrows. First, as a set of ordered pairs with the first one being the head of the arrow and the second being the tail, that is, $K \subset \mathfrak{X} \times \mathfrak{X}$ is a partial ordering. We are going to have to assume that K is a tree with a root, i.e. you cannot go in cycles, no node is its own predecessor, and only one node has no predecessor.

3. Immediate predecessors: The arrows can also be represented by a function $p : \mathfrak{X} \rightarrow \{\mathfrak{X}, \emptyset\}$ that maps each node in $\mathfrak{X}$ to its **immediate predecessor**.
4. The origin: By assumption, there is only one node with no predecessor, it is called the root or the origin, sometimes denoted by $\circ$, sometimes by an open circle, sometimes by a filled in circle.
5. Immediate successors: The **immediate successors of a node** x is $s(x) = p^{-1}(x)$.
6. Predecessors: Iteratively applying $p(\cdot)$ gives the set of all predecessors, e.g. $p(r) = x$, $p(p(x)) = p(\circ) = \emptyset$, so the set of all predecessors of the node r is $\{x, \circ\}$.
7. Successors: Iteratively applying $s(\cdot)$ gives the set of all successors.
8. Terminal nodes and decision nodes: The **terminal nodes** are $T = \{x \in \mathfrak{X} : s(x) = \emptyset\}$. All other nodes, $\mathfrak{X} \setminus T$, are called **decision nodes**.
9. Who plays where: The player partition P is a partition of $\mathfrak{X} \setminus T$ into $I + 1$ sets, $P_0, P_1, \dots, P_I$. At $x \in P_i$, player i is the one to choose an action. Player 0 is Chance or Nature.
10. Information partition: It matters very much what one knows when one makes a choice, and this is the function of the information partition. To each P_i , there is a partition U_i of P_i , the elements of U_i are called the **information sets** of player i . The idea is that player i cannot distinguish between points in an information set in U_i . This means that player i 's choices cannot vary across different parts of their information set, the second condition just below. In the pictures, information sets are represented dashed lines connecting decision nodes.

The partitions U_i must satisfy two conditions,

- (a) For every terminal node z , the set of predecessors of z intersect any information set at most once. [This condition is repeated as the first condition in the Perfect Recall assumption below.]
 - (b) All nodes in an information set must have the same number of successors.
11. Actions: The last two conditions are related to the choice of actions available to the players. In the game above, player 1 has two actions at the information set $H = \{\circ\} \in U_1$, the set of available actions, $A(H)$, is $\{\text{Push}_1, \text{Wait}_1\}$. At the information set $H = \{x, y\} \in U_2$, $A(H)$ is the set $\{\text{Push}_2, \text{Wait}_2\}$. The implications of 2 choosing a particular action depend on where in $\{x, y\}$ the player actually is — if at node x Push_2 and Wait_2 lead to terminal nodes r or s , if at y , they lead to t or u .


For any decision node x , let $H(x)$ denote the information set containing x and let $A(x)$ be a set of actions available at x . At decision nodes x , we assume that if $H(x) = H(x')$, then $A(x) = A(x')$ so that $A(H)$ is well-defined for any information set H . Further, we assume that at every decision node x , there is a one-to-one correspondence between elements of $A(x)$ and $s(x)$, the immediate successors of x . The interpretation is that at $H(x) \in U_i$, player i chooses some $a \in A(H(x))$, and this leads to the corresponding node in $s(x)$.

Now we can explain the conditions (a) and (b) on the information partitions.

- (a) If this condition is violated, then not only does player 1 not remember what he's chosen in the past, s/he may not remember having chosen.
 - (b) If two nodes, $x \neq x'$, in an information set $H \in U_i$ had different numbers of successors, then i 's decision problem at the two nodes differ. Since we want to assume that when people choose, they choose from a known set of options, they would need to know whether are at x or at x' . But $x, x' \in H \in U_i$ represents i not being able to distinguish the two.
12. Perfect recall: We assume that the players never forget something they once knew — if they observe an action by someone else or take an action themselves, they will never arrive at a later point in the game at which they do not know all the consequences of the observed or taken action.

Formally, two conditions must hold, the first was given above:

- (a) If x and x' are in the same information set for a player i , $H(x) = H(x')$, then x is neither a predecessor nor a successor of x' .
- (b) If $x \neq x'$ are in the same information set for a player i , $H(x) = H(x')$, x'' is a predecessor of x belong to one of i 's information sets, and a'' is the action at $H(x'')$ that leads (eventually) to x , then there must be a predecessor, y , to x' that belongs to $H(x'')$ such that a'' is the action taken at y on the way to x' . (If i cannot distinguish between $x \neq x'$, then it had better not be the case that i had information distinguishing x and x' at any predecessor of x at which i chose an action.) The left hand game in Figure 2 violates this condition if we take $x = x_1$, $x' = x_2$, the right hand game violates this condition if we take $x \in \{y_1, y_2\}$ and $x' \in \{y_3, y_4\}$.



13. Strategies: A **pure strategy** for i is a mapping from the $H \in U_i$ to the associated $A(H)$. The H 's in U_i are the possible contingencies that may arise, the places at which i may need to choose an action. To rephrase, a strategy for i is a **complete contingent plan**, a list of what will be done at each and every contingency, that is, at each possible H in U_i . A **mixed strategy** is a probability distribution over pure strategies.

This concept of a strategy as a complete contingent plan turns out to be amazingly hard for many people, but it is crucial. I think this is because, for the most part, we go through our lives figuring out what we will do when we get to the decision point, crossing the bridge when we get to it colloquially. Go back and review the Bridge Crossing Lemma. Once you've done that, take a look at the following examples.

- (a) In the first spying game, 1 moves at only one information set, picking either L or R . This means that 1's set of pure strategies is $\{L, R\}$. 2 moves at three information sets, the one directly after 1 has moved, the one where 2 has chosen to spy and learned that 1 pick L , and the one where 2 has chosen to spy and learned that 1 pick R . Reading the information sets from left to right, the $12 = 2 \cdot 3 \cdot 2$ strategies are

2's info set	spying found L	1 has moved	spying found R
	l	spy	l
	l	spy	r
	l	l	l
	l	l	r
	l	r	l
	l	r	r
	r	spy	l
	r	spy	r
	r	l	l
	r	l	r
	r	r	l
	r	r	r

- (b) In the Felicia game, her pure strategies specify a complete contingent plan, that is, a plan that tells what she will do in either the high or the low damages case. Reading from left to right in that game tree, the four strategies are (D_H, D_H) , (D_H, D_L) , (D_L, D_H) , and (D_L, D_L) . The Acme pure strategies are also complete contingent plans, they specify what they will do when faced with either a H or a L claim, (a_H, a_L) , (a_H, r_L) , (r_H, a_L) , (r_H, r_L) .
- (c) In the modified “going to war as a signal” game, 1 moves at 2 different information sets, making one of 2 choices at each one, so 1’s set of pure strategies has 4 elements. 2 moves at 4 different information sets, and has 2 choices at each one, hence has $2^4 = 16$ pure strategies.
14. Outcomes: Given a vector $s = (a_i)_{i \in I} \in A = \times_{i \in I} A_i$ of pure strategies (including a pure strategy for Nature), there is a unique terminal node, $\mathbb{O}(s)$ that will arise, that is, $\mathbb{O} : S \rightarrow T$. The outcome associated with a mixed strategy σ is denoted $\mathbb{O}(\sigma)$ and is the image of σ under the mapping $\mathbb{O}$.
15. Utilities: Associated with every terminal node z is a utility $u(z)$. These are given as vectors at the terminal nodes in the picture.
16. Equilibrium: A vector σ^* is an equilibrium if

$$(\forall i \in I)(\forall a_i \in A_i)[u_i(\mathbb{O}(\sigma^*)) \geq u_i(\mathbb{O}(\sigma^* \setminus a_i))].$$

17. The normal (or strategic) form: Given an extensive form game, Γ , let A_i denote i ’s set of pure strategies. Define $v_i(s) = u_i(\mathbb{O}(s))$. The normal form for Γ is $(A_i, v_i)_{i \in I}$. That

is, the normal form lists each player's pure strategies and assigns utilities through the outcome function. Thus, the definition of equilibrium just given is simply the definition of an equilibrium of the normal form game. Sometimes this is called the canonical normal form to distinguish it from some other kinds of normal form games that we'll get to later.

18. The agent normal form: We start with an extensive form game Γ having player set I . Each $i \in I$ has a collection U_i of information sets. For each $H \in U_i$, split i into a component personality, i_H .⁶ Specifically, pretend that each i_H is a separate person, but, and this is crucial, pretend that their utility at z , $u_{i_H}(z)$, is equal to $u_i(z)$.
19. Behavioral strategies: In the agent normal form, randomization by the $(i_H)_{H \in U_i}$ is stochastically independent. This independent randomization over the $A(H)$ is called a behavioral strategy. A behavioral strategy gives a distribution over the pure strategies. Kuhn's theorem says that any distribution over the pure strategies can be replaced by a strategically equivalent behavioral strategy. This means that any equilibrium σ^* gives rise to an equivalent vector of behavioral strategies, b^* , which must also be an equilibrium. It is usually much easier to use behavioral strategies, and you will quickly become adept at using them.⁷

Problem 4.4 *What is the dimension of the space of mixed strategies in the first spying game? What is the dimension of the space of behavioral strategies.*

4.3 Extensive form games and weak dominance arguments

The time has come to start solving these games. There are too many equilibria, sometimes "weak dominance" arguments can get rid of some of them.


4.3.1 Atomic Handgrenades

The first game we will solve is called Atomic Handgrenades, sometimes it is called the Chain Store paradox. To remind you, you are approached by a fellow carrying a certified atomic handgrenade. He says, "Give me 20\$ or else I will explode this small thermo-nuclear device." Your choice is whether or not to give him the 20\$. One (not the only) representation of this situation has your two strategies being "Give 20\$" and "Don't Give

⁶This has the makings of a really bad tv show, but there are good reasons to do this.

⁷Or suffer the consequences, sleepless nights and frustration.

20\$". The fellow's strategies are "Blow up hand-held thermo-nuclear device if not given 20\$" and "Don't blow up hand-held thermo-nuclear device if not given 20\$". These are strategies that have conditional clauses in them. The extensive form representation of the game is (where $-y \ll -20$):



The (canonical) normal form representation of Atomic Handgrenades is

	Blow up if not given	Don't blow up if not given
Give	$(-20, +20)$	$(-20, +20)$
Don't	$(-y, -y)$	$(0, 0)$

Note that there are exactly 2 equilibria for this game, and this is the first finite game in which we've had anything but an odd number of equilibria. There is a reason for that, but we would need more of a particular kind of mathematics than I am willing to wade through to prove this kind of result. Further, since most of our interest is going to be in extensive form games, the conditions guaranteeing an odd number of equilibria are usually violated.

It is embarrassing to have two such different equilibria. Remember, we are trying to tell stories about why things happen. Saying that either the bluff will work or it won't is, in modern parlance, "lame."

Problem 4.5 Give the normal form for Gianni Schicchi and show that it too has 2 equilibria.

4.3.2 A detour through subgame perfection

This is a topic of some historical importance. Notice that Atomic Handgrenades has a proper subgame, Γ' that starts at 2's decision node. One could ask, as a matter of general principle, that equilibrium in Γ , when restricted to Γ' , is an equilibrium. Such an equilibrium is called **subgame perfect**.

This is a fairly strong requirement, it requires that bluffing not happen in equilibrium. This gets us what we want in this game, a unique “acceptable” equilibrium. However, there are games Γ_1 having subgames that are equivalent (in very strong senses) to other games Γ_2 without subgames. The choice is either to abandon subgame perfection or to abandon the equivalence of games. I’ll abandon subgame perfection as a theoretical construct without much regret. However, since it’s an implication of theoretical constructs that we will accept, you might as well know how to use it.

Problem 4.6 *Two firms compete by producing quantities q_i and q_j of a homogeneous good, and receiving profits of the form*

$$\pi_i(q_i, q_j) = [p(q_i + q_j) - c]q_i,$$

where $p(\cdot)$ is the inverse market demand function for the good in question. Assume that $p(q) = 1 - q$ and that $0 \leq c \ll 1$.

1. (Cournot competition) Suppose that the firms pick quantities simultaneously. Find the unique equilibrium.
2. (Stackelberg competition) Suppose that firm i picks q_i , which is then observed by firm j before they pick q_j . Find the set of equilibria for this game. Find the unique subgame perfect equilibrium (called the Stackelberg equilibrium).
3. Find the profit rankings of the Cournot and the Stackelberg equilibrium.

Problem 4.7 *A software designer, s , and a marketer, m , form a partnership to which they contribute their efforts, respectively $x \geq 0$ and $y \geq 0$. Both have quasi-linear utility functions, $u_s = \$_s - x^2$ and $u_m = \$_m - y^2$, where $\$_s$ and $\$_m$ are monies received by s and m respectively.*

The twice continuously differentiable, strictly concave profit function π satisfies

$$(\dagger) \quad \pi(0, 0) = 0, \text{ and } (\forall x^\circ, y^\circ > 0)[\partial\pi(x^\circ, y^\circ)/\partial x > 0, \partial\pi(x^\circ, y^\circ)/\partial y > 0].$$

The profit function need not be symmetric, that is, it may happen that $\pi(x, y) \neq \pi(y, x)$.

Consider the following three scenarios:

- (A) *Side payments are possible, and the Nash bargaining solution with threat point $(u_s, u_m) = (0, 0)$ determines the outcome.*
- (B) *Neither effort nor sidepayments are legally enforceable, the partners choose their efforts simultaneously, and share the profits equally.*

(C) Neither effort nor sidepayments are legally enforceable, and the partners share the profits equally. However, the software designer chooses her effort before the marketer chooses hers, and the marketer observes the designer's effort before choosing her own.

1. Give conditions on $\pi(\cdot, \cdot)$ above and beyond $(\dagger)$, the weaker the better, so that both the software designer and the marketer strictly prefer (A) to (B). Prove your result.
2. Give conditions on $\pi(\cdot, \cdot)$ above and beyond $(\dagger)$, the weaker the better, so that the software designer strictly prefers (C) to (B). Prove your result.
3. Show that if, in addition to $(\dagger)$, $\partial\pi(0, 0)/\partial x > 0$ and $\partial\pi(0, 0)/\partial y > 0$, then there is a unique, strictly positive solution in scenario (B).
4. Show that if $\pi(\cdot, \cdot)$ is homothetic, then the solution (x_A, y_A) in scenario (A) is a linear multiple of any solution (x_B, y_B) in scenario (B). Under what conditions is the multiple larger or smaller than 1?

We will talk about subgame perfection as weak dominance in agent normal form games below. Weak dominance and iterated weak dominance is more generally applicable than subgame perfection. Remember throughout, arguments for weak dominance implicitly include arguments against bluffing.

Problem 4.8 (The Rotten Kid Theorem) First, the child picks $A \geq 0$. This gives rise to incomes $I_C(A)$ and $I_P(A)$ for the child and parent respectively. Second, the parent observes (I_C, I_P) and chooses a bequest, $B \in \mathbb{R}$, to leave for the child. The child's utility is $U(I_C + B)$, the parent's is $V(I_P - B) + kU(I_C + B)$, $k > 0$. The usual strict concavity, differentiability, and interior solution conditions hold for $I_C(\cdot)$, $I_P(\cdot)$, $U(\cdot)$, and $V(\cdot)$. In the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of this game, A^* solves the problem $\max_{A \geq 0} (I_C(A) + I_P(A))$. [What is striking is that the possibility of being left a bequest by soft-hearted parent makes the child behave perfectly admirably, even if they're really rotten, that is, even if they do not care in the least about their parent's utility.]


Problem 4.9 Player 1 moves first, either choosing to play a 2×2 game with player 2, or giving 2 a single choice. After 2's single choice, the payoffs are (3, 0) or (2, 1). The 2×2 game has payoffs

	Left	Right
Up	(0, 3)	(1, 3)
Down	(2, 1)	(2, 0)

1. Draw an extensive form representation of this game in which there are two subgames, one at the beginning of 2's single choice and one at the beginning of the 2×2 game. Solve for the subgame perfect equilibria of this game.
2. Write out the (canonical) normal form for this game. Solve for any and all weakly undominated equilibria in both forms. You should find subgame perfect equilibria that are not weakly undominated and weakly undominated equilibria that are not subgame perfect.
3. Write out the agent normal form for this game. Solve for the weakly undominated equilibria of the agent normal form of this game. You should find that the subgame perfect equilibria are now exactly the weakly undominated equilibria.

4.3.3 A first step toward defining equivalence for games

A more important observation is that the same normal form game arises from very different extensive form games. Having T (for Top) and B (for Bottom) replacing the strategies “Give” and “Don’t” above, L (for Left) and R (for Right) replacing the strategies “Blow up if not given” and “Don’t blow up if not given” consider the following two games.



These last two extensive form games have the same normal form and the same equilibrium set as Atomic Handgrenades. As a first take on the equivalence of games, let us agree that two games with the same canonical normal form are equivalent. For all three of these equivalent games, the equilibrium set is $\{(T, L), (B, R)\}$.

When we look at the (T, L) equilibrium in the Atomic Handgrenades version, it requires that player 2 be playing the strategy “If we should arrive at the point x where I must choose between blowing everything up and not blowing everything up, I will choose to blow everything up.” This seems to be a rather unlikely strategy for 1 to seriously believe that 2

will contemplate,⁸ so maybe we should not believe in the (T, L) equilibrium. While this is a good intuition, but it doesn't help in any of the equivalent games because there is no point like x at which we can say that 1 would never believe that 2 is contemplating something foolish.

There is an argument as to why the strategy L is a bad one for 1 to think that 2 is playing, and the argument works in all four forms of the game. It has to do with the observation that, no matter what strategy 1 is playing, 2 is always at least as well off playing R as playing L , and for some strategies that 1 might play, 2 is strictly better off playing R instead of L . This is called **weak dominance**, and perfectly reasonable people believe that weakly dominated strategies are not used.

4.4 Weak dominance arguments, plain and iterated

A strategy $\sigma_i \in \Delta_i$ **strongly dominates** $t_i \in A_i$ if

$$(\forall \sigma' \in \Delta)[u_i(\sigma' \setminus \sigma_i) > u_i(\sigma' \setminus t_i)].$$

No strongly dominated t_i can be in the support of any equilibrium (for finite games).

A strategy $\sigma_i \in \Delta_i$ **weakly dominates** $t_i \in A_i$ if

$$(\forall \sigma' \in \Delta)[u_i(\sigma' \setminus \sigma_i) \geq u_i(\sigma' \setminus t_i)] \text{ and}$$

$$(\exists \sigma^\circ \in \Delta)[u_i(\sigma^\circ \setminus \sigma_i) > u_i(\sigma^\circ \setminus t_i)].$$

Comment: Splitting agents, as we do in agent normal form games, changes the set of strategies and the set of weakly dominated strategies. Go back and look at Problems 4.9. Then do the following problem.

Problem 4.10 (Kohlberg & Mertens, Figure 9) *Consider the two player game*

	Left	Right
X	(2, 2)	(1, 1)
Y	(2, 2)	(0, 0)
Z	(0, 0)	(0, 0)

1. Show that (X, L) is the only undominated equilibrium of this game.

⁸At least if the payoffs/preferences are as given.

2. Give an extensive form representation of the following game: Split agent 1 into 1_a who picks whether or not to play Y and 1_b who, if s/he has chosen not to play Y , picks between X and Z ; have 2 pick L or R after 1_a and 1_b and in ignorance of those choices.
3. In the extensive form game you have given, show that R is dominated for 2. Show that in the extensive form game with R deleted, only Y is undominated for 1_a .

In Atomic Handgrenades, R weakly dominates L , so that if we believe that weakly dominated strategies are never used, then the only part of the equilibrium set that we are interested in is (B, R) . Weak dominance arguments get rid of some equilibria.

You might wonder why we allow mixed strategies in the definition of things that might weakly dominate a given t_i . Consider the following game.

	L	M	R
T	(9, 4)	(30, 1)	(6, 0)
B	(6, 0)	(110, 1)	(6, 4)

Neither strategy for 1 is weakly dominated. The strategy M is not weakly dominated by either L or R , but it is strongly dominated by any $\sigma_2 \in \Delta_2$ satisfying $\sigma_2(L) > \frac{1}{4}$ and $\sigma_2(R) > \frac{1}{4}$. The set of equilibria for this game is $Eq = \{(T, L)\} \cup \{(\sigma_1, R) : \sigma_1(B) \geq \frac{1}{2}\}$.

Now suppose that we look at the game in which M is removed because it will never be played. This gives the game

	L	R
T	(9, 4)	(6, 0)
B	(6, 0)	(6, 4)

and in this game T weakly dominates B for 1, but none of 2's strategies are weakly dominated. We considered only a subset of Δ as possibilities, and new weak dominance relations appeared. For this game, the set of equilibria is (again) $Eq = \{(T, L)\} \cup \{(\sigma_1, R) : \sigma_1(B) \geq \frac{1}{2}\}$.

Now suppose that we look at the game in which B is removed. None of the equilibria in $\{(\sigma_1, R) : \sigma_1(B) \geq \frac{1}{2}\}$ make any sense in this game because they are putting positive mass on strategies that have disappeared. The new game is


	L	R
T	(9, 4)	(6, 0)

In this game 1 has no weakly dominated strategies, but R is strictly dominated for 2. Removing R leaves the only possible actions being (T, L) . Iteratively deleting weakly dominated strategies has reduced the set of equilibria.

Problem 4.11 *Show that in the Cournot game with linear demands, iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies leads to the Cournot equilibrium.*

In the following game, player 1 has an outside option, a safety point if you will. In the extensive form game, if player 2 gets to play, it means that 1 has forsaken her/his outside option. One could argue that this means that 2 should believe that if s/he gets to play, it is because 1 believes that the equilibrium that 1 and 2 will play together is better for 1 than the outside option. This is called a “money burning” game because player 1 has forsaken something expensive, an example of forsaking something expensive is burning money. The iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies that delivers this conclusion also applies to the version of the game in which 2 moves first and then 1 picks, not knowing what 2 has picked.

Problem 4.12 *Consider the following version of the money-burning game, Γ ,*



1. Give the normal form for Γ .
2. Give the extensive form of this game in which 2 move first.
3. Find $Eq(\Gamma)$.
4. Find the subset of $Eq(\Gamma)$ that survives iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies.

The above iterative procedure made use of dominance relations that only appear when a subset of Δ is being considered. This idea of dominance relative to a set turns out to be very useful, and we will return to it after we take a detour through some of the best known applications of weak dominance arguments.

4.5 Mechanisms

Suppose somebody, call them a principal, wants to hire someone else, call them an agent, to do a particular job. A possible complication is that the principal cannot observe, at least not at any reasonable cost in time or money, exactly how the agent does the job. Another possible complication is that the principal doesn't know everything about the job that the agent knows. However, the principal does observe the final outcome. The principal wants to design a reward schedule for the agent, a mechanism if you will, that depends on the observable final outcome, and that induces the agent to behave as the principal desires.

For example, the owner of a factory (the principal) may hire a manager (the agent) to run the factory while the principal runs off to the South Pacific. It is too costly for the principal to watch what the agent does from Tahiti. However, each quarter the principal's accountant calls and tells the principal the realized profits. Now, profits are presumably related to the agent's actions, but they also have a random component. This is a peculiar market, the principal is buying the services sold by someone else, but the exact services are not specified in the contract. Here the mechanism is a wage schedule depending on the observable profit.

For another example, the principal sees a doctor or a lawyer (agent) when something is wrong. Often, the extent and treatment for the problem are not known to the principal and only probabilistically known to the agent. The principal eventually observes the outcome, that is, when/if the problem goes away. This too is a peculiar market, the principal is asking the agent what is needed and then buying the needed services from the agent. In the doctor example, the wage schedule should depend on the health outcome.

For yet another example, people differ in their real willingness and ability to pay for public goods. Public goods should be offered if the sum, over the affected people, of the willingness to pay is greater than or equal to the cost of the public good. However, if actual payment depends on reported willingness to pay, people have a motivation to "free ride," that is, to say that they are less willing to pay than they truly are in order to receive the public good at less cost to themselves. Here, one invents a rule or mechanism for turning reported willingnesses to pay into a decision about the public good. Given the mechanism/rule, the people best respond. In particular, they don't play weakly dominated strategies. Here, the principal is an abstraction sometimes thought of as society, there are many agents, and society, in the guise of the economist writing down the model, wants to get a particular kind of outcome. Some specific models are in order.

4.5.1 Hiring a manager

The principal offers a contract to the agent. The contract specifies what reward or wage the agent will get as a function of the observable outcome, say profit — S_1 is the set of

functions $\pi \mapsto w(\pi)$. The agent examines the contract, $w(\cdot)$, and either decides to decline the job offer, or accepts the offer and chooses a managerial behavior, $b \in B$ — S_2 is the set of functions from S_1 to $\{\text{decline}\} \cup B$. If a point in B is chosen, then a random profit, Π_b , is realized. The expected utilities when the job offer is not declined are $E u_1(\Pi_b - r(\Pi_b))$ and $E u_2(r(\Pi_b), b)$. The principal's utility depends only on the difference between the realized profit and the wage they pay, the agents utility depends only on the wage they receive and their choice of managerial behavior. If the job offer is declined, the expected utilities are $\underline{u}_1$ and $\underline{u}_2$.

Just as in Atomic Handgrenades, the manager could bluff, saying that s/he won't take the job unless offered a very large salary schedule, one that guarantees more (in expected utility) than $\underline{u}_2$. However, when offered something more reasonable, by which I mean some lower wage schedule offering an expected utility greater than $\underline{u}_2$, declining is a weakly dominated strategy. Thus, in looking at an equilibrium for this game, we can proceed in two stages: first, figure out 2's best responses to different $w(\cdot)$'s; second, figure out the highest $E u_1$ as a function of $w(\cdot)$ coupled with best responses by 2.

We are going to start with the simplest case: $B = \{b_l, b_h\}$ where l and h stand for low and high respectively, the possible profit levels are $\{\pi_l, \pi_h\}$, $\pi_l < \pi_h$, the probability of π_h conditional on action b_l being taken is $P(\pi_h|b_l) = \alpha$, the probability of π_h conditional on action b_h being taken is $P(\pi_h|b_h) = \beta$, and $0 < \alpha < \beta < 1$. Also, suppose that u_2 is of the form $u(w) - v(b)$ where u is concave in wages, where $v(b_l) < v(b_h)$, and suppose that u_1 is linear in profits minus wage payments.

Problem 4.13 *For some values of the parameters of this game, the equilibrium involves the manager choosing b_l . Characterize the equilibrium $w(\cdot)$ for such equilibria. For other values of the parameters of this game, the equilibrium involves the manager choosing b_h . Show that the corresponding equilibrium $w(\cdot)$ involves performance rewards, that is, $w(\pi_l) < w(\pi_h)$. [You can use graphs to answer this question.]*

Problem 4.14 *Change the set of profit levels to $\{\pi_1 < \pi_2 < \dots < \pi_M\}$, have $P(\pi_m|b_l) = \alpha_m$, $P(\pi_m|b_h) = \beta_m$ where $\sum_{m=1}^M \alpha_m \pi_m < \sum_{m=1}^M \beta_m \pi_m$, but otherwise leave the game unchanged.*

1. *For some values of the parameters of this game, the equilibrium involves the manager choosing b_l . Characterize the equilibrium $w(\cdot)$ for such equilibria.*
2. *For other values of the parameters of this game, the equilibrium involves the manager choosing b_h . For such an equilibrium:*
 - (a) *Give the Kuhn-Tucker optimality conditions that must be satisfied by the equilibrium $w(\pi_m)$, $m = 1, \dots, m$.*

- (b) Show that the equilibrium $w(\cdot)$ may not involve performance rewards, that is, $w(\pi_m) > w(\pi_{m+1})$ is possible.
- (c) Show that if α_m/β_m decreases in m , the equilibrium $w(\cdot)$ involves performance rewards.
3. Add an extra stage to this game — after observing π_m , the manager can report any $\pi_{m-k} \leq \pi_m$ (say by overpaying a supplier), and wage depends on the reported π . Show that in any equilibrium involving the manager picking b_h , the equilibrium $w(\cdot)$ involves weak performance rewards, that is, $w(\pi_{m-1}) \leq w(\pi_m)$.

4.5.2 Funding a public good

A group of neighborhood families, $i \in \{1, \dots, I\}$, must decide whether or not to pool their money to hire a morning crossing guard for a busy intersection that the children walking to school must cross. The cost of a guard is C , which must be financed by family contributions, t_i . The set of feasible alternatives can be modeled as

$$X = \{x = (y, m_1 - t_1, \dots, m_I - t_I) : y \in \{0, 1\}, t_i \geq 0, \sum_i t_i \geq yC\},$$

where m_i is family i 's initial endowment of money. Family i 's preferences are given by

$$u_i(x, \theta_i) = \theta_i y + (m_i - t_i),$$

where $\theta_i \in \Theta_i = \{\theta_L, \theta_H\}$ where $0 < \theta_L < \theta_H$. The θ_i are independent, and have probability $\frac{1}{2}$ of being either θ_H or θ_L . The set of possible vectors of preferences is Θ with typical element $\theta = (\theta_1, \dots, \theta_I) \in \Theta = \times_{i \in I} \Theta_i$. We are going to assume that each family knows their own θ_i but not the θ_j of any $j \neq i$. (Draw a tree here).

A social choice rule is a function f mapping Θ to X . Family i 's maximal willingness to pay, p_i , is the number that solves

$$\theta_i + (m_i - p_i) = m_i$$

because paying p_i and having the public good (crossing guard) leaves them just as well off as they are without the public good. In particular, $p_i = \theta_i$. A social choice rule is ex post efficient if for all θ such that $\sum_i \theta_i = \sum_i p_i > C$, $f(\theta)$ has $y = 1$, and if $\sum_i \theta_i = \sum_i p_i < C$, $f(\theta)$ has $y = 0$.

The general form of a political decision process involves each family i picking an m_i in some set M_i ("M" for Message). Since the M_i at this point are rather abstract, this seems to cover all of the relevant territory — M_i might include canvassing the neighbors, putting

up placards, calling city hall, sacrificing chickens to the traffic gods, whatever. However, we think that contributions to the crossing guard fund are voluntary, so the M_i should include an m_i^0 corresponding to “ i will make no contribution,” and if m_i^0 is played, then family i makes no contribution. A strategy for family i is a point in $A_i = M_i^{\{\theta_L, \theta_H\}}$. A vector s of strategies gives a mapping from Θ to $\times_{i \in I} M_i$. A mechanism is a mapping, $\mathcal{M}$, from $\times_{i \in I} M_i$ to allocations. Putting these together, each strategy gives a mapping from Θ to allocations. Since allocations have associated utilities, $s \mapsto E u_i(\mathcal{M}(s))$, we have a game. Since a given s leads to a distribution over the terminal nodes and it is $E u$ that is maximized, the equilibria for these games are sometimes called **Bayesian Nash** equilibria.

Since no-one can be forced to pay, the mechanism must have the property that for any m with $m_i = m_i^0$, then i ’s part of the allocation in $\mathcal{M}(m)$ involves i not paying. One interesting kind of question is whether or not there exist any mechanisms with the property that the equilibrium of the corresponding game is ex post efficient. At first glance, this seems impossibly difficult to answer, after all, there are no restrictions on the M_i nor the $\mathcal{M}$ besides the existence of a “no pay” option. However, there is a result, called the **Revelation Principle**, that allows us to study this question with some hope of success.

Some terminology: a social choice rule $f(\cdot)$ is **implemented by a mechanism** $\mathcal{M}$ if there is an equilibrium s^* such that $\forall \theta \in \Theta, \mathcal{M}(s^*(\theta)) = f(\theta)$. We are trying to answer the question “Which social choice rules are implementable?”

Intuition: when a family of type θ_i plays in a pure strategy equilibrium, s^* , they play $m_i = s_i^*(\theta_i)$. We can, if we wish, interpret any given $s_i^*(\theta_i)$ as if the family had said θ_i . Equivalently, we can imagine a mechanism that asks the family for their θ_i and guarantees that if told θ_i , $s_i^*(\theta_i)$ will be played. Since the mechanism delivers the same allocation, they family is just as happy revealing their true willingness to pay.

It’s important not to get too excited here — everyone truthfully revealing their types is possible, but only if it is part of an equilibrium. It is still the case that if revealing their type hurts them, they won’t do it. In particular, everyone must have the option of not paying.

Formally, replace each M_i with the simpler two point space, $M'_i = \{\theta_L, \theta_H\}$, and define a simpler mechanism, $\mathcal{M}'(\theta) = \mathcal{M}(s^*(\theta))$. Let $f(\cdot)$ be the mapping from Θ to allocations induced by s^* and $\mathcal{M}$, equivalently, by truth-telling and $\mathcal{M}'$, and let us examine the implications for $f(\cdot)$ of these strategies being an equilibrium.

First, it must be the case that $\forall i \in I, E u_i(f) \geq w_i$. If this is not true, then s^* is not an equilibrium because the family has the option of playing the strategy $s'_i \equiv m_i^0$, which delivers an expected utility greater than or equal to w_i . These conditions, one for each $i \in I$, are called **individual rationality (IR)** constraints. Second, after seeing any θ_i , the expected utility to reporting θ_i to $\mathcal{M}'$ must be at least as large as reporting any $\theta'_i \neq \theta_i$. If this is not true, then s^* is not an equilibrium, after all, one of the options with the original mechanism is to play $s'_i(\theta_i) = s^*(\theta'_i)$, but it is an equilibrium to play $s_i^*(\theta_i)$. In terms of $f(\cdot)$, it must be the case that for all $i \in I, E u_i(\mathcal{M}'(\theta \setminus \theta_i)) \geq E u_i(\mathcal{M}'(\theta \setminus \theta'_i))$ for all θ'_i . These

conditions are called **incentive compatibility (IC)** constraints.

The IR and IC constraints must be satisfied if f is implementable. If f satisfies the constraints, then it is implementable by the truth telling strategies in the simpler game described above. Therefore

Theorem 4.3 *The social choice rule $f(\cdot)$ is implementable if and only if it is feasible and satisfies the IR and IC constraints.*

Now the real work starts, what's implementable?

Problem 4.15 *Suppose that $\sum_i \theta_H > C > \sum_i \theta_L$ and $f(\cdot)$ is the unanimity rule, “hire the guard and spread the cost evenly between the families only when all report θ_H .” Show that $f(\cdot)$ is implementable but not generally efficient.*

Problem 4.16 *Suppose that f is the rule, “hire the guard and spread the cost evenly among those reporting θ_H only when the sum of the reported θ_H 's is greater than C .” Is this implementable? Efficient?*

Problem 4.17 *The following pivotal voter rule satisfies the IR and IC constraints, but may not be feasible, and may collect more money than is needed to finance the project.*

$$f_i(\theta_1, \dots, \theta_I) = \begin{cases} (1, w_i - \theta_i) & \text{if } \sum_{j \neq i} \theta_j \geq C, \\ (1, w_i - (C - \sum_{j \neq i} \theta_j)) & \text{if } C - \theta_i \leq \sum_{j \neq i} \theta_j < C, \\ (0, w_i) & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

Let $y^*(\theta_1, \dots, \theta_I) = 1$ if $\sum_k \theta_k \geq C$, 0 otherwise. Let $\tilde{\theta}_{-i}$ denote the random realization of the type of families other than i . Define a class of transfer functions, mechanisms if you will, depending on reported θ 's, by

$$t_i(\theta) = -E \sum_{j \neq i} \tilde{\theta}_j \cdot y^*(\theta_i, \tilde{\theta}_{-i}) + h_i(\theta_{-i}).$$

So far as equilibrium calculations are concerned, the $h_i(\theta_{-i})$ cannot affect anything, this from Lemma 1.4. When each i maximizes the first term, they are maximizing a term that we can think of as containing the sum of their externalities on other players, assuming that the other players truthfully reveal their own θ_j . When all players do this, the mechanism satisfies the IC constraints, by fooling with the $h_i(\cdot)$, it is also possible to take care of feasibility and budget balancing.

4.5.3 Monopolist selling to different types

Roughly 20% of the consumers of peanut butter buy 80% of the peanut butter that is sold. Roughly the same is true for hard liquor and wine. These are goods that are sold in larger and smaller quantities, and it is usually the case that the per unit price is cheaper for the larger quantities.⁹ One explanation for this phenomenon is that the per unit packaging cost is smaller for the larger containers, after all, volume goes as the cube of dimension while packaging goes as the square. However, that is too prosaic an explanation for our present tastes and purposes, so we are going to look for another explanation.

Suppose that there are two types of consumers of peanut butter, good x , and that they are described by the two utility functions,

$$u_l(x, w) = r_l v(x) + w, \quad u_h(x, w) = r_h v(x) + w,$$

where $0 < r_l < r_h$, $v(\cdot)$ is a differentiable, strictly concave, strictly increasing function satisfying $v(0) = 0$ (a harmless normalization), $\lim_{x \rightarrow \infty} v'(x) = 0$ (the consumer eventually grows tired of peanut butter), $\lim_{x \downarrow 0} r_l v'(x) > c$ where c is the marginal cost of producing peanut butter (the type l consumer's marginal utility of peanut butter is larger than the marginal cost of peanut butter if they have nearly none of it), and w represents wealth to spend on other items in the consumer's life. In the x - w plane, the slopes of the indifference curves are

$$\frac{dw}{dx} = -\frac{\frac{\partial u_l}{\partial x}}{\frac{\partial u_l}{\partial w}} = -\frac{r_l v'(x)}{1} = -r_l v'(x), \quad \frac{dw}{dx} = -\frac{\frac{\partial u_h}{\partial x}}{\frac{\partial u_h}{\partial w}} = -\frac{r_h v'(x)}{1} = -r_h v'(x),$$

so that the indifference curve of the h type through any point (x, w) is strictly steeper than the indifference curve of the l type through the same point. This is the famous **single-crossing property** — the indifference curves of the different types cross at most a single time.

Before advancing to the fancy explanation for two sizes, let us suppose that you were a monopolist selling to one of these types, that you knew their type, t , and that your marginal cost of production is c . You are going to choose a size, q , to sell and a \$ price p to charge the consumer. The profit maximization problem is

$$\max_{p,q} p - cq \text{ subject to } u_t(q, w - p) \geq u(0, w^\circ), \quad t = l, h$$

where w° is the initial wealth of the consumer. Notice that revenues are p , not p times q here, p is a dollar price, not a dollar per unit price. The constraint comes from the

⁹This is much less true at my local grocery store than it was at the local grocery stores of my youth.

observation that consumer can always not buy peanut butter (just as they could always opt out of paying for the public good above). The Lagrangean for this problem is

$$\mathcal{L}(p, q; \lambda) = p - cq - \lambda[w^\circ - (r_t v(q) + w^\circ - p)] = p - cq + \lambda[r_t v(q) - p] \quad t = l, h.$$

Since $\lim_{x \downarrow 0} r_l v'(x) > c$, the solution is interior, and it is clear that the constraint is binding, therefore the Kuhn-Tucker conditions reduce to

$$\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial p} = 1 - \lambda = 0, \quad \frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial q} = -c + \lambda r_t v'(q) = 0, \quad \frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial \lambda} = r_t v(q) - p = 0.$$

The first two equations say that marginal utility is equal to marginal cost. This means that it is Pareto efficient for the monopolist to be able to tell the consumers apart. This is no surprise, this is the famous case of the perfectly discriminating monopolist. The third equation says that the solution lies on the indifference curve of type t through their initial holdings, w° . It is easy to show that at solutions (p_l, q_l) and (p_h, q_h) to this pair of problems, $q_l < q_h$, and that there are $v(\cdot)$ such that $p_l/q_l > p_h/q_h$, that is, it is always the case that the l types are given smaller quantities than the h types, and it is sometimes the case that they pay a higher per unit cost than the h types.

Problem 4.18 *Show it is always the case that the l types are given smaller quantities than the h types, and it is sometimes the case that they pay a higher per unit cost than the h types.*

We are going to assume that $p_l/q_l > p_h/q_h$ (because I like this case better, but it really doesn't matter), and examine what happens when the monopolist cannot distinguish the types of consumers from each other. The starting point is

Problem 4.19 *Show that $u_h(p_l, q_l) > u_h(p_h, q_h)$.*

In words, the h type consumers would prefer to consume the l type's q_l at \$ price p_l . Now, the monopolist extracts all the surplus from the consumers when s/he can distinguish between them. However, if the h types can lie about their type and get the (p_l, q_l) combination, they will. The monopolist might try all kinds of complicated mechanisms to get the consumers to reveal their types so as to extract more from them, but by the revelation principle, any and all such mechanisms must be reduceable to maximizing profits subject to IR and IC constraints. Letting N_l and N_h represent the numbers of l and h types respectively, the monopolist's problem is

$$\max_{(p_l, q_l), (p_h, q_h)} N_l(p_l - cq_l) + N_h(p_h - cq_h) \text{ subject to}$$

$$u_l(p_l, q_l) \geq w^\circ, \quad u_h(p_h, q_h) \geq w^\circ,$$

$$u_l(p_l, q_l) \geq u_l(p_h, q_h), \quad u_h(p_h, q_h) \geq u_h(p_l, q_l).$$

The first line of constraints are the IR constraints, the second line are the IC constraints.

Problem 4.20 Letting $\alpha = N_l/(N_l + N_h)$, find how the solutions to the above problem vary as a function of $\alpha \in [0, 1]$.

4.5.4 Efficiency in sales and the revelation principle

Buyers are interested in getting what they want at minimal cost and sellers are interested in selling so dearly as possible. The most the buyer is willing to pay and the least the seller is willing to accept are private information. When a buyer and seller get together, they go through posturing of various (culture dependent) types until they either strike a deal or walk away. The equilibrium of the game provides a map from their private information to the final outcome. This suppression of the strategies is very useful. It means that we do not need to understand anything about how the bargaining actually works, we just need the association between outcomes and private info.

We're going to go through the revelation principle logic for this specific context: If the mapping from private info to the final outcome was the result of an equilibrium, then we could just enter the private info into the mapping and ask about the utility properties of the final outcome at the end. In particular, both the buyer and the seller, if they knew they were submitting their private info to such a mapping, would be perfectly happy to reveal their true private info. After all, if they would be happier revealing some other value of their private info and thereby getting some other outcome, then they could have acted that way in the original game, and gotten that other outcome. But we had an equilibrium, so they cannot like the other outcome better. This is called the **revelation principle**. It is widely used.

Also, since neither can be forced to trade, the outcomes must be at least as good as the walk-away utility. You need to be careful about this constraint, mostly it is sensible, sometimes it is not.

Problem 4.21 A used car salesman and a potential buyer negotiate over the price of an old car. With probability b , the buyer values the car at \$500, with probability $(1 - b)$, she values it at \$1,000, $0 < b < 1$. The salesman's valuation is independent of the buyer's. With probability s , he values the car at \$250, with probability $(1 - s)$, he values it at \$750, $0 < s < 1$. The von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions of the salesman and the buyer are linear in the difference between their valuation of the car and the money they receive or pay. Further, the buyer's and the seller's valuation are private information, known to them before they consider buying or selling. Find the set of (s, b) pairs for which efficient trade can be attained as an equilibrium outcome. Evaluate the tradeoff between potential gains from trade and efficiency.

4.5.5 Shrinkage of the equilibrium set

In many games, getting rid of weakly dominated strategies shrinks the equilibrium set. Before returning to the more powerful iterated deletion kinds of arguments, it is worth being specific about how much shrinkage has been going on. For example, in the monopolist example, one kind of equilibrium involves both types of consumers playing the strategy “we won’t buy unless we are getting our favorite quantities at marginal cost.” One monopolist best response to these strategies is to produce the corresponding quantities at marginal cost. The consumer strategies are in turn best responses to the monopolist best response, so we have an equilibrium in which the monopolist, the agent with more power, the agent that decides before the consumers decide, getting nothing. The equilibrium set is actually much larger than just indicated — take any pair (p'_l, q'_l) , (p'_h, q'_h) in which production costs are covered. If the consumers weakly prefer these points to their initial endowments, they can be equilibrium outcomes. However, the consumer strategies just given are weakly dominated.

4.6 Weak dominance with respect to sets

The examples in §4.5 did not require iterated deletion, but some of the games in §4.4 did. Iterated deletion looks at the dominance relations that appear with smaller sets of strategies, and this idea of dominance relations that appear with smaller sets of strategies becomes even more powerful when we look at the self-referential tests for dominance.

4.6.1 Variants on iterated deletion of dominated sets

A strategy $\sigma_i \in \Delta_i$ **dominates (or strongly dominates)** $t_i \in A_i$ **relative to** $T \subset \Delta$ if

$$(\forall \sigma^\circ \in T)[u_i(\sigma^\circ \setminus \sigma_i) > u_i(\sigma^\circ \setminus t_i)].$$

If $T = \Delta$, this is the previous definition of dominance. Let $D_i(T)$ denote the set of $t_i \in A_i$ that are dominated relative to T . Smaller T ’s make the condition easier to satisfy.

In a similar fashion, a strategy $\sigma_i \in \Delta_i$ **weakly dominates** $t_i \in A_i$ **relative to** $T \subset \Delta$ if

$$(\forall \sigma^\circ \in T)[u_i(\sigma^\circ \setminus \sigma_i) \geq u_i(\sigma^\circ \setminus t_i)], \text{ and} \\ (\exists \sigma' \in T)[u_i(\sigma' \setminus \sigma_i) > u_i(\sigma' \setminus t_i)].$$

Let $WD_i(T)$ denote the set of $t_i \in A_i$ that are weakly dominated relative to T .

Lemma 4.4 *If Γ is finite, then for all $T \subset \Delta$, $A_i \setminus D_i(T) \neq \emptyset$ and $A_i \setminus WD_i(T) \neq \emptyset$.*

This is not true when Γ is infinite.

Problem 4.22 Two variants of ‘pick the largest integer’.

1. $\Gamma = (A_i, u_i)_{i \in I}$ where $I = \{1, 2\}$, $A_i = \mathbb{N}$, $u_i(n_i, n_j) = 1$ if $n_i > n_j$, and $u_i(n_i, n_j) = 0$ otherwise. Every strategy is weakly dominated, and the game has no equilibrium.
2. $\Gamma = (A_i, v_i)_{i \in I}$ where $I = \{1, 2\}$, $A_i = \mathbb{N}$, and $v_i(n_i, n_j) = \Phi(n_i - n_j)$, $\Phi(\cdot)$ being the cdf of a non-degenerate Gaussian distribution, every strategy is strongly dominated (hence the game has no equilibrium).

We are now going to rephrase the iterated deletion of dominated strategies as the passing of a sequence of tests: For $E \subset Eq(\Gamma)$ and $T \subset \Delta$, E **passes a T -test** if

$$(\forall \sigma \in E)(\forall i \in I)[\sigma_i(D_i(T)) = 0].$$

For example, E passes a Δ -test if no element of E puts mass on a dominated strategy.

Iteration sets $S_i^1 = A_i$, defines $\Delta^n = \times_{i \in I} \Delta(S_i^n)$, and if S^n has been defined, set $S_i^{n+1} = S_i^n \setminus D_i(\Delta^n)$. If Γ is finite, then Lemma 4.4 implies

$$(\exists N)(\forall n, n' \geq N)[S_i^n = S_i^{n'} \neq \emptyset].$$

There are many variations on this iterative-deletion-of-dominated-strategies theme. In all of them, $A_i^1 = \Delta_i$.

1. $S_i^{n+1} = S_i^n \setminus D_i(\Delta^n)$. If this reduces the strategy sets to singletons, then the game is **dominance solvable** (a term due to Herve Moulin).
2. $S_i^{n+1} = S_i^n \setminus WD_i(\Delta^n)$ where $WD_i(T)$ is the set of strategies weakly dominated with respect to T .
3. Set $S_i^2 = S_i^1 \setminus WD_i(\Delta^1)$, and for $n \geq 2$, set $S_i^{n+1} = S_i^n \setminus D_i(\Delta^n)$. [2], [1] show that the most that can be justified by appealing to common knowledge of the structure of the game and common knowledge of expected utility maximization is this kind of iterated deletion procedure.

4.6.2 Self-referential tests

These iterated procedures become really powerful when we make them self-referential. Let us ask if a set of equilibria, $E \subset Eq(\Gamma)$, is “sensible” or “internally consistent” by asking if it passes an E -test. This kind of self-referential test is called an **equilibrium dominance test**. Verbally, this makes (some kind of) sense because, if everyone knows that only equilibria in a set E are possible, then everyone knows that no-one will play any strategy that

is either weakly dominated or that is strongly dominated *relative to E itself*. That is, E should survive an E -test.

There is a problem with this idea, one that can be solved by restricting attention to a class $\mathcal{E}$ of subsets of $Eq(\Gamma)$. The class $\mathcal{E}$ is the class of closed and connected¹⁰ subsets of $Eq(\Gamma)$.


Formally, fix a set $E \subset Eq(\Gamma)$, set $S_i^1 = A_i$, $E^1 = E$, given A_i^n for each $i \in I$, set $\Delta^n = \times_{i \in I} \Delta(S_i^n)$, and iteratively define S_i^{n+1} by

$$S_i^{n+1} = S_i^n \setminus \{D_i(\Delta^n) \cup D_i(E^n)\}.$$

$E \in \mathcal{E}$ **passes the iterated equilibrium dominance test** if at each stage in the iterative process, there exists a non-empty $E^{n+1} \in \mathcal{E}$, $E^{n+1} \subset E^n$, such that for all $\sigma \in E^{n+1}$ and for all $i \in I$, $\sigma_i(\{D_i(\Delta^n) \cup D_i(E^n)\}) = 0$. We will examine the workings of this logic first in a “horse” game, then in a class of games known as signaling games.

4.6.3 A horse game

These games are called horse games because the game tree looks like a stick figure horse, not because they were inspired by stories about the Wild West.



There are three sets of equilibria for this game, Listing 1's and 2's probabilities of playing D_1 and D_2 first, and listing 3's probability of playing L_3 first, the equilibrium set can be

¹⁰If you've had a reasonable amount of real analysis or topology, you will know what the terms “closed” and “connected” mean. We will talk about them in more detail later. Intuitively, you can draw a connected set (in our context) without taking your pencil off of the paper.

partitioned into $Eq(\Gamma) = E_A \cup E_B \cup E_C$,

$$E_A = \{((0, 1), (0, 1), (\gamma, 1 - \gamma)) : \gamma \geq 5/11\}$$

where the condition on γ comes from $15 \geq 9\gamma + 20(1 - \gamma)$,

$$E_B = \{((1, 0), (\beta, 1 - \beta), (1, 0)) : \beta \geq \frac{1}{2}\}$$

where the condition on β comes from $15 \geq 10\beta + 20(1 - \beta)$, and

$$E_C = \{((0, 1), (1, 0), (0, 1))\}.$$

Note that $\mathbb{O}(\cdot)$ is constant on the sets E_A , E_B , and E_C . In particular, this means that for any $\sigma, \sigma' \in E_k$, $u(\sigma) = u(\sigma')$. I assert without proof that the E_k are closed connected sets.¹¹

There are no weakly dominated strategies for this game:

1. $u_1(s \setminus D_1) = (15, 15, 0, 0)$ while $u_1(s \setminus A_1) = (10, 20, 30, 20)$ so no weakly dominated strategies for 1,
2. $u_2(s \setminus D_2) = (40, 9, 50, 20)$ while $u_2(s \setminus A_2) = (40, 15, 50, 15)$ so no weakly dominated strategies for 2,
3. $u_3(s \setminus L_3) = (10, 0, 10, 30)$ while $u_3(s \setminus R_3) = (0, 1, 0, 3)$ so no weakly dominated strategies for 3.


Each E_k survives iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies. However, E_A and E_B do not survive self-referential tests, while E_C does.

1. E_A — the strategy D_1 is dominated for 1 **relative to** E_A . Removing D_1 makes L_3 weakly dominated for 3, but every $\sigma \in E_A$ puts mass on the deleted strategy, violating the iterative condition for self-referential tests. (We could go further, removing L_3 make A_2 dominated for 2, and every $\sigma \in E_A$ puts mass on A_2 .)
2. E_B — the strategy R_3 is dominated for 3 relative to E_B , removing R_3 make D_2 weakly dominated for 2, meaning that every $\sigma \in E_B$ puts mass on the deleted strategy, violating the iterative condition for self-referential tests.

¹¹Intuitively, the sets are closed because they are defined by weak inequalities, and they are connected because, if you were to draw them, you could move between any pair of points in any of the E_k without lifting your pencil.

The set E_C contains only one point, and it is easy to check that 1 point survives iterated deletion of strategies that are either weakly dominated or weakly dominated relative to E_C .

Problem 4.23 For the following horse game, partition $Eq(\Gamma)$ into closed and connected sets on which $\mathbb{O}(\cdot)$ is constant and find which of the elements of the partition survive the iterative condition for self-referential tests.



4.6.4 Generalities about signaling games (redux)

A **signaling game** is one in which the first player to move, known as the Sender, has some private information, known as their type. On the basis of that private information, the Sender takes an action, known as a signal, which is seen by the second player, known as the Receiver. On the basis of the signal they have seen but not on the basis of the unobserved type of the Sender, the Receiver takes an action and the game ends. Utilities depend on the type of the Sender, the signal, and the action taken by the Receiver. The Sender may have incentives to mislead the Receiver, and the incentives may vary depending on their type. The Receiver has incentives to infer the Sender's type, incentives that may vary depending on the signal. Three examples:


1. (Spence's labor market model) Potential employees, Senders, know their own type better than their potential employers, the Receiver, and they cannot credibly communicate their type — after all, every potential type of Sender would say that they are marvelous, and when everyone says the same thing about themselves, it carries no weight. However, potential employees have a variety of signaling devices available to them, most prominently the amount of schooling they choose before applying for

a job. If you believe that the marvelous potential employees suffer less while getting (say) a college degree, then the potential employer might want to offer a wage schedule that depends on whether or not the applicant has a degree. One can imagine that the wage schedule might give incentives for the marvelous types to go to college and the others not to go to college. This is called a **sorting equilibrium**, the different types sort themselves by signal. Some comments:

- (a) A sorting equilibrium could make schooling valuable for the potential employees whether or not they learn anything relevant to their future job. This is a story about schooling as a sorting device rather than as an institution that teaches valuable skills.
 - (b) To the extent that higher education is a sorting rather than a training device, figures on the private returns to education overestimate the social return to education.
 - (c) Given differential access to colleges, the sorting equilibrium also provides employers a legal avenue to discriminate, they simply claim that the job requires a B.A.
2. (Entry deterrence) Consider a market with an incumbent firm and a potential entrant. The incumbent's cost structure is private information. The incumbent would like to convince the potential entrant that the cost structure is low so that the potential entrant will stay out. There are many potential signals the incumbent could use to convince the entrant, for example, a large advertising campaign that only an incumbent with a low cost structure would want to undertake. After seeing the incumbent's signal, the potential entrant tries to infer something about the cost structure. A **pooling equilibrium** involves all the different types of incumbents choosing the same signal. In this case, the low and the high cost incumbents are pooled together in the mind of the potential entrant, providing camouflage for the high cost incumbents.
3. (Suing for damages) Take another look at the Felicia game.

4.6.5 Revisiting a specific entry-deterrence signaling game

We're going to revisit the game given by Cho and Kreps (1987).



There is a fellow who, on 9 out of every 10 days on average, rolls out of bed like Popeye on spinach. When he does this we call him “strong.” When strong, this fellow likes nothing better than Beer for breakfast. On the other days he rolls out of bed like a graduate student recovering from a comprehensive exam. When he does this we call him “weak.” When weak, this fellow likes nothing better than Quiche for breakfast. In the town where this schizoid personality lives, there is also a swaggering bully. Swaggering bullies are cowards who, as a result of deep childhood traumas, need to impress their peers by picking on others. Being a coward, he would rather pick on someone weak. He makes his decision about whether to pick, p , or not, n , after having observed what the schizoid had for breakfast.

We are going to solve this game in two different fashions, the first works with the normal form, the second uses what is called the agent normal form. The agent normal form corresponds to a different version of the motivating story above, and solving it by iterated deletion requires the use of self-referential tests.

Working in the normal form

Taking expectations over Nature’s move, the 4×4 normal form for this game is

$(st, wk) \backslash (b, q)$	(p, p)	(p, n)	(n, p)	(n, n)
(b, b)	$(9, -8)$	$(9, -8)$	$(29, 0)$	$(29, 0)$
(b, q)	$(10, -8)$	$(12, -9)$	$(28, 1)$	$(30, 0)$
(q, b)	$(0, -8)$	$(18, 1)$	$(2, -8)$	$(20, 0)$
(q, q)	$(1, -8)$	$(21, 0)$	$(1, -8)$	$(21, 0)$

The equilibrium set for this game can be partitioned into E_1 and E_2 where

$$E_1 = \{((q, q), (0, \beta, 0, 1 - \beta)) : 21 \geq 12\beta + 30(1 - \beta), \text{ i.e. } \beta \geq \frac{1}{2}\},$$

and

$$E_2 = \{((b, b), (0, 0, \beta, 1 - \beta)) : 29 \geq 28\beta + 30(1 - \beta) \text{ i.e. } \beta \geq \frac{1}{2}\}.$$

Note that $\mathbb{O}(\cdot)$ is constant on the two closed and connected sets E_1 and E_2 , so that once again, the players are indifferent to points within the sets E_k . The quiche-eating set of equilibria, E_1 , is not intuitive. Any $\sigma \in E_1$ corresponds to the weak type hiding behind the shadow of the strong type, but the strong type not getting what they want. Iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies kills all of E_1 and all but one point in E_2 .

The strategy (p, p) is strictly dominated by (n, n) for the bully, the strategy (q, b) is strictly dominated by $\frac{1}{4}$ on (b, q) , $\frac{3}{4}$ on (q, q) . Eliminating these gives the game

(st, wk) \ (b, q)	(p, n)	(n, p)	(n, n)
(b, b)	(9, -8)	(29, 0)	(29, 0)
(b, q)	(12, -9)	(28, 1)	(30, 0)
(q, q)	(21, 0)	(1, -8)	(21, 0)

In this game, (n, n) weakly dominates (p, n) for 2, and once (p, n) is eliminated, (b, b) and (b, q) strongly dominated (q, q) for 1. Eliminating these gives the game

(st, wk) \ (b, q)	(n, p)	(n, n)
(b, b)	(29, 0)	(29, 0)
(b, q)	(28, 1)	(30, 0)


In this game, (n, p) weakly dominates (n, n) , once (n, n) is removed, (b, b) is 1's strict best response, so the only equilibrium to survive iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies is $((b, b), (n, p))$, i.e. both types have Beer for breakfast and the Bully leaves anyone having Beer alone, but picks a fight with anyone having Quiche for breakfast.

Working in the agent normal form

Consider the following, rather different version of the same basic story: 9 out of every 10 days on average, a stranger who feels like Glint Westwood¹² comes into town. We call such

¹²A mythical Hollywood quasi-hero, who, by strength, trickiness and vile cigars, single-handedly overcomes huge obstacles, up to and including bands of 20 heavily armed professional killers.

strangers “strong.” Strong strangers like nothing better than Beer (and a vile cigar) for breakfast. On the other days, a different kind of stranger comes to town, one who feels like a graduate student recovering from a comprehensive exam. We call such strangers “weak.” Weak strangers like nothing better than Quiche for breakfast. Strong and weak strangers are not distinguishable to anyone but themselves. In the town frequented by breakfast-eating strangers, there is also a swaggering bully. Swaggering bullies are cowards who, as a result of deep childhood traumas, need to impress their peers by picking on others. Being a coward, he would rather pick on someone weak. He makes his decision about whether to pick, p , or not, n , after having observed what the stranger had for breakfast. With payoffs listed in the order 1_{st} , 1_{wk} , 2 and normalizing strangers’ payoffs to 0 when they are not breakfasting in this town, the game tree is



This game has three players (four if you include Nature), 1_{st} (aka Glint), 1_{wk} (aka the weak stranger), and 2 (aka the Bully). In principle, we could also split the Bully into two different people depending on whether or not they observed Beer or Quiche being eaten. The logic is that we are the sum of our experiences, and if our experiences are different, then we are different people. If we did this second agent splitting, we would have the game in what is called **agent normal form**. In this game, instead of putting 0's as the utilities for the strangers' when they are not breakfasting in this town, we could have made 1_{st} 's utility equal to 1_{wk} 's even when they are out of town. Since we are changing utilities by adding a function that depends only on what someone else is doing, this cannot change anything about the equilibrium set.

More generally, to give the agent normal form for an extensive form game, 1) for each $H \in U_i \in P_i$ (go back and look at the notation for extensive form games if you have already forgotten it), we invent a new agent i_H , 2) we assign all “copies” of each i the same utility at each terminal node. This is a bit confusing — we are acting as if these are different people, but they are different people with exactly the same preferences. There are two reasons for this confusing choice:

1. It leads to Kuhn’s theorem, an extremely important result that we will get to in a while.
2. We would like the sets of equilibrium outcomes to be the same in the original game and in the agent normal form version of the game. In the signaling game above, since no players’ information sets ever precede each other, the different copies having different utilities didn’t matter. It would matter if 1_{st} made a choice that impacted 1_{wk} ’s utility and subsequent choices.

2 still has a dominated strategy, (p, p) . By varying 2’s strategy amongst the remaining 3, we can make either Beer or Quiche be a strict best response for both strangers. This means that no strategies are dominated for the strangers, and iterated deletion of dominated strategies stops after one round.

Again, the equilibrium set for this game can be partitioned into two sets, E_1 and E_2 , but note that we must now specify 3 strategies,

$$E_1 = \{((q), (q), (0, \beta, 0, 1 - \beta)) : 21 \geq 12\beta + 30(1 - \beta), \text{ i.e. } \beta \geq \frac{1}{2}\},$$

and

$$E_2 = \{((b), (b), (0, 0, \beta, 1 - \beta)) : 29 \geq 28\beta + 30(1 - \beta) \text{ i.e. } \beta \geq \frac{1}{2}\}.$$

Again, $\mathbb{O}(\cdot)$ is constant on the two closed and connected sets E_1 and E_2 .

However, the self-referential tests do eliminate E_1 — for 1_{wk} , Beer is dominated relative to E_1 , after removing Beer for 1_{wk} , (p, n) is weakly dominated for 2, implying that no $\sigma \in E_1$ survives the iterative steps. It is fairly easy to check (and you should do it) that E_2 does survive the iterative steps of the self-referential tests.

Morals about the difference between a game and its agent normal form

First, whether or not we should use a particular game, its agent normal form, or some hybrid (as above where we did not split player 2) depends on what story we are telling. Games boil away a great deal of contextual detail, this is the source of their power as story-telling devices. Trying to make a blanket pronouncement about which form is generally

correct is like trying to decide, on the basis of the game matrix, which of the Partners (in the Battle of the Partners coordination game) is dominant in the sphere of week-end entertainment. This is a ridiculous exercise, both because any answer must be intellectually bankrupt, and because any answer would lessen our ability to explain.

Second, even though the set of equilibrium outcomes is the same in a game and in the agent normal form of the game, splitting agents makes a huge difference to the power of iterated deletion arguments, even in games where the copies of an agent do not play after each other.

4.7 Kuhn's Theorem

In the normal form of the Beer-Quiche game, there were 4 pure strategies, implying that the set of mixed strategies is 3-dimensional. When we looked at the agent normal form, the two versions of player 1, 1_{st} and 1_{wk} , had 1-dimensional sets of mixed strategies. If we can show that every one of the 3-dimensional mixed strategies can be replicated by stochastically independent choices by 1_{st} and 1_{wk} , then we can save one dimension in our analysis of the equilibria. The content of Kuhn's theorem is that we can replicate any mixed strategy by use of stochastically independent choices made in the agent normal form of the game.

Saving one dimension may not seem like much, there are other games in which the savings are immense.


Problem 4.24 *Let Γ be a 2×2 game. Play Γ repeatedly, say for n times, and at the end of each play of the game, suppose that each player observes the complete previous play of the game.*

1. *Draw a game tree to represent this situation for $n = 2$.*
2. *As a function of n , give the number of pure strategies for player i .*
3. *Again as a function of n , give the dimensionality of the space of strategies in the agent normal form.*

A **behavior strategy** for i , b_i , is a mapping from i 's information sets, the $H \in U_i$, U_i a partition of P_i , to distributions over the actions available at the information set. The probabilities, $b_i(\cdot|U_i)$ and $b_i(\cdot|U'_i)$, $U_i \neq U'_i$, are interpreted as stochastically independent. This is just as if agents at all information sets were different. One way to understand behavioral strategies is that they are "local" randomizations, local to the information set. A mixed strategies is a global randomization, a once and for all randomization over contingent plans.

It is clear that any behavioral strategy specifies a distribution over pure strategies. To talk of replacing mixed strategies by equivalent behavioral strategies, we must say what it means for strategies to be equivalent. Two mixed strategies σ'_i and σ''_i are **equivalent in an extensive form game** if for all $\sigma \in A$ and for decision nodes x , $\mathbb{O}(\sigma \setminus \sigma'_i | x) = \mathbb{O}(\sigma \setminus \sigma''_i | x)$.

Problem 4.25 In the following game, verify that for every mixed strategy σ'_1 for player, there is a behavioral strategy, b'_1 , with the property that for all σ and all non-terminal nodes x , $\mathbb{O}(\sigma \setminus \sigma'_1 | x) = \mathbb{O}(\sigma \setminus b'_1 | x)$.



Fix a mixed strategy σ_i for i . We are going to use σ_i to **generate** a behavioral strategy b_i that is equivalent to σ_i . For $H \in U_i$, let

$$R_i(H) = \{a_i \in A_i : (\exists s' \in A)[\mathbb{O}(s' \setminus s)(Z(H)) > 0]\}$$

where $Z(H)$ is the set of terminal nodes that follow H . In words, $R_i(H)$ is the set of i 's strategies that do not absolutely preclude reaching H . If $\sigma_i(R_i(H)) > 0$, define

$$b_i(a_i | H) = \frac{\sigma_i(R_i(H) \cap \{a_i : s_i(H) = a_i\})}{\sigma_i(R_i(H))},$$

that is, $b_i(a_i | H)$ is the probability that a_i is chosen by i given that some pure strategy

possibly reaching H is played. If $\sigma_i(R_i(H)) = 0$, that is, σ_i precludes reaching H , define

$$b_i(a_i|H) = \sigma_i(\{a_i : s_i(H) = a_i\}),$$

that is, $b_i(a_i|H)$ is the probability that a_i is chosen by i at H without conditioning on having reached H .

Go through a couple of examples to show that the mapping from mixed strategies to behavioral strategies can be many-to-one, and to show that mixed strategies are equivalent to the behavioral strategies given above.

Theorem 4.5 (Kuhn) *Every mixed strategy σ_i is equivalent to its generated b_i , and each b_i is equivalent to any of the σ_i that generate it.*

4.8 Equivalence of games


There are innocuous transformations of games that should not affect our analysis of equilibria. The easiest of these involves clumping duplicate strategies together as one strategy. Two strategies are **duplicates** if no-one cares about the difference between the two. Formally,

Definition 4.6 *In a game $\Gamma = (A_i, u_i)_{i \in I}$, t_i and t'_i are **duplicates** if*

$$(\forall j \in I)(\forall s \in A)[u_j(s \setminus t_i) = u_j(s \setminus t'_i)].$$

Remember that in extensive form games, $u_i(s) = u_i(\odot(s))$, and duplicates work through the outcome function.

Consider the following version of the money-burning game.




Player 1's pure strategies are $A_1 = \{(Out, L), (Out, R), (In, L), (In, R)\}$. The 4×2 normal form for this game is

	l	r
(Out, L)	$(2, 9)$	$(2, 9)$
(Out, R)	$(2, 9)$	$(2, 9)$
(In, L)	$(5, 1)$	$(0, 0)$
(In, R)	$(0, 0)$	$(1, 5)$

It is pretty clear that (Out, L) and (Out, R) are duplicates. Let us give them one name, say Out . This gives the 3×2 normal form for this game is

	l	r
(Out)	$(2, 9)$	$(2, 9)$
(In, L)	$(5, 1)$	$(0, 0)$
(In, R)	$(0, 0)$	$(1, 5)$

The normal form that results from an extensive form game after duplicate strategies have been identified is called the **semi-reduced norm form**, so the 3×2 game is the semi-reduced normal form for the money burning game given above. It corresponds directly to the following (and other) extensive form games



The following contains a list of transformations of a game. Game theorists generally agree that these transformations do not change the structure of a semi-reduced normal form game, at least not too much. Notice that the list does **not** include splitting up an agent as we do when we look at the agent normal form of a game. We have seen that iterated deletion arguments have very different implications after such changes.

Theorem 4.7 Γ and Γ' have the same semi-reduced normal form if we can reach Γ' from Γ by applying a finite sequence of the following transformations or their inverses (given in parantheses).

1. Identifying (adding) duplicate strategies.

2. *Expanding (coalescing) a choice: Partition the action set $A(H)$ at H into A and $\bar{A}$, have the agent first choose between A and $\bar{A}$, and choose between the actions in A and the actions in $\bar{A}$.*
3. *Interchanging (interchanging) simultaneous moves.*
4. *Integrating out (adding moves by) Nature: If a chance move leads only to terminal nodes, replace this move and its terminal successors by a single terminal node with the corresponding expected payoffs.*
5. *Addition (subtraction) of a superfluous decision point: Let H be an information set at which i moves, $z \notin Z(H)$ a terminal node. If y precedes z , add a decision point $x \in H$ immediately before y such that after x , any action in $A(H)$ leads to a copy of y and such that no $j \neq i$ gets to hear which choice was taken at x .*

The **reduced normal form** of a game reverses all of the agent splitting that goes into making the agent normal form of a game. Go back to Problems 4.10. From it you can conclude that a solution concept for games that satisfies existence, invariance (a solution to a game is a solution to any game having the same reduced normal form), undominatedness (no player puts positive mass on a weakly dominated strategy), and iterated dominance (a solution to a game contains a solution of any game obtained by the deletion of a strategy which is dominated against the set), must violate the backward induction axiom, which states that

For any extensive form game, a solution of the normal form of that game contains a solution of the agent normal form of the game.

So, we have seen, several times now, that agent splitting, while being innocuous for the set of Nash equilibria, and even making it relatively easy (by Kuhn's theorem) to find the Nash equilibria, has very strong effects on the various subsets of equilibria that we study.

4.9 Some other problems

Your homework is any three of the following seven problems. I'd recommend that you look at all of them well enough to know how to set them up.

Problem 4.26 *In the spying and coordination game, fully analyze the equilibrium sets of both games. [This means give the normal form, the agent normal form, the sets of Nash equilibria on which the outcome function is constant, the equilibria that survive iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies, and the equilibrium sets that survive the self-referential tests.]*

Problem 4.27 *In the going to war as a signal games, fully analyze the equilibrium sets. In particular, in comparing the two games with and without sleepers, evaluate the statement, “When spying is cheap, it lowers the probability of war.”*

Problem 4.28 *In the “same structure, less story” game, fully analyze the equilibrium set as a function of x .*

Problem 4.29 *A seller values an object at 0 and would like to sell to a potential buyer with a valuation that takes the value $a > 0$ with probability ρ , $0 < \rho < 1$, and takes the value $b > a$ with probability $1 - \rho$. Thus, for either of the potential buyer’s valuations, there is the possibility of mutually improving trade. The seller chooses a “take-it-or-leave-it” price, $p \in [0, \infty)$, and the buyer responds by accepting or rejecting the offer, ending the game.*

1. Characterize the pure strategy Nash equilibria of this game.
2. Characterize the pure strategy subgame perfect equilibria of this game.
3. When are the subgame perfect equilibria of this game **inefficient**?
4. Suppose that the game is changed so that, if the first offer is rejected, the buyer has the option to make a second offer, but that this offer will be the last. Supposing that payoffs are not discounted, evaluate the efficiency of the subgame perfect equilibria of this game.

Problem 4.30 *Consider a market with one incumbent firm and a potential entrant. The potential entrant has low costs with probability 0.2, and has high costs with probability 0.8. The actual costs (low or high) of the entrant are private information to the entrant, who decides whether to stay “out” or “enter.” The outside option for the low cost entrant has an expected utility of 25, while the outside option for the high cost entrant has an expected utility of 0. If the potential entrant stays out, then the incumbent has an expected utility of 25. If the potential entrant enters, then the incumbent decides whether to “fight” or “acquiesce.” If the incumbent fights, then the payoffs for the entrant and incumbent respectively are $(20, -25)$ when the entrant is low cost, and $(-10, 40)$ when the entrant is high cost. If the incumbent acquiesces, then the payoffs are $(40, 10)$ when the entrant is low cost, and $(20, 30)$ when the entrant is high cost.*

1. Give the extensive and normal forms for this game.
2. Partition the set of equilibria into closed and connected sets on which the outcome functions is constant.

3. Which of the closed and connected sets that you found survive iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies. Which survive the self-referential test?
4. Do your answers to the previous question change if you work in the agent normal form?

Problem 4.31 (Spence labor market model) An employer faces two types of employees, types $t = 1, 3$. An employee of type t produces t , that is, type has been identified with marginal product. The proportion of $t = 1$ employees is $q \in (0, 1)$, and the proportion of $t = 3$ employees is $1 - q$. The employer cannot observe a potential employee's type, but can observe the educational level obtained before the hiring decision occurs. Type t employees incur a utility cost of $E(9 - 3t)/2$ to acquire education level E .

1. Formulate this situation as a signaling game.
2. Give the pooling equilibrium or equilibria of the signaling game.
3. Give the separating equilibrium or equilibria.
4. Show that the self-referential tests may pick between the pooling and the separating cases.

Problem 4.32 Fully analyze the equilibrium of Felicia game with the self-referential techniques.

Chapter 5

Mathematics for Game Theory

We'll begin with a review of “real” numbers, trying to understand them as a special (very special) metric space built up from the rational numbers. This requires sequences, which we will also use to talk about limits, closure, continuity, and compactness. We will prove one fixed point theorem, the one known as the contraction mapping theorem, and we will discuss another one, Kakutani's fixed point theorem. This last one was designed for game theory, and directly implies the existence of Nash equilibria. With one additional step, it implies the existence of Hillas stable sets of equilibria. These are closed, connected sets of equilibria that survive self-referential tests. Hillas stable sets are always a subset of the perfect equilibria and always contain a proper equilibrium, and these two solution concepts will be treated with the tools developed here.

5.1 Rational numbers, sequences, real numbers

Intuitions about integers, denoted $\mathbb{N}$, are very strong, they have to do with counting things. Including 0 and the negative integers gives us $\mathbb{Z}$. The rationals, $\mathbb{Q}$, are the ratios m/n , $m, n \in \mathbb{Z}$, $n \neq 0$. We can do all physical measurements using $\mathbb{Q}$ because they have a denseness property — if $q, q' \in \mathbb{Q}$, $q \neq q'$, then there exists a q'' strictly between q and q' . (One visual image, if we were to imagine stretching the rational numbers out one after the other, nothing of any width whatever could get through.)

One of the theoretical problems with $\mathbb{Q}$ as a model of quantities is that there are easy geometric constructions that yield lengths that do not belong to $\mathbb{Q}$ — consider the length of the diagonal of a unit square, by Pythagoras' Theorem, this length is $\sqrt{2}$, if $\sqrt{2} = m/n$ for some $m, n \in \mathbb{N}$, $n \neq 0$, then by cancellation, we know that at most one of the integers m and n are even, however, cross multiplying and then squaring both sides of the equality gives $2n^2 = m^2$, so it must have been m that is even, but if m is even, it is of the form $2m'$ and $m^2 = 4(m')^2$ giving $2n^2 = 4(m')^2$ which is equivalent to $n^2 = 2(m')^2$, which implies that n

is even, $(\Rightarrow \Leftarrow)$. If you believe that all geometric lengths must exist, i.e. you believe in some kind of deep connection between numbers that we can imagine and physical measurements, this observation could upset you, and it might make you want to add some new “numbers” to $\mathbb{Q}$, at the very least to make geometry easier. The easiest way to add these new numbers is an example of a process called completing a metric space. It requires some preparation.

A **sequence** in a set X is a mapping from $\mathbb{N}$ to X . A sequence q^n in $\mathbb{Q}$ is a Cauchy sequence if

$$(\forall q > 0, q \in \mathbb{Q})(\exists M \in \mathbb{N})(\forall n, n' \geq M)[|x^n - x^{n'}| < q].$$

The set of all Cauchy sequences in $\mathcal{C}$. We say that two Cauchy sequences, x^n, y^n , in $\mathbb{Q}$ are equivalent if

$$(\forall q > 0, q \in \mathbb{Q})(\exists N \in \mathbb{N})(\forall n \geq M)[|x^n - y^n| < q].$$

The set of real numbers, $\mathbb{R}$, is, by definition, the set of equivalence classes of Cauchy sequences. For any Cauchy sequence x^n , $[x^n]$ denotes the Cauchy equivalence class. For example,

$$\sqrt{2} = [1, 1.4, 1.41, 1.414, 1.4142, 1.41421, 1.414213, \dots].$$

Notice that

$$\sqrt{2} = [1.5, 1.45, 1.415, 1.4145, 1.41425, 1.414215, 1.4142135, \dots]$$

because this second sequence is equivalent to the first one. The constant sequences are important, for any $q \in \mathbb{Q}$, we'll use the symbol “ q ” to mean the equivalence class of the constant sequence,

$$q = [q, q, q, \dots].$$

Looking at the constant sequences shows that we have imbedded $\mathbb{Q}$ in $\mathbb{R}$.

We understood addition, subtraction, multiplication, and division for $\mathbb{Q}$, we just extend our understanding in a fashion very close to the limit construction. Specifically,

$$[x^n] + [y^n] = [x^n + y^n], [x^n] \cdot [y^n] = [x^n \cdot y^n], [x^n]/[y^n] = [x^n/y^n], [x^n] - [y^n] = [x^n - y^n].$$

While these definitions seem immediately correct, to be thorough we must check that if x^n and y^n are Cauchy, then the sequences $x^n + y^n$, $x^n \cdot y^n$, x^n/y^n , and $x^n - y^n$ are also Cauchy. So long as we avoid division by 0, they are.

Problem 5.1 *Show that if x^n and y^n are Cauchy sequences in $\mathbb{Q}$, then the sequences $x^n + y^n$ and $x^n \cdot y^n$ are also Cauchy.*

The last problem doesn't quite finish the job of transferring our understandings of addition, subtraction, multiplication, and division to $\mathbb{R}$. What's missing is the statement that all sequences in any equivalence class are treated the same way.

Problem 5.2 Suppose that x^n and y^n are Cauchy sequences. If r^n is equivalent to x^n and s^n is equivalent to y^n , then $r^n + s^n$ is equivalent to $x^n + y^n$ and $r^n \cdot s^n$ is equivalent to $x^n \cdot y^n$.

If a function $f : \mathbb{Q} \rightarrow \mathbb{Q}$ has the property that $f(x^n)$ is a Cauchy sequence whenever x^n is a Cauchy sequence, then $f(\cdot)$ can be extended to a function $f : \mathbb{R} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ by defining $f([x^n]) = [f(x^n)]$. For example, Problem 5.1 implies that any polynomial $P(\cdot)$ with rational coefficients can be extended in this fashion. Letting the rational coefficients converge to real coefficients completes the rest of the story for polynomials.

Now it is time to extend the concepts of “greater than” and “less than” from $\mathbb{Q}$ to $\mathbb{R}$. We say that a number $r = [x^n] \in \mathbb{R}$ is greater than 0 (or strictly positive) if there exists a $q \in \mathbb{Q}$, $q > 0$, such that $(\exists N \in \mathbb{N})(\forall n \geq N)[q \leq x^n]$. We say that $[x^n] > [y^n]$ if $[x^n] - [y^n]$ is strictly positive. The set of strictly real numbers is denoted $\mathbb{R}_{++}$. Note that if $[x^n] > [y^n]$, then it is not the case that $[y^n] > [x^n]$. Further, if it not the case that $[x^n] > [y^n]$ or $[y^n] > [x^n]$, then $[x^n] = [y^n]$, that is, the sequence x^n and y^n are (Cauchy-)equivalent. The notational version of this is $[x^n] \geq [y^n]$ if $[x^n] > [y^n]$ or $[x^n] = [y^n]$.

Now that we know what “ $>$ ” and “ $\geq$ ” mean, define

$$\max\{x, y\} = \begin{cases} x & \text{if } x \geq y \\ y & \text{if } y \geq x \end{cases}$$

From this, we can define $|x| = \max\{x, -x\}$. In turn, this leads to defining the distance between x and y in $\mathbb{R}$ by $d(x, y) = |x - y|$. The function $d : \mathbb{R} \times \mathbb{R} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}_+$ is called a **metric**. There are many metrics on many sets. We introduce the abstraction based $d(\cdot, \cdot)$ on the $\mathbb{R}$, the idea of a metric space. A **metric space** is a pair (X, d) where $X \neq \emptyset$, $d : X \times X \rightarrow \mathbb{R}_+$ where $d(\cdot, \cdot)$ satisfies three conditions:

1. (symmetry) $(\forall x, y \in X)[d(x, y) = d(y, x)]$,
2. (distinguishes points) $d(x, y) = 0$ if and only if $x = y$,
3. (triangle law) $(\forall x, y, z \in X)[d(x, y) + d(y, z) \geq d(x, z)]$.

Examples: $X = \mathbb{N}$ with $d(x, y) = |x - y|$; $X = \mathbb{Q}$ with $d(x, y) = |x - y|$; $X = \mathbb{R}^n$ with $d(x, y) = [\sum_{i=1}^n |x_i - y_i|^p]^{1/p}$, $p \geq 1$ (here we could work by defining $\|x\|_p = [\sum_{i=1}^n |x_i|^p]^{1/p}$ and $d(x, y) = \|x - y\|_p$); $X = C[0, 1]$ with $d(x, y) = \max_{t \in [0, 1]} |x(t) - y(t)|$; $[-B, +B]^S$ for any (non-empty) set S with $d(x, y) = \sup_{s \in S} |x(s) - y(s)|$.

The last pair of examples are quite important, and use results that we do not yet have. One is that we need to show that $\max_{t \in [0, 1]} |x(t) - y(t)|$ exists when x, y are continuous functions (and one of the reasons we don’t have it is because we haven’t defined continuous functions). The other is that we haven’t said what “sup” is. It’s also known as a “least upper bound,” or lub.

5.2 Limits, completeness, glb's and lub's

We'll begin with limits, then discuss completeness, glb's and lub's, and then turn to the contraction mapping theorem. The contraction mapping theorem will lead us on a detour through stationary Markov chains and discounted dynamic programming.

5.2.1 Limits

A sequence x^n in a metric space (X, d) has a limit x if

$$(\forall \epsilon \in \mathbb{R}_{++})(\exists N \in \mathbb{N})(\forall n \geq N)[d(x^n, x) < \epsilon].$$

This is written as $x^n \rightarrow x$ which is said as “ x^n converges to x .”

Problem 5.3 *Using only what has been given above, show that in the metric space $(\mathbb{R}, d)$, $d(x, y) = |x - y|$, the sequence $x^n = 2^{-n}$ converges to $x = 0$.*

A sequence r^n in $\mathbb{R}$ is Cauchy if

$$(\forall \epsilon \in \mathbb{R}_{++})(\exists M \in \mathbb{N})(\forall n, n' \geq M)[|r^n - r^{n'}| < \epsilon].$$

Theorem 5.1 *If r^n is a Cauchy sequence in $\mathbb{R}$ if and only if there exists an $r \in \mathbb{R}$ such that $r^n \rightarrow r$.*

The property that Cauchy sequences converge is very important. There are a huge number of inductive constructions of an x^n that we can show is Cauchy. Knowing there is a limit in this context gives a good short-hand name for the result of the inductive construction. Some examples: the irrational numbers that help us do geometry; Brownian motion that helps us understand finance markets; value functions that help us do dynamic programming both in micro and in macro. Only the first of these examples happens in $\mathbb{R}$, it is time to generalize the property that Cauchy sequences converge.

5.2.2 Completeness

A **sequence** in a metric space (X, d) is Cauchy if

$$(\forall \epsilon \in \mathbb{R}_{++})(\exists M \in \mathbb{N})(\forall n, n' \geq M)[|x^n - x^{n'}| < \epsilon].$$

The set of all Cauchy sequences in X is $\mathcal{C}(X)$. Two Cauchy sequences, x^n, y^n , in X are equivalent if

$$d(x^n, y^n) \rightarrow 0 \text{ in } \mathbb{R}.$$

The set of equivalence classes of Cauchy sequences is called the completion of X and is denoted $\widehat{X}$. For example, $\mathbb{R} = \widehat{\mathbb{Q}}$. Let $x = [x^n]$, $y = [y^n]$, we can define $\widehat{d}(x, y)$ as the limit of the sequence $d(x^n, y^n)$ (though this takes proving that the limit exists, this however, is a consequence of the sequence $d(x^n, y^n)$ being Cauchy and Theorem 5.1).

A metric space (X, d) is called **complete** if every Cauchy in X converges to some point in X . Theorem 5.1 is just the statement that $\mathbb{R}$ is complete with the usual metric. This is just a special case of

Theorem 5.2 *For any metric space (X, d) , $(\widehat{X}, \widehat{d})$ is complete.*

Problem 5.4 *Prove this theorem.*

5.2.3 Greatest lower bounds and least upper bounds

Some subsets of $\mathbb{R}$ do not have minima, even if they are bounded, e.g. $S = (0, 1]$. The concept of a **greatest lower bound**, also known as an **infimum**, fills this gap.

Some subsets of $\mathbb{R}$ do not have maxima, even if they are bounded, e.g. $S = [0, 1)$. The concept of a **least upper bound**, also known as a **supremum**, fills this gap.

Which one works with, infima or suprema, is a matter of taste. In reading the following discussion of infima, be sure to go through what would change if we were discussing suprema.

A set $S \subset \mathbb{R}$ is **bounded below** if there exists an $r \in \mathbb{R}$ such that for all $s \in S$, $r \leq s$. This is written as $r \leq S$. A number $\underline{s}$ is a **greatest lower bound (glb) for or infimum of S** if $\underline{s}$ is a lower bound and $s' > \underline{s}$ implies that s' is not a lower bound for S . Equivalently, that $\underline{s}$ is a glb for S if $\underline{s} \leq S$ and for all $\epsilon > 0$, there exists an $s \in S$ such that $s < \underline{s} + \epsilon$. If it exists, the glb of S is often written $\inf S$.

Problem 5.5 *If s and s' are glb's for $S \subset \mathbb{R}$, then $s = s'$. In other words, the glb, if it exists, is unique.*

Theorem 5.3 *If $S \subset \mathbb{R}$ is bounded below, there there exists an $\underline{s} \in \mathbb{R}$ such that $\underline{s}$ is the glb for S .*

Proof: Let r be any lower bound for S , set $r^1 = r$, given that r^n has been defined, define r^{n+1} to be $r^n + 2^{m(n)}$ with $m(n) = \max\{m \in \mathbb{Z} : r^n + 2^m \leq S\}$ using the conventions that $\max \emptyset = -\infty$ and $2^{-\infty} = 0$. By construction, the sequence r^n is weakly increasing, and is a Cauchy sequence. Let $s = \lim_n r^n$ (which exists because $\mathbb{R}$ is complete).

The proof will be finished when we show that s is the infimum. For this we must show that $s \leq S$ and if $s' > s$, then $\exists x \in S$ such that $x < s'$.

1. If it is not the case that $s \leq S$, then there exists $x \in S$ such that $x < s$. Since $r^n \rightarrow s$, for sufficiently large n , $r^n > x$ (by convergence of r^n to s). This contradicts the definition of r^n . Therefore s is a lower bound for S .

2. Pick arbitrary $s' > s$ and suppose that $(s, s') \cap S = \emptyset$. Let $\delta = s' - s > 0$. Pick m' to be the largest m such that $2^m < \delta$. Pick N such that for all $n \geq N$, $r^n > s - 2^{m'}$. Then $r^{N+1} \geq r^N + 2^{m'} > s$. Since the sequence is weakly increasing, this contradicts $r^n \rightarrow s$. ■

An alternative development of $\mathbb{R}$ starts with $\mathbb{Q}$ and adds enough points to $\mathbb{Q}$ so that the resulting set satisfies the property that all sets bounded below have a greatest lower bound. Though more popular as an axiomatic treatment, I find the present development to be both more intuitive and more broadly useful, as well as being an instructive parallel when it comes time to develop other models of quantities. I wouldn't overstate the advantage too much though, there are very good axiomatic developments of the other models of quantities.

Before turning to contraction mappings, let us go back to the space $X = [-B, +B]^S$ for any (non-empty) set S with $d(x, y) = \sup_{s \in S} |x(s) - y(s)|$.

Lemma 5.4 *When $X = [-B, +B]^S$ and $d(x, y) = \sup_{s \in S} |x(s) - y(s)|$, (X, d) is a complete metric space.*

This will be useful when S is the set of states for a dynamic programming problem and we are interested in bounded value functions, that is, functions that map from S to $[-B, +B]$.

5.3 The contraction mapping theorem and applications

Let (X, d) be a metric space. A mapping f from X to X is a **contraction mapping** if

$$(\exists \beta \in (0, 1)) (\forall x, y \in X) [d(f(x), f(y)) < \beta d(x, y)].$$

Lemma 5.5 *If $f : X \rightarrow X$ is a contraction mapping, then for all $x \in X$, the sequence*

$$x, f^{(1)}(x) = f(x), f^{(2)}(x) = f(f^{(1)}(x)), \dots, f^{(n)}(x) = f(f^{(n-1)}(x)), \dots$$

is a Cauchy sequence.

Problem 5.6 *Prove the lemma.*

A **fixed point of a mapping** $f : X \rightarrow X$ is a point x^* such that $f(x^*) = x^*$. Note that when $X = \mathbb{R}^n$, $f(x^*) = x^*$ if and only if $g(x^*) = 0$ where $g(x) = f(x) - x$. Thus, fixed point existence theorems may tell about the solutions to systems of equations.

Theorem 5.6 (Contraction mapping) *If $f : X \rightarrow X$ is a contraction mapping and (X, d) is a complete metric space, then there exists a unique x^* such that $f(x^*) = x^*$, and for all $x \in X$, the sequence*

$$x, f^{(1)}(x) = f(x), f^{(2)}(x) = f(f^{(1)}(x)), \dots, f^{(n)}(x) = f(f^{(n-1)}(x)), \dots$$

converges to x^* .

Proof: Let $x^n(x) = f^{(n)}(x)$. From the previous Lemma, we know that $\forall x$, $x^n(x)$ is Cauchy. Pick an arbitrary $x, x' \in X$. Since X is complete, $x^n(x) \rightarrow x^*$ for some x^* . Since f is a contraction mapping,

$$\begin{aligned} d(x^1(x), x^1(x')) &\leq \beta d(x, x'), \\ d(x^2(x), x^2(x')) &\leq \beta d(x^1(x), x^1(x')) \leq \beta^2 d(x, x'), \\ \vdots &\leq \vdots, \\ d(x^n(x), x^n(x')) &\leq \beta^n d(x, x'), \\ \vdots &\leq \vdots \end{aligned}$$

Since $0 < \beta < 1$, $\beta^n \rightarrow 0$. Thus, $x^n(x)$ is Cauchy, and $d(x^n(x), x^n(x')) \rightarrow 0$ so that $x^n(x')$ is Cauchy equivalent to $x^n(x)$. These imply that $x^n(x)$ and $x^n(x')$ both converge to x^* .

To show that $f(x^*) = x^*$, we'll pick an arbitrary $\epsilon > 0$ and show that $d(x^*, f(x^*)) < \epsilon$. So, pick arbitrary $\epsilon > 0$. For some $x \in X$, let $x^n = f^{(n)}(x)$ so that $x^n \rightarrow x^*$. By the triangle inequality,

$$d(x^*, f(x^*)) \leq d(x^*, x^n) + d(x^n, x^{n+1}) + d(x^{n+1}, f(x^*)).$$

Because f is a contraction mapping, the last term, $d(x^{n+1}, f(x^*))$, is less than or equal to $\beta d(x^n, x^*)$. Now pick M such that for all $n, m \geq M$, $d(x^*, x^n) < \epsilon/3$ and $d(x^n, x^m) < \epsilon/3$. Combining,

$$d(x^*, f(x^*)) \leq d(x^*, x^n) + d(x^n, x^{n+1}) + d(x^{n+1}, f(x^*)) < \epsilon/3 + \epsilon/3 + \beta\epsilon/3 < \epsilon,$$

which completes the proof. ■

5.3.1 Stationary Markov chains

For our purposes, a **stochastic process** is a sequence $(X_t)_{t=0}^\infty$ of random variables taking values in a finite space S . Stationary Markov chains are a special kind of stochastic process.

Let P_0 be a distribution on S . A **stationary Markov chain** is a stochastic process with the property that P_0 is the distribution of X_0 , and there is a matrix $P = (P_{i,j})_{i,j \in S}$,

such that

$$(\forall t)[P(X_{t+1} = j | X_0 = i_0, \dots, X_{t-1} = i_{t-1}, X_t = i) = P(X_{t+1} = j | X_t = i) = P_{i,j}.$$

In particular, this requires that

$$(\forall i)[\sum_{j \in S} P_{i,j} = 1].$$

The matrix P is called the **one-step transition matrix**. This name comes from the following observation: if π^T is the (row) vector of probabilities describing the distribution of X_t , then $\pi^T P$ is the (row) vector describing the distribution of X_{t+1} . This means that $\pi \mapsto \pi P$ is a mapping from $\Delta(S)$ to $\Delta(S)$. If this mapping is a contraction, we can apply the contraction mapping theorem, because, as we will see, $\Delta(S)$ is complete.

It seems that Markov chains must have small memories, after all, the distribution of X_{t+1} depends only on the state at time t . This can be “fixed” by expanding the state space, e.g. replace S with $S \times S$ and the last two realizations of the original X_t can influence what happens next. To be specific here, we want $P(X_{t+1} = j | X_t = i_t, X_{t-1} = i_{t-1})$. Let $Y_t = [X_t, X_{t-1}]$ and $Y_{t+1} = [X_{t+1}, X_t]$, so that $P(Y_{t+1} = [j, j'] | X_t = i_t, X_{t-1} = i_{t-1})$ should be a Markov matrix subject to the restriction that it can only be positive if $j' = i_t$. An expanded version of the same device works if we want k -period histories to determine the transition probabilities from t to $t+1$.

For $i, j \in S$, let $P_{i,j}^{(n)} = P(X_{t+n} = j | X_t = i)$. The matrix $P^{(n)}$ is called the **n -step transition matrix**. One of the basic rules for stationary Markov chains is called the Chapman-Kolmogorov equation,

$$(\forall 1 < m < n) \left[P_{i,j}^{(n)} = \sum_{k \in S} P_{i,k}^{(m)} \cdot P_{k,j}^{(n-m)} \right].$$

This means that if π^T is the (row) vector of probabilities describing the distribution of X_t , then $\pi^T P^{(n)}$ is the (row) vector describing the distribution of X_{t+n} . Further, the matrix $P^{(n)}$ is really P^n , the matrix P multiplied by itself n times.

Let $\Delta(S)$ denote the set of probabilities on S . $\pi \in \Delta(S)$ is an **ergodic distribution for P** if $\pi^T P = \pi^T$.

Problem 5.7 Solve for the set of ergodic distributions for each of the following P where $\alpha, \beta \in (0, 1)$:

$$\begin{bmatrix} 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 \end{bmatrix} \quad \begin{bmatrix} 0 & 1 \\ 1 & 0 \end{bmatrix} \quad \begin{bmatrix} \alpha & (1-\alpha) \\ (1-\alpha) & \alpha \end{bmatrix} \quad \begin{bmatrix} \alpha & (1-\alpha) \\ (1-\beta) & \beta \end{bmatrix} \quad \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 0 \\ (1-\beta) & \beta \end{bmatrix}.$$

Theorem 5.7 *If S is finite and $P \gg 0$, then the mapping $\pi^T \mapsto \pi^T P$ from $\Delta(S)$ to $\Delta(S)$ is a contraction mapping.*

Proof: For each $j \in S$, let $m_j = \min_i P_{i,j}$. Because $P \gg 0$, we know that for all j , $m_j > 0$. Define $m = \sum_j m_j$. We will show that for $p, q \in \Delta(S)$, $\|pP - qP\|_1 \leq (1 - m)\|p - q\|_1$.

$$\begin{aligned}
 \|pP - qP\|_1 &= \sum_{j \in S} \left| \sum_{i \in S} (p_i - q_i) P_{i,j} \right| \\
 &= \sum_{j \in S} \left| \sum_{i \in S} (p_i - q_i) (P_{i,j} - m_j) + \sum_{i \in S} (p_i - q_i) m_j \right| \\
 &\leq \sum_{j \in S} \sum_{i \in S} |p_i - q_i| (P_{i,j} - m_j) + \sum_{j \in S} m_j \left| \sum_{i \in S} (p_i - q_i) \right| \\
 &= \sum_{i \in S} |p_i - q_i| \sum_{j \in S} (P_{i,j} - m_j) + 0 \\
 &= \|p - q\|_1 \cdot (1 - m)
 \end{aligned}$$

where the next-to-last equality follows from the observation that $p, q \in \Delta(S)$, and the last equality follows from the observation that for all $i \in S$, $\sum_{j \in S} P_{i,j} = 1$ and $\sum_{j \in S} m_j = m$. ■

Provided that $\Delta(S)$ is complete (it is, we just haven't proven it yet), Theorem 5.7 gives a sufficient condition for $\pi P^n \rightarrow q^*$ where q^* is unique. The condition is sufficient, but it is not necessary. Consider the matrix

$$P = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 0 \\ (1 - \beta) & \beta \end{bmatrix}.$$

Note that $(1, 0)P^n = (1, 0)$, $(0, 1)P^n = ((1 - \beta^n), \beta^n)$, so that for all $a \in [0, 1]$, $(a, 1 - a)P^n = a(1, 0) + (1 - a)((1 - \beta^n), \beta^n) \rightarrow (1, 0)$.

Another instructive example is the matrix

$$P = \begin{bmatrix} \frac{1}{2} & \frac{1}{2} & 0 \\ 0 & \frac{1}{2} & \frac{1}{2} \\ \frac{1}{2} & 0 & \frac{1}{2} \end{bmatrix}.$$

Even though P has some 0 entries, $P^2 \gg 0$. Theorem 5.7 tells us that for every π , $\pi P^{2n} \rightarrow q^*$. Further, $\pi P^{2n+1} = (\pi P)P^{2n} \rightarrow q^*$, so that the entire sequence $\pi P^n \rightarrow q^*$. Generalizing this observation proves

Corollary 5.8 *If there exists N such that $P^N \gg 0$, then there exists a unique q^* such that*

for all π , $\pi P^n \rightarrow q^*$.

If P has the property that there exists a unique q^* such that for all π , $\pi P^n \rightarrow q^*$, then we say that P is a **stationary ergodic Markov chain**. This is the best kind of Markov chain to analyze.

About $\Delta(S)$ being a complete metric space: Let p^n be a Cauchy sequence in $\Delta(S) \subset \mathbb{R}^S$; Since $\mathbb{R}^S$ is complete, $p^n \rightarrow x$ for some $x \in \mathbb{R}^S$; What we need to show is that $x \in \Delta(S)$; Show that $x \geq 0$; Show that $\sum_s x(s) = 1$.

Problem 5.8 Under the conditions of Theorem 5.7, show that the matrix P^n converges and characterize the limit. [With e_i being the unit vector in the i 'th direction, note that $e_i P^n \rightarrow q^*$ where q^* is the unique ergodic distribution.]

By the way, there are mappings f such that f^2 is a contraction mapping but f is not.

Example 5.9 Let $X = \mathbb{R}_+$, $d(x, y) = |x - y|$, and let f be the cdf of the uniform distribution on the interval $(1, 2)$. For $x, y \in (1, 2)$, $d(f(x), f(y)) = d(x, y)$, but for all x, y , $d(f^2(x), f^2(y)) = 0$.

5.3.2 Some evolutionary arguments about equilibria

Fix a finite game $\Gamma = (A_i, u_i)_{i \in I}$. We're going to describe a large class of deterministic dynamics for proportions of populations playing the different strategies, then we'll add some noise in a fashion that gives us a stationary ergodic Markov chain. Then we'll try to see what we can tell about the system when the noise is small.

The idea is to imagine a population, M , of players, $M_i \geq 2$ of whom play the i 'th role, $M = \sum_i M_i$. A player's role is their "type." At the beginning of each period t , the player's pick their pure strategies for the period. Let $\sigma_{i,t}(a_i)$ denote the proportion of M_i players that choose a_i . The state of the system at time t is $\sigma_t = (\sigma_{i,t})_{i \in I}$. Note that there are only a finite number of states. Within each period, the players are matched against each other in such a fashion that their utility is $u_i(\sigma_t \setminus a_i)$ if they're playing a_i . Let $v_{i,t} \in \mathbb{R}^{A_i}$ denote the vector with a_i 'th component $u_i(\sigma_t \setminus a_i)$.

There is an underlying deterministic dynamic, $\sigma_{i,t+1} = b_i(\sigma_t)$, $\sigma_{t+1} = (\sigma_{i,t+1})_{i \in I}$. This describes how the population M_i responds, in period $t + 1$, to the events that transpire in period t . We assume that the dynamic has "Darwinian properties," that is,

$$(\sigma_{i,t+1} - \sigma_{i,t})^T \cdot v_{i,t} \geq 0,$$

with strict inequality if $\sigma_{i,t}(Br_i(\sigma_t)) < 1$. This is a broad class of dynamics. One example of such a dynamic has all players of type i switch to a pure strategy best response to σ_t (and

pick the lowest numbered option if there are ties). This is an *anonymous* dynamic, that is, a dynamic in which all players of type i behave the same way. All of the work in this area assumes anonymous dynamics, and we'll follow that tradition.

Problem 5.9 *Suppose that Γ is the 2×2 game “Matching Pennies,” than $M_1 = M_2 = 3$, and that both types follow the best response dynamic. Give the associated Markov chain and the set of possible paths that the system can follow.*

We now add noise to the system. In each period, each player of type i plays $b_i(\sigma_t)$ with probability $1 - \epsilon_i$, and with probability ϵ_i , their action is randomly determined according to a distribution $\eta_i \gg 0$. The ϵ_i events and the η_i events are all mutually independent. We sometimes think of η_i as being the introduction of mutants, and this happens with small probability.

The new one-step transition matrix is $P_{\epsilon, \eta} \gg 0$. Let $\mu_{\epsilon, \eta}$ denote the unique ergodic distribution for $P_{\epsilon, \eta}$.

If there exists a unique μ_η such that for all $\epsilon^n \rightarrow 0$, $\mu_{\epsilon^n, \eta} \rightarrow \mu_\eta$, then we know that for arbitrarily small mutation probability, there is only one long term distribution for the system. If $\mu_\eta = \mu_{\eta'}$ for any $\eta, \eta' \gg 0$, then the details of the mutations don't matter either.

It turns out that to get $\mu_{\epsilon^n, \eta} \rightarrow \mu_\eta$ in some pretty simple games we need $\lim_n \epsilon_i^n / \epsilon_j^n = 1$. To see why go back to Problem 5.9. Generally, to get $\mu_\eta = \mu_{\eta'}$ for different η, η' , one needs extra assumptions. The needed assumptions are weaker when the game Γ is generic, and generally impossible to satisfy when you allow all kinds of ties in the payoffs. This makes one rather unsure about the use of these ideas in extensive form games.

5.3.3 The existence and uniqueness of value functions

A maximizer faces a sequence of interlinked decision at times $t \in \mathbb{N}$. At each t , they learn the state, s , in a state space S . Since we don't yet have the mathematics to handle integrating over larger S 's, we're going to assume that S is countable. For each $s \in S$, the maximizing person has available actions $A(s)$. The choice of $a \in A(s)$ when the state is s gives utility $u(a, s)$. When the choice is made at $t \in \mathbb{N}$, it leads to a random state, X_{t+1} , at time $t + 1$, according to a transition probability $P_{i,j}(a)$, at which point the whole process starts again. If the sequence $(a_t, s_t)_{t \in \mathbb{N}}$ is the outcome, the utility is $\sum_t \beta^t u(a_t, s_t)$ for some $0 < \beta < 1$. Assume that there exists a $B \in \mathbb{R}_{++}$ such that $\sup_{(a_t, s_t)_{t \in \mathbb{N}}, a_t \in A(s_t)} |\sum_t \beta^t u(a_t, s_t)| < B$. This last happens if $u(a, s)$ is bounded, or if its maximal rate of growth is smaller than β .

One of the methods for solving infinite horizon, discounted dynamic programming problems just described is called the method of successive approximation: one pretends that the problem has only one decision period left, and that if one ends up in state s after this last

decision, one will receive $\beta V_0(s)$, often $V_0(s) \equiv 0$. Define

$$V_1(s) = \max_{a \in A(s)} u(a, s) + \beta \sum_{j \in S} V_0(j) P_{s,j}(a).$$

For this to make sense, we must assume that the maximization problem has a solution, which we do. (There are sensible looking conditions guaranteeing this, the simplest is the finiteness of $A(s)$.) More generally, once V_t has been defined, define

$$V_{t+1}(s) = \max_{a \in A(s)} u(a, s) + \beta \sum_{j \in S} V_t(j) P_{s,j}(a).$$

Again, we are assuming that for any $V_t(\cdot)$, the maximization problem just specified has a solution.

We've just given a mapping from possible value functions to other possible value functions. The point is that it's a contraction mapping.

The space $X_B = [-B, +B]^S$ is the space of all functions from S to the interval $[-B, +B]$. For $v, v' \in X$, define

$$\rho(v, v') = \sup_{s \in S} |v_s - v'_s|.$$

Problem 5.10 ρ is a metric on X_B and the metric space (X_B, ρ) is complete.

Define the mapping $f : X_B \rightarrow X_B$ by defining the s 'th component of $f(v)$, that is, $f(v)_s$, by

$$f(v)_s = \max_{a \in A(s)} u(a, s) + \beta \sum_{j \in S} v_j P_{s,j}(a).$$

Problem 5.11 The function f just described is a contraction mapping.

Let v^* denote the unique fixed point of f . Let $a^*(s)$ belong to the solution set to the problem

$$\max_{a \in A(s)} u(a, s) + \beta \sum_{j \in S} v_j^* P_{s,j}(a).$$

Problem 5.12 Using the policy $a^*(\cdot)$ at all points in time gives the expected payoff $v^*(s)$ if started from state s at time 1.

Define $\hat{v}(s)$ to be the supremum of the expected payoffs achievable starting at s , the supremum being taken over all possible feasible policies, $\alpha = (a_t(\cdot, \cdot))_{t \in \mathbb{N}}$,

$$\hat{v}(s) = \sup_{(a_t(\cdot, \cdot))_{t \in \mathbb{N}}} E \left(\sum_t \beta^t u(a_t, s_t) \mid s_1 = s \right).$$

Problem 5.13 For all s , $v^*(s) = \widehat{v}(s)$.

Combining the last two problems, once you've found the value function, you are one step away from finding an optimal policy, further, that optimal policy is stationary.

5.4 Limits and closed sets

Let $F \subset X$, (X, d) a metric space. F is a **closed set** if for all sequences x^n in F , if $x^n \rightarrow x$, then $x \in F$. In words, F is closed if it contains all of its limit points. A set G is **open** if its complement is closed. Closed and open sets do not exhaust the class of all sets.

Problem 5.14 Show that $[0, 1]$ is a closed subset of $\mathbb{R}$. Show that $(0, 1)$ is an open subset of $\mathbb{R}$. Show that $(0, 1]$ is neither a closed nor an open subset of $\mathbb{R}$. Show that $\mathbb{Q} \subset \mathbb{R}$ is neither a closed nor an open subset of $\mathbb{R}$.

Theorem 5.10 The class of closed sets is closed under intersection, that is, if F_α , $\alpha \in A$, is a collection of closed sets, then $F = \cap_\alpha F_\alpha$ is a closed set, and if A is finite, then $F = \cup_\alpha F_\alpha$ is closed.

Problem 5.15 Let F_α , $\alpha \in A$ be a collection of sets. Show that $X \setminus (\cap_\alpha F_\alpha) = \cup_\alpha (X \setminus F_\alpha)$. Using this, show that if G_α , $\alpha \in A$, is a collection of open sets, then $G = \cup_\alpha G_\alpha$ is open, and if A is finite, then $G = \cap_\alpha G_\alpha$ is open.

The ball around of point with radius ϵ is $B(x, \epsilon) = \{y : d(x, y) < \epsilon\}$.

Theorem 5.11 G is open if and only if for all $x \in G$, there exists $\epsilon > 0$ such that $B(x, \epsilon) \subset G$.

Pictorially, this is a very useful way of thinking about open sets, they are sets with the property that any point is blanketed against the outside world.

If $Eq(\Gamma)$ is a set of equilibria, it would be nice to know that it is a closed set. If not, there exists a set σ^n of equilibria and a strategy σ such that $\sigma^n \rightarrow \sigma$ but σ is not an equilibrium. Even more interesting is the question about the closure of the equilibrium correspondence.

Suppose a game has terminal nodes Z so that the possible utility assignments to terminal nodes are $\mathbb{R}^{Z \cdot I}$. For any $u \in \mathbb{R}^{Z \cdot I}$, let $\Gamma(u)$ denote the game Γ with payoffs u . Define $E \subset \mathbb{R}^{Z \cdot I} \times \Delta$ by

$$E = \{(u, \sigma) : \sigma \in Eq(\Gamma(u))\}.$$

The point-to-set mapping $u \mapsto Eq(\Gamma(u))$ is called the **equilibrium correspondence**. Its graph is the set E just given. If we knew that the set E was closed (and this is the content

of Problems 5.20 below), this would mean that $(u^n, \sigma^n) \rightarrow (u, \sigma)$, $\sigma^n \in Eq(\Gamma(u^n))$, then $\sigma \in Eq(\Gamma(u))$. If we believed that we might have made a small mistake in the utilities, say one on the order of $u^n - u$ so that the true utilities are u but we looked at $\sigma^n \in Eq(u^n)$, why then, σ^n is close to some $\sigma \in Eq(u)$. This means that our theory is robust to some small misspecifications, at least in the sense that we will not have as our prediction something that is too far from being a true prediction.

5.5 Limits and continuity

Let (X, d) and (Y, ρ) be two metric spaces. A function $f : X \rightarrow Y$ is **continuous at** x if $x^n \rightarrow x$ implies $f(x^n) \rightarrow f(x)$. A function $f : X \rightarrow Y$ is **continuous** if it is continuous at every $x \in X$.

Problem 5.16 Show that the function $f : X \rightarrow X$ defined by $f(x) = x$ is a continuous function from (X, d) to (X, d) .

Problem 5.17 Show that if $Y = \mathbb{R}$, both f and g are continuous at x , then $f + g$ and $f \cdot g$ are continuous at x .

Problem 5.18 Show that if $X = Y = \mathbb{R}$ and $P : X \rightarrow Y$ is a polynomial, then P is continuous.

Problem 5.19 For any function $f : X \rightarrow Y$ and any $S \subset Y$, and any collection A_α , $\alpha \in A$, of subsets of Y ,

1. $f^{-1}(\cup_\alpha A_\alpha) = \cup_\alpha f^{-1}(A_\alpha)$,
2. $f^{-1}(\cap_\alpha A_\alpha) = \cap_\alpha f^{-1}(A_\alpha)$,
3. $f^{-1}(Y \setminus S) = X \setminus f^{-1}(S)$.

Theorem 5.12 A function $f : X \rightarrow Y$ is continuous if and only if $f^{-1}(F)$ is a closed subset of X for all closed $F \subset Y$.

Problem 5.20 Show that the set $E = \{(u, \sigma) : \sigma \in Eq(\Gamma(u))\}$ is a closed subset of $\mathbb{R}^{Z \cdot I} \times \Delta$.

5.6 Limits and compactness

A sequence x^n in X is a mapping from $\mathbb{N}$ to X . A subsequence of x^n is the restriction of this mapping to an infinite subset, $N' = \{n_1, n_2, \dots\} \subset \mathbb{N}$. A subsequence is a sequence in its own right, specifically the sequence x^{n_k} , $k \in \mathbb{N}$. Defining $y^k = x^{n_k}$, we say that the subsequence x^{n_k} converges if the sequence y^k converges. Sometimes subsequences are denoted $x^{n'}$. Any subsequence has further subsequences, often denoted $x^{n''}$. Etc.

Problem 5.21 Let $x^n = 1/n$ if n is even, $x^n = 1 - 1/n$ if n is odd. Show that x^n does not converge and give four different convergent subsequences.

A set $F \subset X$ is **compact** if every sequence in F has a convergent subsequence and that subsequence converges to a point in F . Every compact set must be closed, not every closed set need be compact, e.g. $F = [0, +\infty) \subset \mathbb{R}$ is closed but not compact. A closed subset of a compact set is compact.

Theorem 5.13 If u is a continuous function on a compact set F , then there exists a non-empty, closed set of $x^* \in F$ such that $(\forall x \in F)[u(x^*) \geq u(x)]$.

Theorem 5.14 A set $F \subset \mathbb{R}^k$ is compact if and only if it is closed and bounded.

In particular, in a finite game, each Δ_i is compact. The following result is sometimes quite useful.

Theorem 5.15 If K is compact and $f : K \rightarrow Y$ is continuous, then $f(K)$ is a compact set.

5.7 Correspondences and fixed point theorem

Recall the best response correspondence from a long time ago. Theorem 5.13 and the compactness of Δ_i imply that for all σ , $Br_i(\sigma)$ is a non-empty, compact subset of Δ_i . By linearity in own strategies, $Br_i(\sigma)$ is convex.

Problem 5.22 Show that the graph of $\sigma \mapsto Br(\sigma)$ is a closed subset of $\Delta \times \Delta$ by expressing it as the intersection of closed sets.

Combining, the correspondence $\sigma \mapsto Br(\sigma)$ maps the non-empty, compact, convex Δ to itself, is non-empty valued, convex valued, and has a closed graph. These are the conditions for Kakutani's fixed point theorem.

5.8 Kakutani's fixed point theorem and equilibrium existence results

A **correspondence** Ψ from X to Y is a function from X to subsets of Y . The graph of Ψ is the set

$$gr_{\Psi} = \{(x, y) : y \in \Psi(x)\}.$$

Just as functions can be identified with their graphs, correspondences can be identified with their graphs.

A point x^* in X is a **fixed point of the correspondence** Ψ from X to X if $x^* \in \Psi(x^*)$. If we identify a function f from X to X with the correspondences $F(x) = \{x\}$, then x^* is a fixed point of f if and only if it is a fixed point of F . From before, we know that $\sigma^* \in Eq(\Gamma)$ if and only if $\sigma^* \in Br(\sigma^*)$, that is, if and only if σ^* is a fixed point of the best response correspondence.

Definition 5.16 *A correspondence Ψ from a non-empty, compact, convex subset, K , of $\mathbb{R}^n$ to $\mathbb{R}^n$ is a **game theoretic correspondence (gtc)** if*

1. *for all $x \in K$, $\Psi(x) \neq \emptyset$,*
2. *for all $x \in K$, $\Psi(x)$ is convex,*
3. *gr_{Ψ} is a closed subset of $K \times K$.*

Theorem 5.17 (Kakutani) *Every gtc has a fixed point.*

Since $Br(\cdot)$ is a gtc, an immediate implication is

Theorem 5.18 (Nash) *Every finite game has an equilibrium.*

Another is

Theorem 5.19 (Brouwer) *If K is a compact convex subset of $\mathbb{R}^N$ and $f : K \rightarrow K$ is continuous, then there exists an x^* such that $f(x^*) = x^*$.*

None of the conditions in Kakutani's theorem can be omitted.

Problem 5.23 *Give a correspondence Ψ that has no fixed point and satisfies all of the assumptions of a gtc except:*

1. *K is compact,*

2. K is convex,
3. for all $x \in K$, $\Psi(x) \neq \emptyset$,
4. for all $x \in K$, $\Psi(x)$ is convex,
5. gr_Ψ is a closed subset of $K \times K$.

Let $D \subset X \times X$ be the diagonal, i.e. $D = \{(x, x) : x \in X\}$. D is closed. If Ψ is a correspondence from X to X , then the fixed points of Ψ are the set of x^* such that $(x^*, x^*) \in (gr_\Psi \cap D)$. Because the intersection of closed sets is closed, the set of fixed points of a gtc is closed.

5.9 Perturbation based theories of equilibrium refinement

In §4, we removed equilibria by a variety of iterative procedures. In this section, we will perturb games in a variety of ways then take limits as the perturbations go to 0. In the various iterated deletion procedures, we noticed that there were some implications for beliefs that players might have had at different information sets. Perturbations also have implications for beliefs.

5.9.1 Overview of perturbations

An ϵ -perturbation of a game Γ is a game Γ_ϵ that we are willing to say is close to Γ . The ϵ may be a vector. The perturbation approach to refining $Eq(\Gamma)$ is to consider only those $\sigma \in Eq(\Gamma)$ that are of the form $\sigma = \lim_{\epsilon \rightarrow 0} \sigma^\epsilon$ where $\sigma^\epsilon \in Eq(\Gamma_\epsilon)$. This perturbation approach has three basic variants:

1. (perfection) accept σ if there exists any Γ_ϵ , $\epsilon \rightarrow 0$, $\sigma^\epsilon \in Eq(\Gamma_\epsilon)$, $\sigma^\epsilon \rightarrow \sigma$,
2. (properness) accept σ if there exists any reasonable Γ_ϵ , $\epsilon \rightarrow 0$, $\sigma^\epsilon \in Eq(\Gamma_\epsilon)$, $\sigma^\epsilon \rightarrow \sigma$,
3. (stability) accept σ only if for all Γ_ϵ , $\epsilon \rightarrow 0$, there exists $\sigma^\epsilon \in Eq(\Gamma_\epsilon)$, $\sigma^\epsilon \rightarrow \sigma$.

Imagine a ball resting on a wavy surface. Any rest point is an equilibrium. The rest point is perfect if there exists some kind of tiny tap that we can give the ball and have it stay in the same area. The rest point is proper if it stays in the same area after reasonable kinds of taps (e.g. we might agree that taps from straight above are not reasonable). The

rest point is stable if no matter what kind of tiny tap it receives, the ball stays in the same area after being tapped.

There are a variety of different ways to say that $d(\Gamma, \Gamma_\epsilon) < \epsilon$. One is to perturb the set of strategies, e.g. for $\epsilon_i \in \mathbb{R}_{++}^{A_i}$, let

$$\Delta^{\epsilon_i} = \{\sigma_i \in \Delta_i : (\forall a_i \in A_i)[\sigma_i(s_i) \geq \epsilon_i(s_i)]\}.$$

This notion of perturbation leads directly to Selten's perfection, with the appropriate notion of "reasonable" ϵ_i 's, to Myerson's properness, and to Kohlberg and Merten's stability.

Another form of perturbation adds independent full support "noise," η , to each component of the utilities $u \in \mathbb{R}^{Z \cdot I}$, takes $P(\|\eta\| < \epsilon) > 1 - \epsilon$, tells i the realization of the $\eta_{i,z}$ but not the realization of the $\eta_{j,z}$, $j \neq i$, and has the players play the game Γ . This gives van Damme's $\mathcal{P}$ -firm equilibria (perfection). Restricting to 'reasonable' η as the ones satisfying $E\|\eta\| < \epsilon$ gives Stinchcombe and Zauner's $\mathcal{P}$ -good equilibria (properness). Asking for robustness to all reasonable η gives Stinchcombe and Zauner's $\mathcal{P}$ -stable equilibria (stability).

Yet another form of perturbation identifies a game Γ with its best response correspondence, $Br(\cdot)$, and uses perturbations of the correspondence. This leads to Hillas stability, has not (to my knowledge) been used for a perfection or a properness concept. We will return to this in detail soon enough.

5.9.2 Perfection by Selten

Let $\epsilon = (\epsilon_i)_{i \in I}$ where $\epsilon_i \in \mathbb{R}_{++}^{A_i}$. Define Γ_ϵ to be the game $(\Delta^{\epsilon_i}, u_i)_{i \in I}$ where

$$\Delta^{\epsilon_i} = \{\sigma_i \in \Delta_i : (\forall a_i \in A_i)[\sigma_i(s_i) \geq \epsilon_i(s_i)]\}$$

and u_i is extended to Δ_i in the usual fashion.

Definition 5.20 σ is **perfect** if there exists $\epsilon^n \rightarrow 0$, $\sigma^{\epsilon^n} \in Eq(\Gamma_{\epsilon^n})$ such that $\sigma^{\epsilon^n} \rightarrow \sigma$.

Let $Per(\Gamma)$ denote the set of perfect equilibria. Kakutani's fixed point theorem implies that each $Eq(\Gamma_\epsilon) \neq \emptyset$, the compactness of Δ implies that any sequence σ^{ϵ^n} has a convergent subsequence, hence perfect equilibria exist.

The simplest example of the use of perfection is in the following 2×2 game where $Per(\Gamma) \subsetneq Eq(\Gamma)$,

	Left	Right
Up	(1, 1)	(0, 0)
Down	(0, 0)	(0, 0)

Fix a vector of perturbations (ϵ_1, ϵ_2) . If 1 is playing a strategy σ_1 with $\sigma_1(\text{Up}) \geq \epsilon_1(\text{Up}) > 0$ and $\sigma_1(\text{Down}) \geq \epsilon_1(\text{Down}) > 0$, then 2 payoffs satisfy

$$u_2(\sigma_1, \text{Left}) \geq \epsilon_1(\text{Up}) > 0, \text{ and } u_2(\sigma_1, \text{Right}) = 0.$$

This means that in any perturbed game, Left strictly dominates Right for 2. Therefore, in any equilibrium of the perturbed game, 2 puts as much mass as possible on Left, that is, 2 plays the strategy $\sigma_2(\text{Left}) = 1 - \epsilon_2(\text{Right})$, $\sigma_2(\text{Right}) = \epsilon_2(\text{Right})$. By symmetry, 1 puts as much mass as possible on Up. Taking limits as $(\epsilon_1, \epsilon_2) \rightarrow 0$, the unique perfect equilibrium is (Up, Left).

A note here, since the $\epsilon_i \gg 0$, weak dominance turns into strict dominance in the perturbed games. Therefore, in perfect equilibria, weakly dominated strategies are not played.

Perfect equilibria do not survive deletion of strictly dominated strategies, an observation due to Roger Myerson.

	L	R	A_2
T	(1, 1)	(0, 0)	(-1, -2)
B	(0, 0)	(0, 0)	(0, -2)
A_2	(-2, -1)	(-2, 0)	(-2, -2)

Delete the two strictly dominated strategies, A_1 and A_2 and you are back at the previous 2×2 game. In the present game, (B, R) is a perfect equilibrium. To see why, suppose that 2's perturbations satisfy $\epsilon_2(A_2) > \epsilon_2(L)$ and that 2 is playing the perturbed strategy $\sigma_2 = (\epsilon_2(L), 1 - (\epsilon_2(L) + \epsilon_2(A_2)), \epsilon_2(A_2))$. In this case, the payoff to T is strictly less than 0 while the payoff to B is 0. Therefore, if 1's perturbations satisfy the parallel pattern, there is only one equilibrium, (B, R) played with as much probability as possible. Taking limits as the perturbations go to 0, (B, R) is perfect. After deletion of the strongly dominated strategies, (B, R) is not perfect. Oooops.

Another example: taking expectations over Nature's move, the 4×4 normal form for the Beer-Quiche game is

$(\text{st}, \text{wk}) \backslash (b, q)$	(p, p)	(p, n)	(n, p)	(n, n)
(b, b)	(9, -8)	(9, -8)	(29, 0)	(29, 0)
(b, q)	(10, -8)	(12, -9)	(28, 1)	(30, 0)
(q, b)	(0, -8)	(18, 1)	(2, -8)	(20, 0)
(q, q)	(1, -8)	(21, 0)	(1, -8)	(21, 0)

The equilibrium set for this game can be partitioned into E_1 and E_2 where

$$E_1 = \{((q, q), (0, \beta, 0, 1 - \beta)) : 21 \geq 12\beta + 30(1 - \beta), \text{ i.e. } \beta \geq \frac{1}{2}\},$$

and

$$E_2 = \{((b, b), (0, 0, \beta, 1 - \beta)) : 29 \geq 28\beta + 30(1 - \beta) \text{ i.e. } \beta \geq \frac{1}{2}\}.$$

Problem 5.24 Show that all of the equilibria in the normal form of the Beer-Quiche game are perfect. Show the same in the agent normal form of the game.

There is a bit more theory to be had.

Theorem 5.21 (Selten) *Per(Γ) is a non-empty, closed subset of $Eq(\Gamma)$, and $\sigma^* \in Per(\Gamma)$ implies that for all $i \in I$, $\sigma_i^*(D_i) = 0$.*

Proof: (Non-emptiness) We have seen that $Per(\Gamma) \neq \emptyset$.

(Every perfect equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium) Suppose $\sigma \in Per(\Gamma)$, but assume, for the purposes of contradiction, that $\sigma \notin Eq(\Gamma)$. Since σ is perfect, there exists $\sigma^{\epsilon^n} \in Eq(\Gamma_{\epsilon^n})$, $\sigma^{\epsilon^n} \rightarrow \sigma$ as $\epsilon^n \rightarrow 0$. Since σ is not an equilibrium, there $(\exists i \in I)(\exists a_i \in A_i)[u_i(\sigma \backslash a_i) > u_i(\sigma)]$. This implies that $Br_i^P(\sigma)$ contains points strictly better than σ for i . We will show that

$$(\ddagger) (\exists N)(\forall n \geq N)[\sigma_i^{\epsilon^n}(Br_i^P(\sigma)) = 1 - \sum_{t_i \notin Br_i^P(\sigma)} \epsilon_i^n(t_i)].$$

This implies that $\sigma_i^{\epsilon^n}(Br_i^P(\sigma)) \rightarrow 1$, which implies that $\sigma_i(Br_i^P(\sigma)) = 1$ which implies that σ is an equilibrium, a contradiction that completes the proof.

For any $s'_i \in Br_i^P(\sigma)$, continuity of the u_i implies that there exists an N such that for all $n \geq N$, $u_i(\sigma^{\epsilon^n} \backslash s'_i) > u_i(\sigma^{\epsilon^n} \backslash t_i)$ for any $t_i \notin Br_i^P(\sigma)$. Since $\sigma^{\epsilon^n} \in Eq(\Gamma_{\epsilon^n})$, this delivers $(\ddagger)$.

(Perfect equilibria put no mass on weakly dominated strategies) Suppose $t_i \in A_i$ is weakly dominated. Then for all $\epsilon \gg 0$ and all $\sigma \in \times_{i \in I} \Delta^{\epsilon_i}$, $u_i(\sigma \backslash t_i) < u_i(Br_i(\sigma))$. Since $\sigma^{\epsilon^n} \in Eq(\Gamma_{\epsilon^n})$, this means that $\sigma_i^{\epsilon^n}(t_i) = \epsilon_i^n(t_i) \rightarrow 0$. Therefore $\sigma_i(t_i) = 0$.

(Closedness) For $\delta \in \mathbb{R}_{++}$, let E_δ denote the closure of the set of all $Eq(\Gamma_\epsilon)$ where $0 \ll \epsilon \ll \delta \cdot \tilde{1}$. (Note that $\delta < \delta'$ implies that $E_\delta \subset E_{\delta'}$.) It is easy to check that $Per(\Gamma) = \cap_\delta E_\delta$, that is, $Per(\Gamma)$ is the intersection of closed sets, hence closed. ■

The extensive form version of perfect is called “trembling hand perfection.” To get it, just rephrase perfection using behavioral strategies. Let B_i denote i ’s set of behavioral strategies, that is, $B_i = \times_{H \in U_i} \Delta(A(H))$. For each $i \in I$, let $\epsilon_i = (\epsilon_H)_{H \in U_i}$ where $\epsilon_H \in \mathbb{R}_{++}^{A(H)}$. Define

$$B_i^{\epsilon_i} = \{b_i \in B_i : (\text{for all } H \in U_i)(\forall a_i \in A(H))[b_i(a_i) \geq \epsilon_H(a_i)]\}.$$

Note that if Γ is a normal form game, then $B_i^{\epsilon_i}$ is just Δ^{ϵ_i} .

For an extensive form game Γ , define Γ_ϵ to be the game $(B_i^{\epsilon_i}, u_i)_{i \in I}$ where u_i is composed with the outcome function $\mathbb{O}(\cdot)$.

Definition 5.22 b is trembling hand perfect if there exists $\epsilon \rightarrow 0$, $b^\epsilon \in Eq(\Gamma_\epsilon)$ such that $b^\epsilon \rightarrow b$.

Often times, trembling hand perfect equilibria are simply called perfect equilibria. Theorem 5.21 applies, except, and this is an important exception, no trembling hand perfect equilibrium puts positive mass on any strategy that is weakly dominated in the agent normal form of the game.

5.9.3 Properness by Myerson

A strategy $\sigma \gg 0$ is **ϵ -perfect**, $\epsilon \in \mathbb{R}_{++}$, if for all $i \in I$, $\sigma_i(Br_i^P(\sigma)) \geq 1 - \epsilon$. It is easy to show that σ is perfect if and only if it is the limit of ϵ^n -perfect equilibria, $\epsilon^n \rightarrow 0$. An ϵ perfect equilibrium σ is **ϵ -proper** if

$$(\forall i \in I)(\forall a_i, t_i \in A_i) [[u_i(\sigma \setminus a_i) < u_i(\sigma \setminus t_i)] \Rightarrow [\sigma_i(a_i) \leq \epsilon \sigma_i(t_i)]] .$$

σ is **proper** if it is the limit of ϵ^n -proper equilibria as $\epsilon^n \rightarrow 0$.

Properness limits the set of perturbations that are allowed and then takes the set of limits. It has not limited the set of perturbations too far to preclude existence. Let $Pro(\Gamma)$ denote the set of proper equilibria.

Theorem 5.23 (Myerson) *$Pro(\Gamma)$ is a non-empty, closed subset of $Per(\Gamma)$.*

The proof is, to a first order of approximation, infinitely clever.

Proof: Pick $\epsilon \in (0, 1)$. Set $\epsilon_i(a_i) = \epsilon^{\#A_i} / \#A_i$ for each $s_i \in A_i$. The perturbed strategy set $\Delta_i(\epsilon_i)$ is compact, convex and non-empty, as is the set $\times_{i \in I} \Delta_i(\epsilon_i)$. Define the correspondence $\Psi_i(\cdot)$ from $\times_{i \in I} \Delta_i(\epsilon_i)$ to $\times_{i \in I} \Delta_i(\epsilon_i)$ by

$$\Psi_i(\sigma) = \{\sigma_i \in \Delta_i(\epsilon_i) : [u_i(\sigma \setminus a_i) < u_i(\sigma \setminus t_i)] \Rightarrow [\sigma_i(a_i) \leq \sigma_i(t_i)]\}.$$

To see that $\Psi_i(\sigma) \neq \emptyset$, we introduce the ranking of a pure strategy $a_i \in A_i$ against σ , defining it by

$$r_i(\sigma, a_i) = \#\{t_i \in A_i : u_i(\sigma \setminus t_i) > u_i(\sigma \setminus a_i)\}.$$

Thus, if $a_i \in Br_i^P(\sigma)$, then $r_i(\sigma, a_i) = 0$. Consider the mixed strategy

$$\sigma_i(a_i) = \frac{\epsilon^{r_i(\sigma, a_i)}}{\sum_{t_i \in A_i} \epsilon^{r_i(\sigma, t_i)}}.$$

This is clearly a mixed strategy, and it belongs to $\Delta_i(\epsilon_i)$, so $\Psi_i(\sigma) \neq \emptyset$. It is also fairly easy to show that Ψ is a g.t.c., therefore it has a fixed point. The fixed point is an ϵ -proper equilibrium.

Take a sequence $\epsilon^n \downarrow 0$ and a corresponding sequence σ^n of ϵ^n -proper equilibria. Taking a subsequence if necessary, we can find a σ such that $\sigma^{n'} \rightarrow \sigma$ because Δ is compact.

To show that $Pro(\Gamma)$ is closed, let T_ϵ be the closure of the set of δ -proper equilibria, $\delta \in (0, \epsilon)$. It is nearly immediate that $Pro(\Gamma) = \bigcap_{\epsilon > 0} T_\epsilon$, i.e. that the set of proper equilibria is the intersection of a collection of closed sets, hence it is itself closed. ■

Problem 5.25 (Optional) *Show that the Ψ used in the previous proof is a gtc.*

Let us reconsider the previous 3×3 example,

	L	R	A_2
T	$(1, 1)$	$(0, 0)$	$(-1, -2)$
B	$(0, 0)$	$(0, 0)$	$(0, -2)$
A_2	$(-2, -1)$	$(-2, 0)$	$(-2, -2)$

Note that if $\sigma \gg 0$, then for both $i \in I$ for this game, and all $t_i \neq A_i$, $u_i(\sigma \setminus A_i) < u_i(\sigma \setminus t_i)$. For an ϵ -proper equilibrium, we need to have $\sigma_i(A_i) \leq \epsilon \cdot \sigma_i(t_i)$ for both $t_i \neq A_i$. The only way to make B better than T in our calculations for (B, R) being perfect was to have $\epsilon_2(L) > \epsilon_2(A_2)$. This cannot happen in an ϵ -proper equilibrium. Therefore, there is only one proper equilibrium, (T, L) . This survives deletion of strictly dominated strategies. There are 3 person games for which the set of proper equilibria changes after deletion of a strictly dominated strategy.¹

5.9.4 Sequential equilibria

These are a subset of the trembling hand perfect equilibria. From that point of view, they are not exciting. What is really useful is that sequential equilibria are *defined* in terms of beliefs. This change unleashed a huge torrent of creative energy in the quest for a good refinement of $Eq(\Gamma)$. Let $b \gg 0$ be a strictly positive behavioral strategy. Bayes' Law gives beliefs, $\beta(\cdot|b)$ at each information set H .

Definition: A strategy-belief pair, (b, β) is a **sequential equilibrium** if there exists $b^n \gg 0$, $b^n \rightarrow b$ such that $\beta(\cdot|b^n) \rightarrow \beta$, and b is a best response to β at each H .


$Seq(\Gamma)$ denotes the set of sequential equilibria.

Definition: A strategy-belief pair, (b, β) is a **Bayesian Nash equilibrium** if $\beta(\cdot|b)$ is defined by Bayes Law at all H reached with positive probability when b is played, and b is a best response to β at each H .

Give some examples, emphasizing the beliefs at H that arise from Bayes Law and $b^n \gg 0$.

Every trembling hand perfect equilibrium is sequential, but not the reverse. Consider the following game

¹Oh well, we need more work if we are to get S 's that satisfy the self-referential tests above.



Problem 5.26 Show that $Per(\Gamma) \subsetneq Seq(\Gamma) = Eq(\Gamma)$ in the above game.

5.9.5 Strict perfection and stability by Kohlberg and Mertens

A strategy σ is **strictly perfect** if for all sequences Γ_{ϵ^n} , $\epsilon^n \rightarrow 0$, there exists a sequence $\sigma^n \in Eq(\Gamma_{\epsilon^n})$ such that $\sigma^n \rightarrow \sigma$.

Strictly perfect equilibria do not always exist, e.g.

	L	M	R
T	(1, 1)	(1, 0)	(0, 0)
B	(1, 1)	(0, 0)	(1, 0)

In this game, $Pro(\Gamma) = Per(\Gamma) = Eq(\Gamma)$, so none of the refinements work here. Perhaps they shouldn't, but in any case, it is easy to show that there is no strictly perfect equilibria, just take $\epsilon_2^n(M) > \epsilon_2^n(R) > 0$, $\epsilon_2^n(M) \rightarrow 0$. The only limit of equilibria of these perturbed games is (T, L) . Now take $\epsilon_2^n(R) > \epsilon_2^n(M) > 0$, $\epsilon_2^n(R) \rightarrow 0$. The only limit of equilibria of these perturbed games is (B, L) . Oooops, no strictly perfect equilibrium.

If x is a point and F is a set, define $d(x, F) = \inf\{d(x, f) : f \in F\}$.

Definition: A closed set $E \subset Eq(\Gamma)$ has property (SP) if it satisfies

(SP) for all sequences Γ_{ϵ^n} , $\epsilon^n \rightarrow 0$, there exists a sequence $\sigma^n \in Eq(\Gamma_{\epsilon^n})$ such that $d(\sigma^n, E) \rightarrow 0$.

Problem 5.27 Show that if $E = \{\sigma\}$ and E satisfies (SP), then σ is strictly perfect.

Problem 5.28 Show that for all Γ , $Eq(\Gamma)$ satisfies (SP). (If this is too daunting, just show it for two non-trivial games.)

In light of the last problem, what is needed is a smallest closed set E with property (SP).

Definition: A closed $E \subset Eq(\Gamma)$ is K-M stable if it satisfies Condition SP and no closed, non-empty, proper subset of E satisfies Condition SP.

In the 2×3 game above, we see that the unique K-M stable set is $\{(U, L), (R, L)\}$, i.e. it is not connected.

Time for the quick detour about connectedness. A set $E \subset \mathbb{R}^N$ is **path-connected** if for all $x, y \in E$, there is a continuous function $f : [0, 1] \rightarrow E$ such that $f(0) = x$ and $f(1) = y$. Intuitively, this means that you can draw a continuous path from x to y that stays inside of E . It is clear that all convex sets are path-connected. It is also clear that if E and E' are path-connected and $E \cap E' \neq \emptyset$, then $E \cup E'$ is path-connected, though $E \cap E'$ may not be. There is a difference between connected and path-connected, and every path-connected set is connected. I am not going to tell you about the distinction because for our purposes path-connected is enough. However, this is a warning that when you see proofs of connectedness in the literature, you may not recognize the concept.

Look at Faruk Gul's example.

5.9.6 Stability by Hillas

Define the Hausdorff distance between two compact sets K_1 and K_2 by

$$d_H(K_1, K_2) = \inf\{\epsilon > 0 : K_1 \subset K_2^\epsilon, \text{ and } K_2 \subset K_1^\epsilon\},$$

where $K^\epsilon = \cup_{x \in K} B(x, \epsilon)$ is the open ϵ -ball around K .

Define the Hillas distance between two gtc's mapping K to K by

$$d(\Psi, \Psi') = \max_{x \in X} d_H(\Psi(x), \Psi'(x)).$$

Definition: A closed set $E \subset Eq(\Gamma)$ has property (S) if it satisfies

(S) for all sequences of gtc's Ψ^n , $d(\Psi^n, Br) \rightarrow 0$, there exists a sequence σ^n of fixed points of Ψ^n such that $d(\sigma^n, E) \rightarrow 0$.

Definition: A closed set $E \subset Eq(\Gamma)$ is (Hillas) stable if it satisfies (S) and no closed, non-empty, proper subset of E satisfies (S).

This is often said as “ E is (Hillas) stable if it is minimal with respect to property (S).”

In the 2×3 game that we used to demonstrate that strictly perfect equilibria do not exist, it is (perhaps) possible to visualize the perturbations that Hillas uses. It is a good exercise to show that $((1/3, 2/3), (1, 0, 0))$ is the limit of fixed points of Ψ 's close to Br .

Theorem 5.24 (Hillas) *There exist a non-empty stable set E of equilibria. Further, E is connected, satisfies the self-referential tests given above, is a subset of $Per(\Gamma)$, and $Pro(\Gamma) \cap E \neq \emptyset$.*

In practice, the way that this is used is to (1) find the connected sets of equilibria and (2) test whether or not they fail the various criteria. For example, if a connected set E contains strategies that put positive mass on weakly dominated strategies, then $E \not\subset Per(\Gamma)$, and so E is not (Hillas) stable. If none of the proper equilibria belong to E , then E is not (Hillas) stable. If those tests don't work, and they often don't in signaling games, then you can turn to the self-referential tests. If you know that all but one of the connected sets of equilibria fails the criteria, then the existence part of the above theorem tells you that the remaining one must be (Hillas) stable. Directly checking stability can be difficult.

5.10 Signaling game exercises in refinement

Here are a variety of signaling games to practice with. The presentation of the games is a bit different than the extensive form games we gave above, part of your job is to draw extensive forms. Recall that a pooling equilibrium in a signaling game is an equilibrium in which all the different types send the same message, a separating equilibrium is one in which each types sends a different message (and can thereby be separated from each other), a hybrid equilibrium has aspects of both behaviors.

The presentation method is taken directly from Banks and Sobel's (1987) treatment of signaling games. Signaling games have two players, a Sender S and a Receiver R . The Sender has private information, summarized by his type, t , an element of a finite set T . There is a strictly positive probability distribution ρ on T ; $\rho(t)$, which is common knowledge, is the ex ante probability that S 's type is t . After S learns his type, he sends a message, m , to R ; m is an element of a finite set M . In response to m , R selects an action, a , from a finite set $A(m)$; S and R have von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions $u(t, m, a)$ and $v(t, m, a)$ respectively. Behavioral strategies are $q(m|t)$, the probability that S sends the message m given that his type is t , and $r(a|m)$, the probability that R uses the pure strategy a when message m is received. R 's set of strategies after seeing m is the $\#A(m) - 1$ dimensional simplex Δ_m , and utilities are extended to $r \in \Delta_m$ in the usual fashion. For each distribution λ over T , the receiver's best response to seeing m with prior λ is

$$Br(\lambda, m) = \arg \max_{r(m) \in \Delta_m} \sum_{t \in T} v(t, m, r(m)) \lambda(t). \quad (5.1)$$

Examples are represented with a bi-matrix $B(m)$ for each $m \in M$. There is one column in $B(m)$ for each strategy in $A(m)$ and one row for each type. The (t, a) 'th entry in $B(m)$ is

$(u(t, m, a), v(t, m, a))$. With t_1 being the strong type, t_2 the weak, m_1 being beer, m_2 being quiche, a_1 being pick a fight, and a_2 being not, the Beer-Quiche game is

$B(m_1)$	a_1	a_2	$B(m_2)$	a_1	a_2
t_1	10, -10	30, 0	t_1	0, -10	20, 0
t_2	0, 10	20, 0	t_2	10, 10	30, 0

You should carefully match up the parts of this game and the extensive form of B-Q given above.

Here is a simple example to start on:

$B(m_1)$	a_1	$B(m_2)$	a_1	a_2
t_1	2, 2	t_1	3, 3	0, 0
t_2	2, 2	t_2	0, 0	3, 3

Problem 5.29 Draw the extensive form for the game just specified. Find the 3 connected sets of equilibria. Show that all equilibria for this game are both perfect and proper. Show that the 3 connected sets of equilibria are both Hillas and K-M stable.

The following game is Cho's (1987, Example 2.1): the types are A , B , and C , $\rho(A) = \rho(C) = 3/8$, $\rho(B) = 1/4$, the messages are L and R , and the actions are as given.

$B(L)$	U	D	$B(R)$	U	M	D
A	2, 1	-1, 0	A	0, 2	0, 0	0, 2
B	2, 1	0, 0	B	0, 2	4, 3	1, -1
C	2, 0	0, 1	C	0, -3	1, -2	4, 0

Problem 5.30 Draw the extensive form for the game just specified and analyze the equilibrium set.

The following is a sequential settlement game of a type analyzed by Sobel (1989): There are two types of defendants, S : type t_2 defendants are negligent, type t_1 defendants are not, $\rho(t_1) = 1/2$. S offers a low settlement, m_1 , or a high settlement, m_2 . R , the plaintiff, either accepts, a_1 , or rejects a_2 . If R accepts, S pays R an amount that depends on the offer but not S 's type. If R rejects the offer, S must pay court costs and a transfer depending only on whether or not S is negligent. With payoffs, the game is

$B(m_1)$	a_1	a_2	$B(m_2)$	a_1	a_2
t_1	-3, 3	-6, 0	t_1	-5, 5	-6, 0
t_2	-3, 3	-11, 5	t_2	-5, 5	-11, 5


Problem 5.31 Draw the extensive form for the game just specified. Analyze the equilibria of the above game, picking out the perfect, the proper, the sequential, and the Hillas stable sets.

One more game! This one has $\rho(t_1) = 0.4$.

$B(m_1)$	a_1	$B(m_2)$	a_1	a_2	a_3	a_4
t_1	0, 0	t_1	-1, 3	-1, 2	1, 0	-1, -2
t_2	0, 0	t_2	-1, -2	1, 0	1, 2	-2, 3

Problem 5.32 Draw the extensive form for the game just specified. Find the pooling and the separating equilibria, if any, check the perfection and properness of any equilibria you find, and find the Hillas stable sets.

Problem 5.33 A little more practice with sequential equilibria.



This game has two kinds of Nash equilibria, one kind involves player 1 playing down, that is, playing D_1 , the other involves player 1 playing across, that is, playing A_1 .

One of the equilibria in which 1 plays D_1 is (D_1, A_2, L_3) , i.e. the behavioral strategy

$$\pi = (\pi_1, \pi_2, \pi_3) = ((1, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0))$$


where the following table contains the key to reading these 1's and 0's

Player	Strategy
1	$\pi_1 = (\pi_1(D_1), \pi_1(A_1))$
2	$\pi_2 = (\pi_2(D_2), \pi_2(A_2))$
3	$\pi_3 = (\pi_3(L_3), \pi_3(R_3))$


1. Find the set of π_2 and π_3 for which $((1, 0), \pi_2, \pi_3)$ is a Nash equilibrium.
2. Show that none of the π_2 you found in the previous problem is part of a sequential equilibrium.
3. Find the set of Nash equilibria in which 1 plays $\pi_1 = (0, 1)$, that is, in which 1 plays A_1 .
4. Find the set of beliefs, that is, (μ_x, μ_y) , $\mu_y = 1 - \mu_x$, for 3 for which L_3 is a strict best response, for which R_3 is a strict best response, and for which 3 is indifferent between L_3 and R_3 .
5. Show that all of the Nash equilibria of Exercise 3 are sequential.

Problem 5.34 Yet more practice with sequential equilibria. Consider a market with one incumbent firm and a potential entrant. The potential entrant has low costs with probability 0.2, and has high costs with probability 0.8. The actual costs (low or high) of the entrant are private information to the entrant, who decides whether to stay “out” or “enter.” The outside option for the low cost entrant has an expected utility of 25, while the outside option for the high cost entrant has an expected utility of 0. If the potential entrant stays out, then the incumbent has an expected utility of 25. If the potential entrant enters, then the incumbent decides whether to “fight” or “acquiesce.” If the incumbent fights, then the payoffs for the entrant and incumbent respectively are $(20, -25)$ when the entrant is low cost, and $(-10, 40)$ when the entrant is high cost. If the incumbent acquiesces, then the payoffs are $(40, 10)$ when the entrant is low cost, and $(20, 36)$ when the entrant is high cost.

One version of the game tree for this game is



1. A **separating equilibrium** is one in which all the different types of Senders take different actions, thereby separating themselves from each other. A **pooling equilibrium** is one in which all the different types of Senders take the same action. Show that the only Nash equilibria of this game are pooling equilibria, and that all of them are sequential.
2. Show that one of the sequential equilibria of the previous game is still a Nash equilibrium, but is not sequential in the following, changed version of the above game.



Chapter 6

Repeated Games

Here we take a game $\Gamma = (A_i, u_i)_{i \in I}$ and play it once at time $t = 1$, reveal to all players which $a_i \in A_i$ each player chose, then play it again at time $t = 2$, reveal, etc. until N plays have happened, $N \leq \infty$.

The basic observation is, roughly, “repeating games can greatly expand the set of equilibria.” This section of the course is devoted to making this statement meaningful and qualifying it.

There are four basic kinds of reasons to study what happens in repeated games, they are not mutually exclusive. First, it delivers an aesthetically pleasing theory. Second, it has the benefit of making us a bit more humble in our predictions. Third, we believe that many of the most interesting economic interactions are repeated many many times, it is good to study what happens in these games. Fourth, economics, and equilibrium based theories more generally, do best when analyzing routinized interactions. In game theory models, routinized interactions makes it easier to believe that each i has figured out not only that they are solving the problem

$$\max_{\sigma_i \in \Delta(A_i)} u_i(\sigma^* \setminus \sigma_i),$$

but that the solution is σ_i^* . Don’t take the last reason too seriously, the theory of repeated games we will look at first is not particularly good for analyzing how people might arrive at solving the equilibrium maximization problem.

6.1 The Basic Set-Up and a Preliminary Result

When playing the game $N < \infty$ times, the possible history space for the game is H^N , the product space

$$H^N = \underbrace{S \times \dots \times S}_{N \text{ times}}.$$

For any $h^N = (s^1, \dots, s^t, s^{t+1}, \dots, s^N) \in H^N$, i 's payoffs are

$$U_i^N(h^N) = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{t=1}^N u_i(s^t).$$

When playing the game “infinitely often”, the possible history space is

$$H^\infty = (s^1, s^2, \dots) \in S \times S \times \dots,$$

and the payoffs are discounted with discount factor δ ,

$$U_i^\delta(h^\infty) = \frac{1-\delta}{\delta} \sum_{t=1}^\infty \delta^t u_i(s^t).$$

The important point about these payoffs is that they are on the same scale as u , specifically, for all N and all δ ,

$$\begin{aligned} u(S) &\subset U^N(H^N), \quad u(S) \subset U_\delta^\infty(H^\infty), \quad \text{and} \\ U^N(H^N) &\subset \mathbf{co}(u(S)), \quad U_\delta^\infty(H^\infty) \subset \mathbf{co}(u(S)). \end{aligned}$$

These are true because in all cases, the weights on the $u_i(s^t)$ add up to 1, $1 = 1, \frac{1-\delta}{\delta} \sum_{t=1}^\infty \delta^t = 1$, and $\underbrace{1/N + \dots + 1/N}_{N \text{ times}} = 1$. The following will be important several times below.

Problem 6.1 For all $v \in \mathbf{co}(u(S))$ and for all $\epsilon > 0$,

$$(\exists N')(\forall N \geq N')(\exists h^N \in H^N) \|U^N(h^N) - v\| < \epsilon, \quad \text{and}$$

$$(\exists \underline{\delta} < 1)(\exists h^\infty \in H^\infty)(\forall \delta \in (\underline{\delta}, 1)) \|U_\delta^\infty(h^\infty) - v\| < \epsilon.$$

As always, strategies are complete contingent plans. For completeness, we define H^0 as a one-point set, $H^0 = \{h^0\}$. A behavioral strategy for i is, for every $t \in \{1, \dots, N\}$, a mapping

$$\sigma_i^t : H^{t-1} \rightarrow \Delta_i,$$

so that a strategy for i is a sequence $\sigma_i = (\sigma_i^t)_{t=1}^N$, and Σ_i^N is the set of all behavioral strategies. Each vector behavioral strategy $\sigma = (\sigma_i)_{i \in I}$, specifies an outcome distribution over H^N , denoted by $\mathbb{O}(\sigma)$. Playing the strategy σ starting from a history $h^{t-1} \in H^{t-1}$ gives the outcome $\mathbb{O}(\sigma|h^{t-1})$.

Summarizing, for $N < \infty$,

$$\Gamma^N = (\Sigma_i^N, U_i^N)_{i \in I},$$

for $N = \infty$,

$$\Gamma_\delta^\infty = (\Sigma_i^\infty, U_i^\delta)_{i \in I}.$$

A vector σ^* is an equilibrium if the usual conditions hold, and the set of equilibria is $Eq(\Gamma^N)$ or $Eq(\Gamma_\delta^\infty)$ as $N < \infty$ or $N = \infty$. A vector σ^* is a sub-game perfect equilibrium if it is a Nash equilibrium given any starting history h^{t-1} , $t \in \{1, \dots, N\}$. The set of sub-game perfect equilibria is $SGP(\Gamma^N)$ or $SGP(\Gamma_\delta^\infty)$ as $N < \infty$ or $N = \infty$.

Since the strategy sets are very different in Γ , Γ^N , and Γ_δ^∞ , the way that we will be comparing the equilibrium sets is to compare $u(Eq(\Gamma))$, $U^N(Eq(\Gamma^N))$, $U^N(SGP(\Gamma^N))$, $U_\delta^\infty(Eq(\Gamma_\delta^\infty))$ and $U_\delta^\infty(SGP(\Gamma_\delta^\infty))$. The starting point is

Lemma 6.1 *If $\sigma^* \in Eq(\Gamma)$, then $\sigma_i^t \equiv \sigma_i^* \in SGP(\Gamma^N)$, $i \in I$, $t = 1, \dots, N$, and $\sigma_i^t \equiv \sigma_i^* \in SGP(\Gamma_\delta^\infty)$, $i \in I$, $t = 1, 2, \dots$*

Since every SGP is an equilibrium and $Eq(\Gamma) \neq \emptyset$, immediate corollaries are

$$\emptyset \neq u(Eq(\Gamma)) \subset U^N(SGP(\Gamma^N)) \subset U^N(Eq(\Gamma^N)), \text{ and}$$

$$\emptyset \neq u(Eq(\Gamma)) \subset U_\delta^\infty(SGP(\Gamma_\delta^\infty)) \subset U_\delta^\infty(Eq(\Gamma_\delta^\infty)).$$

In this sense, we've "rigged the game," all that can happen is increase in the set of equilibria when the game is repeated.

6.2 Prisoners' Dilemma finitely and infinitely

To get a flavor of what will happen in this section, we will look at repeating the Prisoners' Dilemma game Γ from above.

	Squeal	Silent
Squeal	$(-B + r, -B + r)$	$(-b + r, -B)$
Silent	$(-B, -b + r)$	$(-b, -b)$

Problem 6.2 *Show that $\mathbb{O}(Eq(\Gamma^N))$ contains only one point when $N < \infty$. Show that $SGP(\Gamma^N)$ contains only one point when $N < \infty$.*

One way to work the next problem uses "Grim Trigger Strategies," that is, $\sigma^1 = (\text{Silent}, \text{Silent})$, and for $t \geq 2$, $\sigma_i^t(h^{t-1}) = \text{Silent}$ if h^{t-1} is all Silent, and is equal to Squeal for all other h^{t-1} .

Problem 6.3 *Show that there exists a $\underline{\delta} < 1$ such that for all $\delta \in (\underline{\delta}, 1)$, $\mathbb{O}(SGP(\Gamma_\delta^\infty))$ contains the history in which each player plays Silent in each period.*

The grim trigger strategies are a special case of what are called “Nash reversion” strategies — pick a Nash equilibrium τ for Γ and a vector $s \in S$. Nash reversion strategies are $\sigma^1 = s$, and for $t \geq 2$,

$$\sigma^t(h^{t-1}) = \begin{cases} s & \text{if } h^{t-1} = (s, s, \dots, s) \\ \tau & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}.$$

In this game, the only $\tau \in Eq(\Gamma)$ is (Squeal, Squeal).

Summarizing what we have seen in the repeated prisoners’ dilemma so far, for all $N < \infty$ and for all δ sufficiently close to 1,

$$u(Eq(\Gamma)) = U^N(Eq(\Gamma^N)) = U^N(SGP(\Gamma^N)) \subsetneq U_\delta^\infty(SGP(\Gamma_\delta^\infty)).$$

What is a bit puzzling is the question, “Why is there so large a distinction between Γ^N for large N and Γ_δ^∞ for δ close to 1?” This is puzzling because both types of games are supposed to be capturing interactions that are repeated many many times.

Roy Radner had a solution for the puzzle in the case of the repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma. His solution was later (considerably) generalized by Fudenberg and Levine. Both papers worked with Herbert Simon’s satisficing. Radner worked with the definition of satisficing having to do with solving optimization problems to within some $\epsilon > 0$ of the optimum achievable utility. Fudenberg and Levine replaced complicated optimization problems by simpler ones. This is Simon’s other notion of satisficing. Fudenberg and Levine then showed that, in games more general than the repeated games we’re looking at, this gives Radner’s version of satisficing.

Definition (Radner): For a game $\gamma = (T_i, v_i)_{i \in I}$ and an $\epsilon \geq 0$, a strategy vector σ is an ϵ -equilibrium if

$$(\forall i \in I)(\forall t_i \in T_i)[u_i(\sigma) \geq u_i(\sigma \setminus t_i) - \epsilon].$$

If $\epsilon = 0$, an ϵ -equilibrium is an equilibrium. One can (and you should) write down the definition of an ϵ -SGP.

Radner showed that for every $\epsilon > 0$, there exists an N' such that for all $N \geq N'$, there exists strategies $\sigma \in SGP(\Gamma^N)$ with the property that $\mathbb{O}(\sigma)$ involves (Silent, Silent) at all time periods. One part of Fudenberg and Levine’s work considered a subclass of strategies for a repeated game Γ_δ^∞ . The subclass consisted of strategies of the form “stop thinking about what to do after N periods.” They showed that the set of limits of ϵ -SGP in these strategies, limits being taken as $\epsilon \rightarrow 0$ and $N \rightarrow \infty$, give exactly the SGP of Γ_δ^∞ . Further, equilibria within these subclasses are ϵ -SGP’s.

In any case, using either logic, and variants the trigger strategies discussed above it is possible to show that, for Γ being the Prisoners’ Dilemma,

Theorem 6.2 *If $v > u(\text{Squeal, Squeal})$ and $v \in \mathbf{co}(u(S))$, then for all $\epsilon > 0$,*

1. exists N' such that for all $N \geq N'$, $B(v, \epsilon) \cap U^N(SGP^\epsilon(\Gamma^N)) \neq \emptyset$, and
2. there exists a $\underline{\delta} < 1$ such that for all $\delta \in (\underline{\delta}, 1)$, $B(v, \epsilon) \cap U_\delta^\infty(SGP(\Gamma^N)) \neq \emptyset$.

So, those are the major patterns for the results, the equilibrium sets expand as N grows large or as $\delta \uparrow 1$, and the utilities of the approximate equilibrium set for Γ^N , N large, look like the utilities for Γ_δ^∞ , $\delta \simeq 1$.

Radner offered a couple of rationales for ϵ -equilibria with $\epsilon > 0$, and it worth the time to reiterate his points.

1. First, actually optimizing is quite hard and we might reasonably suppose that people only optimize their payoffs to within some small ϵ . Herbert Simon distinguished between approximately optimizing in this sense, and in exactly optimizing a simplified version of the problem. In this game, we might consider looking for equilibria in some more limited class of strategies, e.g. in a class that contains the one called “tit-for-tat” — start by playing cooperatively and otherwise match your opponent’s last play, and other simpleminded strategies. (I told you game theory often captured the subtle dynamics of a kindergarden classroom.) This second approach has been modeled extensively by assuming that players are limited in a number of aspects, most prominently by Abreu and Rubinstein who assumed that they are “finite automata”.
2. Second, and more intriguingly, Radner argued that we might believe that the players in this game understand that if both optimize all the way, if both squeeze out the last little bit of surplus, then a disaster will befall them both. It seems to me that this is an argument about socialization towards Pareto dominant outcomes — for the common good I am willing to sacrifice a little bit. This seems reasonable, but one might argue that if this is true, then it ought to show up in the payoffs. A really rigid version of this argument would say that if it is hard to put this into the payoffs convincingly (it is) then this indicates that we don’t really understand what’s behind this argument. One way to understand what is going on is to think about the advantages of having a reputation for being a good citizen. In other words, any game should be thought of as being imbedded in a larger social context.

6.3 Some results on finite repetition

Now let Γ be the tragedy of the Commons game as given (a long ways) above. The two claims we will look at are

Claim: If $h \in \mathcal{O}(Eq(\Gamma^N))$, then at the N ’th time period, h specifies the static Nash equilibrium.

This is a special case of

Lemma 6.3 *In the last period of equilibrium play of Γ^N , a static Nash equilibrium is played.*

This implies that complete efficiency cannot be achieved as part of a Nash equilibrium of Γ^N , though one could get the efficient outcome in periods $t = 1, 2, \dots, N - 1$, which is pretty close. One could have all countries (players) playing the strategy

start by playing $1/I$ times the efficient fleet size, continue playing this so long as everyone else does and $t \leq N - 1$, if at $t \leq N - 1$, some country i has deviated from $1/I$ -times the efficient fleet size at any point in the past, then identify the first deviator breaking ties by alphabetizing (in Swahili), have everyone who is not the first deviator play $1/(I - 1)$ times the total fleet size that yields 0 profits at $t + 1$, have the deviator play fleet size of 0, and at $t = N$, if there has been no deviation from $1/I$ times the efficient fleet size, play the static game Nash equilibrium fleet size.

Problem 6.4 *Give conditions on the payoffs U^N for which the strategies just described belong to $Eq(\Gamma^N)$.*

Something peculiar is happening, the Tragedy of the Commons and the Prisoners' Dilemma, played once, have just one equilibrium, however, when played $N < \infty$ times, the Tragedy has many equilibria, the Dilemma just one. It is possible to explain this using the language of “threats.”

6.4 Threats in finitely repeated games

Put equilibrium considerations in the back of your mind for just a little bit, and cast your memory back (fondly?) to those school year days spent in terror of threats by older, larger kids. Consider the question, “What is the worst that players $j \neq i$ can do to player i ?” Well, they can call him/her a booby or a nincompoop, but these are not sticks nor stones, and given that we are now adults, we are not supposed to believe that this hurts too much. However, stealing your lunch money and stuffing you into a garbage can, now that hurts. What $j \neq i$ can do is get together and agree to take those actions that make i so miserable as possible. This is a threat with some teeth to it. Now, i has some protection against this behavior — knowing that the others are ganging up, i can plan accordingly to maximize i 's utility against the gang-up behavior. There are three “safe” utility levels that one might imagine i being able to guarantee itself,

$$\underline{v}_i^{pure} = \min_{a_{-i} \in \times_{j \neq i} A_j} \max_{t_i \in A_i} u_i(a_i, s_{-i}),$$

$$\underline{v}_i^{mixed} = \min_{\sigma_{-i} \in \times_{j \neq i} \Delta(A_j)} \max_{t_i \in A_i} u_i(a_i, \sigma_{-i}), \text{ and}$$

$$\underline{v}_i^{corr} = \min_{\mu_{-i} \in \Delta(\times_{j \neq i} A_j)} \max_{t_i \in A_i} u_i(a_i, \mu_{-i}),$$

Since $\times_{j \neq i} A_j \subset \times_{j \neq i} \Delta(A_j) \subset \Delta(\times_{j \neq i} A_j)$,

$$\underline{v}_i^{pure} \geq \underline{v}_i^{mixed} \geq \underline{v}_i^{corr}.$$

Problem 6.5 Give games where the two inequalities are strict.

The first corresponds of the worst that dolts who do not understand randomization can do to i , the second corresponds of the worst that enemies who do understand independent randomization can do to i , the third corresponds of the worst that fiends who completely understand randomization can do to i . The three $\underline{v}_i$'s are called "safety levels." Here is one of the reasons.

Lemma 6.4 For all $i \in I$ and for all N (for all δ), if σ is an equilibrium for Γ^N (for Γ_δ^∞), then $U_i^N(\sigma) \geq \underline{v}_i^{mixed}$ ($U_{\delta,i}^\infty(\sigma) \geq \underline{v}_i^{mixed}$).

This lemma is ridiculously easy to prove once you see how. Suppose that other players are playing some strategy σ_{-i} . In period 1, have i play a myopic, that is, one period best response to the distribution over A_{-i} induced by σ_{-i}^1 , $\sigma_i \in Br_i(\sigma^1(h^0))$. More generally, after any h^{t-1} , have i play $\sigma_i^t \in Br_i(\sigma(h^{t-1}))$. In each period, it must be the case that $u_i(s^t) \geq \underline{v}_i^{mixed}$.

The following is a pair of reasons to call the $\underline{v}_i$'s safety levels, neither proof is particularly easy.

Theorem (Benoit & Krishna): Suppose that for each $i \in I$ there is a pair of equilibria $\sigma^*(i)$ and $\sigma'(i)$ for Γ such that $u_i(\sigma^*(i)) > u_i(\sigma'(i))$. Suppose also that the convex hull of $u(S)$ has non-empty interior. Let v be a vector in the convex hull of $u(S)$ such that for all $i \in I$, $v_i > \underline{v}_i^{pure}$. Then for all $\epsilon > 0$, there exists an N' such that for all $N \geq N'$, there is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium σ^* of Γ^N such that $\|u(\sigma^*) - v\| < \epsilon$. If the words "subgame perfect" are deleted, then change $\underline{v}_i^{pure}$ to $\underline{v}_i^{mixed}$.

It is intuitive for two reasons, one obvious and one a bit more subtle, that more things are possible when we look at equilibria rather than subgame perfect equilibria. First, there are more equilibria than there are subgame perfect equilibria, this is obvious. Second, some of the strategies that go into the proof require players to min-max someone else, and this can be rather costly. In an equilibrium, one can threaten to min-max someone and never have to seriously consider carrying through on it. But for an equilibrium to be subgame perfect, it must only consider min-max threats that are seriously considered as possibilities. Let us look at both these points in the following 2×2 game,

	L	R
T	(2,9)	(-20,-80)
B	(10,0)	(-30,-100)

For this game, $Eq(\Gamma) = (B, L)$ and $u(Eq(\Gamma)) = (10, 0)$.

Claim: $\mathbb{O}(Eq(\Gamma^2))$ contains the history $h = ((T, L), (B, L))$.

It is important to note that (T, L) is nothing like the unique equilibrium of Γ . The claim can be seen to be true by considering the strategies $\sigma^1(h^0) = (T, L)$, $\sigma_1^2(h^1) \equiv B$, and

$$\sigma_2^2(h^1) = \begin{cases} L & \text{if } h^1 = (T, L) \\ R & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}.$$

These are in fact Nash equilibria, just check the mutual best response property. They are not subgame perfect equilibria, just check that they call for play of a dominated strategy in the case of “otherwise.” That is the obvious reasoning.

Show that the $\underline{v}_i^{pure}$ are $(-20, 0)$ for this game. The more subtle observation is that for 2 to min-max 1, 2 must suffer a great deal. To have a subgame perfect equilibrium in which 1’s utility is held down, we must have strategies in which it regularly happens that some s_i^t giving 2 $u_2(s^t) < \underline{v}_2^{pure}$ happens. Therefore, the strategies for the Benoit and Krishna result must also threaten the threateners. In subgame perfect equilibrium strategies, 2 must be threatened with dire consequences, and it must be an equilibrium threat, after s/he has avoided receiving a period’s worth of -80 or -100 . In particular, s/he must be threatened by something even worse than what s/he was getting by going along with the strategies. In equilibrium strategies, 2 must be threatened with dire consequences, but it needn’t be an equilibrium threat.

Claim: Let v be a vector in the convex hull of $u(S)$, $\mathbf{co}(u(S))$. If $v \gg (-20, 0)$, then for any $\epsilon > 0$, there exists $\underline{\delta} < 1$ such that if for all $i \in I$, $\delta_i \in (\underline{\delta}, 1)$, then

$$(\exists v' \in u(\mathbb{O}(Eq(\Gamma^\infty(\delta))))[||v' - v|| < \epsilon].$$

6.5 Threats in infinitely repeated games

The third reason to call the $\underline{v}_i$ ’s safety levels appears in the following result, which we will not prove, though we will talk about it.¹

Folk Theorem: Suppose that $\mathbf{co}(u(S))$ has non-empty interior. Let v be a vector in $\mathbf{co}(u(S))$ such that for all $i \in I$, $v_i > \underline{v}_i^{mixed}$. For all $\epsilon > 0$, there exists a $\underline{\delta} < 1$ such that for all $\delta \in (\underline{\delta}, 1)$,

$$B(v, \epsilon) \cap U^\delta(SGP(\Gamma_\delta^\infty)) \neq \emptyset.$$

Before discussing how the proof works, let look at an example violating the condition that $\mathbf{co}(u(S))$ have non-empty interior, in particular, let us look at the Matching Pennies

¹We will not even state the most general version of this result, for that see Lones Smith (19??, Econometrica).

game,

	H	T
H	$(+1, -1)$	$(-1, +1)$
T	$(-1, +1)$	$(+1, -1)$

Claim: For all $\delta \in (0, 1)^I$, if $\sigma^\infty \in Eq(\Gamma^\infty(\delta))$, then $\mathbb{Q}(\sigma^\infty)$ is the i.i.d. distribution putting mass $\frac{1}{4}$ on each point in S in each period. In this game, there is no $v \in \mathbf{co}(u(S))$ that is greater than the threat point vector $(0, 0)$.

Three person example violating the interiority condition goes here.

Problem 6.6 *This question concerns infinitely repeated Cournot competition between two firms with identical, constant marginal costs, $c > 0$, identical discount factors, $0 < \delta < 1$, and a linear demand curve with intercept greater than c .*

1. For what range of δ 's can monopoly output be a subgame perfect equilibrium with Nash reversion strategies?
2. Show that as $\delta \uparrow 1$, prices arbitrarily close to the competitive price c also arises as part of the equilibrium price path.

6.6 Rubinstein-Ståhl bargaining

Two people, 1 and 2, are bargaining about the division of a cake of size 1. They bargain by taking turns, one turn per period. If it is i 's turn to make an offer, she does so at the beginning of the period. The offer is α where α is the share of the cake to 1 and $(1 - \alpha)$ is the share to 2. After an offer α is made, it may be accepted or rejected in that period. If accepted, the cake is divided forthwith. If it is rejected, the cake shrinks to δ times its size at the beginning of the period, and it becomes the next period. In the next period it is j 's turn to make an offer. Things continue in this vein either until some final period T , or else indefinitely.

Suppose that person 1 gets to make the final offer. Find the unique subgame perfect equilibrium. Suppose that 2 is going to make the next to last offer, find the unique subgame perfect equilibrium. Suppose that 1 is going to make the next to next last offer, find the subgame perfect equilibrium. Note the contraction mapping aspect and find the unique solution for the infinite length game in which 1 makes the first offer.

Problem 6.7 *The Joker and the Penguin have stolen 3 diamond eggs from the Gotham museum. If an egg is divided, it loses all value. The Joker and the Penguin split the eggs*

by making alternating offers, if an offer is refused, the refuser gets to make the next offer. Each offer and refusal or acceptance uses up 2 minutes. During each such 2 minute period, there is an independent, probability r , $r \in (0, 1)$, event. The event is Batman swooping in to rescue the eggs, leaving the two arch-villains with no eggs (eggsept the egg on their faces, what a yolk). However, if the villains agree on a division before Batman finds them, they escape and enjoy their ill-gotten gains.

Question: What does the set of subgame perfect equilibria look like? [Hint: it is not in your interest to simply give the Rubinstein bargaining model answer. That model assumed that what was being divided was continuously divisible.]

6.7 Optimal simple penal codes

Here we are going to examine the structure of the subgame perfect equilibria of infinitely repeated games.

6.8 Abreu's example

We will take this directly from his paper.

6.9 Harris' formulation of optimal simple penal codes

Time starts at $t = 1$, at each stage the simultaneous game $\Gamma = (A_i, u_i)_{i \in I}$ is played, A_i is sequentially compact with metric ρ_i , and u_i is jointly continuous with respect to any of metrics ρ inducing the product topology. For a history (read vector) $h \in H = \times_{t=1}^{\infty} S$, h_t denotes the t 'th component of h , payoffs are given by

$$U_i(h) = \sum_{t=1}^{\infty} \delta_i^t u_i(h_t),$$

where $0 < \delta_i < 1$. The product topology of H can be metrized by

$$d(h, h') = \sum_{t=1}^{\infty} \min\{2^{-n}, \rho(h_t, h'_t)\}.$$

Problem 6.8 *The set H is sequentially compact in the metric d , and each U_i is continuous.*

Player i 's strategy for period t is a function $\sigma_i^t : H^{t-1} \rightarrow A_i$ where $H^{t-1} := \times_{k=1}^{t-1} S$, and H^0 is, by convention, some one point set. An initial history is a vector $h^t \in H^t$. Player

i 's strategy is the vector $\sigma_i = (\sigma_i^1, \sigma_i^2, \dots)$. A profile of strategies for the players is then $\sigma = (\sigma^i)_{i \in I}$, and a profile of strategies at time t is $\sigma^t = (\sigma_i^t)_{i \in I}$.

Let $\mathbb{O}(\sigma, h, t)$ denote the outcome h for the first t time periods followed by the outcome determined by play of σ . Thus, $(\mathbb{O}(\sigma, h, t))_k = h_k$ for $1 \leq k \leq t$, and

$$(\mathbb{O}(\sigma, h, t))_k = \sigma^k((\mathbb{O}(\sigma, h, t))_1, (\mathbb{O}(\sigma, h, t))_2, \dots, (\mathbb{O}(\sigma, h, t))_{k-1})$$

for $k > t$.

Definition: A strategy combination σ is a **subgame perfect equilibrium of the repeated game** if $(\forall i, t, h)$ and for all strategies γ^i for i ,

$$U_i((\mathbb{O}(\sigma, h, t))) \geq U_i((\mathbb{O}(\sigma \setminus \gamma^i, h, t))).$$

The assumption is that the repeated game has a subgame perfect equilibrium in pure strategies.

Definition: For a strategy vector σ , the history $q \in H$ **comes into force in period $t + 1$ after a given initial history** $h^t = (h_1, \dots, h_t)$ of $\mathbb{O}(\sigma, h, t) = (h_1, \dots, h_t, q_1, q_2, \dots)$.

Given histories in H , q^0 and $(q^i)_{i \in I}$, the following recursive construction of a strategy vector $F(q^0, q^1, \dots, q^I)$ will be used many times below:

1. q^0 comes into force in period 1.
2. If q^j , $0 \leq j \leq I$ came into force in period k , if q^j is followed in all periods up to but not including period $t \geq k$, and if player i deviates against q_{t-k+1}^j in period t , then q^i comes into force in period $t + 1$.
3. If q^j came into force in period k , and more than 1 player deviated against q_{t-k+1}^j in period $t \geq k$, then q^i comes into force in period $t + 1$ where i is the lowest numbered amongst the deviating players.

Definition: A **simple penal code** is a vector of histories $(q^i)_{i \in I}$. A simple penal code is **perfect** if there exists $q^0 \in H$ such that $F(q^0, q^1, \dots, q^I)$ is a subgame perfect equilibrium.

Problem 6.9 If $(q^i)_{i \in I}$ is perfect, then $(\forall i \in I)[F(q^i, q^1, \dots, q^I)]$ is a subgame perfect equilibrium.

Let $P \subset H$ denote the set of outcomes associated with subgame perfect equilibria. Let $\underline{U}_i$ denote $\inf\{U_i(q) : q \in P\}$.

Definition: A simple penal code $(q^i)_{i \in I}$ is **optimal** if it is perfect and if

$$(\forall i \in I)[U_i(q^i) = \underline{U}_i].$$

Lemma: Let $f = F(q^0, q^1, \dots, q^I)$. If no single period deviation against f is profitable for any player in any subgame, then f is a subgame perfect equilibrium.

Problem 6.10 Show that $(q^i)_{i \in I}$ is a perfect simple penal code if and only if for all i, j, t , and all $a_i \in A_i$,

$$\sum_{k=t}^{\infty} \delta_i^k u_i(q_k^j) \geq \delta_i^t u_i(q_t^j \setminus a_i) + \delta_i^t U_i(q^i).$$

Proposition: There exists an optimal simple penal code.

Proposition: If $(q^i)_{i \in I}$ is an optimal simple penal code, then

$$(\forall q^0 \in P)[F(q^0, q^1, \dots, q^I) \text{ is a subgame perfect equilibrium}].$$

6.10 “Shunning,” market-place racism, and other examples

Again, we will work through a problem.

Problem 6.11 There are N identical, incumbent firms Bertrand (price) competing in an industry. The industry (inverse) demand curve is $p = 1 - q$. Each incumbent firm has the constant marginal cost function $C(q_i) = cq_i$ for some $0 < c \ll 1$. The consumers react instantly to price changes, going to the lowest cost supplier, evenly dividing themselves among firms tied at the lowest price. For the repeated versions of this game, the firms have the same discount factor, $\beta \in (0, 1)$.

1. Find the one-shot Bertrand-Nash equilibrium prices, quantities, and profits for this industry.
2. (Nash reversion) As a function of β , find the highest price (i.e. most collusive) q^0 such that $F(q^0, q^1, \dots, q^I)$ is a subgame perfect equilibrium where $(q^1, \dots, q^I)$ is the Nash equilibrium.
3. (Temporary Nash reversion) Let p_m denote the price that a monopolist would charge in this industry and let $\pi_m > 0$ denote industry monopoly profits. For each $i \in I$, let q^i be the history

$$q^i = (\underbrace{\vec{c}, \dots, \vec{c}}_{T \text{ periods}}, \vec{p}_m, \vec{p}_m, \dots)$$

where $\vec{x}$ is an I -length vector with x in each component. Let q^0 be the history

$$q^0 = (p_m, p_m, \dots).$$

Show that for β close to 1 and T large, $F(q^0, q^1, \dots, q^I)$ is a subgame perfect equilibrium. (Verbally, these strategies are “play c for T periods if there is ever a price gouger.”)

4. (*Discriminatory equilibria*) Now suppose that any of the firms could lower their costs to $C(q_i) = rcq_i$ with $0 < r < 1$ by hiring, at a lower wage, members of an oppressed racial, ethnic, gender, or religious group. Let $h_{i,t}$ denote firm i 's hiring practices in period t , with $h_{i,t} = 0$ indicating no hires from the oppressed group and $h_{i,t} = 1$ denoting hires from the oppressed group. Actions by i in period t are $(h_{i,t}, p_{i,t})$. Let q^0 denote the history

$$q^0 = ((0, \vec{p}_m), (0, \vec{p}_m), \dots).$$

Let a^i denote the length- I vector with i 'th component $(0, sc)$, $0 \leq s < r$, and all other components $(0, rc)$. Let q^i denote the history

$$q^i = (\underbrace{a^i, \dots, a^i}_{T \text{ periods}}, q^0).$$

Find conditions on s , T , and β such that $F(q^0, q^1, \dots, q^I)$ is a subgame perfect equilibrium. Verbally, if someone either cheats on the cartel price or hires a member of the oppressed group, they must do penance for T periods before anyone can go back to the profitable discriminatory status quo.

5. Subgame perfect equilibria must survive single person deviations. This is definition and can therefore be changed. One can sometimes find equilibria that survive deviations by groups. Formulate discriminatory equilibria that survive coordinated deviations by “small” subsets of the firms in this game.

The following is Abreu's (1988 E'trica) original example of using simple penal codes. It is a 3×3 game, a two player simultaneous discrete, quantity-setting duopoly game Γ in which each firm may choose a *Low*, *Medium*, or *High* output level:

	L	M	H
L	10, 10	3, 15	0, 7
M	15, 3	7, 7	-4, 5
H	7, 0	5, -4	-15, -15

Consider the Nash reversion simple penal code, $F(q^0, (q^1, q^2))$ with q^0 being $((L, L), (L, L), \dots)$ and $q^1 = q^2$ being $((M, M), (M, M), \dots)$. For discount factor $\delta \geq 5/8$, the Nash reversion strategies are subgame perfect, and for $\delta < 5/8$, they are not. Now consider the simple penal code $F(q^0, (q^1, q^2))$ with q^0 being $((L, L), (L, L), \dots)$, q^1 being $((M, H), (L, M), (L, M), \dots)$ and q^2 being $((H, M), (M, L), (M, L), \dots)$. For $\delta = 4/7 < 5/8$, this vector of strategies is subgame perfect.

Chapter 7

Evolutionary Game Theory

The idea is to look at dynamic processes that increase the play of strategies that do well.¹ This has an evolutionary flavor to it. We do not have to take the idea of evolution perfectly seriously, some of the increase in the play of different strategies may come from imitation by players that are more sophisticated than (say) microbes. Unfortunately, there are few results in evolutionary game theory (so far) that are so useful for story telling as equilibrium analysis has been. To some extent, this is not true in a rather small set of games, the symmetric ones. But first,

7.1 An overview of evolutionary arguments

The idea of evolution had been around for a long time before Charles Darwin wrote *The Origin of Species*. What Darwin provided was a mechanism, variation combined with natural selection, whereby evolution could occur.² Decades later, Watson & Crick discovered, within cells, the chemical basis for variability. Knowing about DNA and having in mind very specific selection stories, biologists have learned a huge amount about the nature of life on this planet. Forces that affect reproductive success of DNA are the critical ones.

As observed by Darwin, selection works at different rates depending on the number of individual animals or plants to be selected amongst, and depending on the intensity of the selection. Thus, donkeys, being mostly owned by the poor in Darwin's England, were rarely owned in sufficient quantity by one person who could and would select for the favorable

¹This section will be re-written by the time we get to it.

²Darwin spent the first chapter of his book reviewing how sheep breeders, horse breeders, pigeon fanciers, horticulturalists, dog breeders (and probably others that I am forgetting) had used variation and selection to achieve really remarkable changes. He also observed that these principles of selective breeding were written about in ancient Chinese texts, by the Romans (Pliny if I remember), and were known to the Eskimo and to isolated tribes in Africa.

characteristics. By contrast, rich sheep breeders owned large flocks, would thoroughly check the details of the growth and characteristics of the large number of young sheep (at three different times before they were of breeding age), and breed only a very small proportion of their sheep. As a result, variation across types of sheep is large and quickly achieved, variation across types of donkeys is small. Here we see the intersection of economics and biology. From a biological point of view, Darwin's England spending more resources on the quality of sheep meant that sheep evolved more quickly and reproduced more often than donkeys. Knowledge of different relations between genotype and phenotype allows us to tell even more finely nuanced stories than this.

In *Guns, Germs, and Steel*, Jared Diamond contrasts the evolution of oaks, a source of acorns, and almond trees. Wild almonds are poisonous to humans (they taste terrible too, though birds can eat them). However, there is a single gene that controls the poison content of almonds. This means that if you find an almond tree that gives good tasting, non-poisonous almonds, its offspring will also give good tasting, non-poisonous almonds. Squirrels do not like to hide almonds, and almond trees grow to producing age fairly quickly. These are important for understanding why humans grow so many more almond trees than oak trees. Most oak trees give acorns with a very high tannin content (this makes them taste horrible, but not to squirrels). In bad times in medieval Europe, acorns were a backup food source (there are ways of cooking them that reduces the tannin content). Some oak trees give sweet acorns, acorns with a low tannin content, and the location of those rare oak trees with low-tannin, good tasting acorns was cherished and important knowledge. There are, however, many different genes that control the tannin content of acorns. Therefore, most of the offspring of an oak tree that gives low-tannin acorns give high tannin acorns. Further, squirrels like to hide acorns. Squirrels are forgetful creatures, most of the oak trees grow from their forgotten acorns. Oak trees take a long time to mature. During their long growing period, one cannot figure out if they are going to give low or high tannin acorns. Combining all of these factors, you can buy almonds but not acorns in the grocery stores. Oak trees are grown by humans as decoration, but not as a food source.

Darwin gave us a mechanism – variation and selection – and a scale at which it worked – across generations of living creatures. Absolutely crucial to evolutionary explanations is the inheritability of traits. As we have learned more about how differences in DNA are expressed, we have been able to tell more nuanced evolutionary stories because we know more about the mechanisms of inheritability. In economics, we do not (yet) understand the parallel mechanism, nor do we have an appropriate scale at which it should operate.

In our principles courses (e.g. Paul Samuelson's *Principles of Economics*), we say that inefficient firms, ones that do not maximize profits, will go out of business. This is surely a variation and selection argument. Firms vary in their behavior, those that do not behave in a certain way die. I want to argue that the last sentence contains two very different possibilities for evolutionary arguments:

1. To make this an evolutionary argument about firms, we need to explain how the successful firms propagate.
2. To make this an evolutionary argument about behavior, we need to explain how the successful behaviors propagate.

Let us take these two ideas in turn, discussing the first one will make it clear that the second kind of argument is more likely to be useful.

Firms: New firms are started by people with different kinds of experience. If they come from a successful firm, they have learned about behaviors that make a firm work. If they are starting up one their own, we expect them to have picked up experience or knowledge from someplace, perhaps an MBA, perhaps some other kind of credential, otherwise people are unlikely to lend them money to get going. To be very specific here, successful behavior includes (but is not limited to) keeping records, double entry book-keeping, returning the phone calls of customers or otherwise being available to them, paying employees on time, sticking to agreements/contracts, publicizing the existence of the firm. Whatever the experience basis of the founders of a firm, most new firms fail quickly and the people who run them go bankrupt. Then, often enough, they try again, hoping that failure has taught them something useful about running a business. Learning something useful makes them behave differently.

To the extent that firms are reproducing themselves, they are doing it by fissioning, by employees leaving to start their own firms, or by spinning off subsidiaries. It is not at all clear what the connection is between these kind of reproductive success and success as we generally think of businesses being successful. It might well be that a growing, successful business is more likely to keep employees and subsidiaries than to have them go off to start their own business.³ A little more starkly, the reproductive success of firms may be tied to their failure. Overall, it seems to me that the firm is the wrong unit of analysis for evolutionary arguments.

Behaviors: If successful behavior is observed and imitated, we have the basic ingredient for an evolutionary argument, one that can work even in contexts where firm level arguments fail.⁴ For example, in the U.S. during this century, every generation the average farm size has doubled and the number of farming firms has halved. The U.S. farm sector is widely regarded as one of the most successful in the world. This is not because the firms have reproduced themselves successfully, on average more than half of them have not, but because the successful behaviors (fertilizers, mechanical planters and harvesters, use of hybrid seed, insurance and forward contracts) have spread. What makes this kind of argument very

³There should be research on this empirical question.

⁴This line of argument is Veblen's.

complicated is that behavior, and especially its reproduction, while easy to talk about, is difficult to pin down.

A recipe for, say, chocolate brownies, is a codification of behavior. A recipe that is tasty and easy to make, if it ends up in the hands of someone who likes to give parties to people who also cook, will be copied. This is a good evolutionary argument: we understand the circumstances that lead to reproduction well enough to make comparative statics kinds of arguments — access to party givers increases the probability of duplication/reproduction. If the recipe is hand copied, you have one source of mutation, if the person is a confident cook, you have another source of mutation, so there is variation and selection at work. An organized set of laws and behavior like the stock market is another codification of behavior. There is the historical argument that one of the reasons that the British conquered so much of the world is that they had a stock market, and in particular, they had limited liability laws. Again, there is a good evolutionary argument here: because of limited liability laws, the rich were willing to buy stock in companies because they knew that the most they could lose was their investment. Because of this, there was a large and concentratable pool of capital available for large investments. The size of the investments made hiring and developing good technical skills more valuable. This in turn made large investments more profitable and produced more riches to go into the stock market. It also made it possible for the British government to raise the large sums of capital necessary to outfit ships. The ships were better than any others in the world in good part because of the rewards to hiring and developing good technical skills.⁵

However, and this is a large reservation, there is nothing like DNA to be found in these stories. In literate societies with large amounts of leisure, recipes are written into cookbooks and printed. When this happens, they stop mutating so quickly (though later editions of Rombauer and Becker are very different than early editions). In industrialized and industrializing societies, the specific laws governing the conduct of stock markets are adapted, in a process involving thoughtful analysis, from other successful models.

Recipes for steel, recipes for good records, recipes for good customer relations, recipes for a stock market, these too are written down and disseminated. In each different case, we can identify circumstances that lead to reproductive success (steel that holds an edge, a functioning tax system, a thriving business, a thriving society). My uneasiness about the lack of a DNA for these stories takes two forms.

1. A huge potential for variability in the reproductive stories arises from this lack.
2. The idea of a species, a population that can breed within itself, seems vague.

⁵This mutually reinforcing kind of argument, made in the social sciences, is one part of Karl Marx's contribution.

The first one seems less worrisome. After all, the reproductive success of (say) giraffes is determined by a very different environment, i.e. set of circumstances than the reproductive success of (say) tubeworms.

Behaviors that manage to be codified into law, e.g. businesses must have records adequate to determine their tax obligations, have very successfully reproduced themselves. For a behavior to reproduce itself this way, it must be consonant with previously established patterns of meaning and legitimacy.⁶ For living creatures to reproduce, they must be able to survive, and even thrive, in their environment. The environment for behavior that reproduces itself by being written into laws and regulations is a mixture of legislative bodies (where laws are written) and law schools (where most legislators, or at least the staff of most legislators, learn about law).

The environment for behavior the reproduces itself by imitation is very different. In European cultures, one shakes hands on meeting someone, and there are any number of gradations of goodwill that can be signaled by the timing, pressure, and accompanying facial and body expressions. (Gradations in bowing replaces this variety of behavior in other cultures.) In European cultures, one shakes hands at the end of negotiations to indicate agreement to terms just discussed. Subtle details in the way the first kind of handshake is conducted can determine whether the second kind of handshake occurs. These behaviors are crucial for the conduct of mutually improving trade, the basis of economics. The reproductive success of these hand shaking behaviors depends on very different factors than the reproductive success of record keeping behaviors.

The second uneasiness, about the lack of an idea of what a species is, seems deeper to me. A species is defined by “‘ x and y belong to the same species’ if they can successfully have fertile offspring.” One of the fundamental recent advances in genetic engineering has been the ability to take DNA from one species and put it into the germ plasm of another. However, we don’t believe that this is what happens in the evolution of different species (except perhaps for some viruses).

To understand things like mutation and cross breeding of behaviors entails understanding how people process old behaviors and information into new behaviors. The thoughtful analysis that went into adapting English banking and stock market structures to France and Germany is much like the taking of DNA from one species and putting it into the germ plasm of another. Veblen’s answer, his source of the variation necessary for selection is “idle curiosity.” As with Keynes’ “animal spirits,” there seems to be something there, but it’s awfully hard to pin down. And in any case, the habit, Veblen’s unit of selection, of idle curiosity should be subject to its own pressures.

Just because species is such a useful and important idea in the study of plants and

⁶See Christopher Jenck’s “Varieties of Altruism” in Mansbridge’s collection on selfishness for a very nice set of observations about being consonant with previously established patterns of meanings and legitimacy.

animals does not mean that it need have a parallel in the study of behavior.

To understand the origin of new behaviors requires the study of culture, and especially the study of the communication of culture.⁷ This seems a bit far afield from what economists are likely to be good at. What we are likely to be good at is studying simplified models capturing a few different aspects of these very complicated stories. We are also likely to be good at convincing ourselves that we have captured the most important aspects.⁸

In any case, the basic reproductive argument is that more successful things, be they organisms or behaviors, become a larger part of the population. Indeed, becoming a larger part of the population is often the measure of success.

There are many mathematical formulations of this idea, and we'll look at a couple of them.⁹

7.2 The basic 'large' population modeling

Before getting into this, be warned, I don't have any patience with the study of ESS concepts that are so specialized that they apply only to symmetric games. The definition that you are getting below is **not** the one that you will see in other introductory treatments. They can only discuss symmetric equilibria.¹⁰

Fix a game $\Gamma = (A_i, u_i)_{i \in I}$. Suppose that there is a large (read continuum) set Ω_i of people of type i and that they are 'programmed' to played a strategy $x_i(\omega_i)$. Being 'programmed' can have a genetic reading as it might in organisms with behavior determined by genetics, it can have a more social reading if we think that 'programming' is some slower process of choice. The strategy $x_i(\omega_i)$ may be a mixed one. Suppose that some small mass ϵ_i of people of type i mutate and start playing x'_i . The basic idea of evolutionary stability is that play of $x = (x_i)_{i \in I}$ is stable if some small proportion, $\epsilon = (\epsilon_i)_{i \in I}$, of "mutants," i.e. players of some $x' = (x'_i) \neq x$, enter the population, those playing $x = (x_i)_{i \in I}$ do better. If you do better, then you dominate in the population and the mutants die out. This is a crucial difference between game theory reasoning we have seen before where the u_i represent preferences. Here the $u_i(s)$ are measures of reproductive success, measures of the number

⁷There are very deep arguments summarized in the aphorism that communication is culture.

⁸There is now a great deal of research that shows that successful people have exaggerated impressions of their own abilities and control. Perhaps the same is true about academic disciplines.

⁹Another reference worth looking at is Thorstein Veblen's "Why Economics is not an Evolutionary Science." Veblen understood and admired Darwin's work and thought that focus on equilibrium thinking dooms economics as a science. Bear this in mind as we look through the variety of evolutionarily motivated equilibrium concepts below.

¹⁰Nash's second proof of equilibrium existence, with modifications that he details, shows that symmetric games do have symmetric equilibria. Thus, there is some hope that ESS's defined only for symmetric games are talking about a non-empty set of objects. So what.

of viable offspring. This means that we need the $u_i(s) \geq 0$ and the theory is not going to be immune to the addition of arbitrary constants.

A vector x is stable, that is, it is an Evolutionarily Stable Strategy (ESS) if it cannot be successfully invaded.¹¹

Notation: For a vectors $u \in \mathbb{R}^L$ and $v = (v_\ell)_{\ell=1}^L$, $v_\ell \in \mathbb{R}^{A_\ell}$, let $u \odot v$ be the vector in $\mathbb{R}^{\times_{\ell=1}^L A_\ell}$ with ℓ 'th component $u_\ell \cdot v_\ell$. Let $(1 - \epsilon)$ denote I -vector with $(1 - \epsilon_i)$ in the i 'th position, ϵ the I -vector with ϵ_i in the i 'th position.

Definition: $x = (x_i)_{i \in I} \in \times_{i \in I} \Delta(A_i)$ is an ESS if for any $x' = (x'_i)_{i \in I} \neq x$, there exists a (sufficiently small) non-zero vector ϵ such that for all $i \in I$,

$$u_i(((1 - \epsilon) \odot x + \epsilon \odot x')) \setminus x_i > u_i(((1 - \epsilon) \odot x + \epsilon \odot x')) \setminus x'_i.$$

Lemma 7.1 x is an ESS if and only if there exists $\delta > 0$ such that

$$(\forall x' \in B(x, \delta))[\{x_i\} = Br_i(x')].$$

No mixed strategy equilibria can possibly satisfy this, but all strict pure strategy equilibria do. Indeed, these conditions are satisfied if and only if x is a pure strategy strict equilibrium. We already know that those are pretty nifty equilibria, now we know that they satisfy evolutionary pressures too. In a game that has only one mixed strategy equilibrium, these conditions cannot be satisfied and no ESS exists.

ESS is not so very general a theory as Nash equilibrium. This may be because evolutionary solutions are not very good, or it may be because Nash equilibrium solutions are too good. To get a bit better understanding, we need to look at the dynamics behind the intuitive stability arguments given for an ESS. Perhaps the problem is that the dynamics have been short-circuited and we have only looked at static conditions that we expect to be fulfilled once the system is settled. Indeed, biologists may not care that the system does not have a steady state provided they have the equations of motion of a system. We will look at two approaches, a continuous time differential equation approach,¹² and some alternate forms of a discrete time approach.

7.2.1 General continuous time dynamics

Suppose that the population Ω_i of type i players is playing the strategy $\sigma_i : \Omega_i \rightarrow \Delta(A_i)$. Define $x_i = x_i(\sigma_i) \in \Delta(A_i)$ by

$$x_i(a_i) = \int_{\Omega_i} \sigma_i(\omega_i)(s_i) d\mu_i(\omega_i).$$

¹¹This same idea shows up in specialized for symmetric games.

¹²?exposed with infinitesimal time increments?

When a population member ω_i is picked according to the distribution μ_i and then plays the strategy $\sigma_i(\omega_i)$, this represents the aggregate probability that the pure strategy $a_i \in A_i$ is played. Rather than directly model changes in the μ_i over time, we concentrate on the reduced form representation contained in x_i . Dynamics are of the form

$$\frac{dx_i(a_i)}{dt} = \dot{x}_i(s_i) = F_i(x, s_i).$$

If $F_i(x, a_i)$ is increasing in $u_i(x \setminus s_i)$, and, given that a_i is more successful than other strategies, increasing in the proportion of the population already playing a_i , then the dynamics have the basic evolutionary flavor. If $F_i(x, a_i) > 0$ when $x_i(s_i) = 0$, then the dynamics can never really settle down. But if $F_i(x, a_i) = 0$ when $x_i(s_i) = 0$, then the dynamics never introduce mutations on their own.

7.2.2 The replicator dynamics in continuous time

The **replicator dynamics** are the favorites. They are

$$\dot{x}_i(a_i) = x_i(s_i)(u_i(x(t) \setminus s_i) - u_i(x(t))).$$

Note that $\sum_{a_i \in A_i} \dot{x}_i(s_i) = 0$. Also note that the replicator dynamics are unaffected by the addition of a constant to u_i . Multiplication by a positive constant affects the speed at which the differential equation moves, and this can matter.

Basic properties: If $x_i(t)(a_i) > 0$, at time t a positive proportion of the population is playing a_i , and $u_i(x(t) \setminus a_i) - u_i(x(t)) > 0$, play of a_i beats the average payoff against the average play of $j \neq i$, then the total proportion of the population playing a_i will increase. If $x_i(t)(s_i)$ is large, i.e. a large proportion of the population is already playing a_i , then the size of the growth is magnified. A useful reformulation, provided $x_i(a_i) > 0$ and $x_i(s'_i) > 0$ is

$$\frac{\dot{x}_i(a_i)}{x_i(s_i)} - \frac{\dot{x}_i(s'_i)}{x_i(s'_i)} = [u_i(x(t) \setminus a_i) - u_i(x(t) \setminus s'_i)].$$

A fixed point of these dynamics is a point x such that if $x(t) \equiv x$, then for all $i \in I$ and all $a_i \in A_i$, $\dot{x}_i(s_i) \equiv 0$. Let $FP \subset \Delta$ denote the set of fixed points.

Lemma 7.2 $Eq(\Gamma) \subset FP$.

Pretty cool, until you realize

Lemma 7.3 $S \subset FP$.

So fixed points for these dynamics are not informative enough. They do not account for the small mutation logic above. Also note

Lemma 7.4 *If $x_i(t)(a_i) > 0$, then for all $\tau \geq t$, $x_i(\tau)(a_i) > 0$.*

These last two results means that we need to study less crude measures of the long term behavior of these dynamics.

Three Definitions: Fix a dynamic system $\dot{x}_i(a_i) = F(x, s_i)$. A point $x^* \in \Delta$ is a **fixed point** of the dynamics if $F(x^*, a_i) \equiv 0$. A fixed point x^* is **stable** if for every $\epsilon > 0$ there exists a $\delta > 0$ such that $x(t) \in B(x^*, \delta)$ implies that for all $\tau \geq t$, $x(\tau) \in B(x^*, \epsilon)$. A stable fixed point x^* is **asymptotically stable** if there exists an $\epsilon > 0$ such that $x(t) \in B(x^*, \epsilon)$ implies that $\lim_{\tau \uparrow \infty} x(t + \tau) = x^*$.

Sometimes (usually) fixed points are called stationary states.

Lemma 7.5 *If x^* is stable for the replicator dynamics, then $x^* \in Eq(\Gamma)$.*

However, consider the 2×2 game

	L	R
T	10, 10	0, 0
B	0, 0	0, 0

In this game, (B, R) is an equilibrium, but it is not stable for the replicator dynamics. This is nice, asking for stability (or asymptotic stability) has deleted a weakly dominated strategy.

Draw the phase diagram for this game. Phase diagrams are really useful for investigating the qualitative behavior of differential equation dynamics. A basic result is

Lemma 7.6 *x^* is a strict equilibrium of Γ if and only if x^* is asymptotically stable for the replicator dynamics.*

The simplest games are the 2×2 games. Look at the replicator dynamics for another two of them, the stag hunt (a coordination game), and another having no pure strategy equilibrium.

	S	H
s	5, 4	0, 1
h	2, 0	2, 1

	l	r
u	5, 4	0, 6
d	2, 2	2, 1

One way to pick between asymptotically stable points is to choose the one with the largest basin of attraction. When you say it so baldly, you will be laughed at. When you fancy it up in the right way, you will be famous.

7.3 Some discrete time stochastic dynamics

What follows is a discrete-time finite population approach to evolutionary pressures. It resembles Kandori, Mailath, and Rob's (1993, Etrica) or Young's (1998, PUP) approach, both of which pick between the strict equilibria of symmetric games on the basis of the size of their basins of attraction. However, I will focus on how limited the arguments are for general games rather than on how much can be proved for a tiny class of games or a tiny class of stochastic specifications.

Fix a finite game $\Gamma = (A_i, u_i)_{i \in I}$. Suppose that there are M_i players of type i , each of which can play any strategy in A_i . Let $\Theta_i \subset \Delta(A_i)$ be the set of probability distributions on A_i with the property that $\theta_i(a_i) = k/M_i$ for some integer k . The interpretation is that if θ_i is part of the state of the system and $\theta_i(a_i) = k/M_i$, then k of the M_i people of type i are playing the strategy a_i . Let $\Theta = \times_{i \in I} \Theta_i$. The aim is to describe an evolutionary scheme based on the state space Θ . The idea is to specify a Markov chain with strictly positive transition probabilities on a finite state space. The strictly positive probabilities are given by full support 'mutations.' Such Markov chains have unique ergodic distributions. The set of equilibria with some kind of evolutionary stability can be defined as the set of limits of ergodic distributions taken as the mutations shrink to 0 probabilistically and/or as the M_i increase to ∞ .

First, note that the $u_i(\theta \setminus \cdot)$ provide a ranking of A_i for each $\theta \in \Theta$.

Second, for given θ , let $B_i(\theta) \subset \Theta_i$ be the set of states for i that move strongly in the direction of higher payoffs from θ ,

$$B_i(\theta) = \{\theta'_i \in \Theta_i : (\forall a_i, t_i \in A_i)[u_i(\theta \setminus t_i) > u_i(\theta \setminus a_i)] \Rightarrow [\theta'_i(a_i) < \theta_i(t_i) \text{ or } \theta_i(a_i) = 0]\}.$$

For example, $B_i(\theta)$ includes the state at which each of the M_i people jump to the best response to θ , and it includes the state at which at least one of each of the M_i people playing any given sub-optimal a_i move to some one of the better strategies t_i .

Third, we describe the law of motion. For each θ , let $\nu_i = \nu_i(\theta) \in \Delta^\circ(A_i)$ be a strictly positive distribution (representing the random choices of the mutants). Let $Q_i = Q_i(\theta)$ be a point in the convex hull of $B_i(\theta)$. Let $\epsilon_i = \epsilon_i(\theta) \in (0, 1)$. The probability distribution for θ_i at $t + 1$ given that the state at t is θ is given by

$$P_i(\theta) = (1 - \epsilon_i)Q_i(\theta) + \epsilon\nu_i(\theta).$$

The probability distribution for θ given that the state at t is θ is given by

$$P(\theta) = \Pi_{i \in I} P_i(\theta).$$

This assumes independence in the transitions, it is not clear that this is correct.

Because each $P_i(\theta) \gg 0$, so is each $P(\theta)$. Let $M = (M_i)_{i \in I}$. Since the state space of the Markov chain is finite, there is a unique ergodic distribution

$$\mu = \mu(\nu, \epsilon, Q, M).$$

The point μ is a distribution over $\Theta \subset \Delta$. Associated with μ is play of $e(\mu) = (P_i(\mu))_{i \in I}$ and what must be true is the $e(\mu) = \mu$. (Sometimes this is useful for calculating the unique ergodic distribution.) Let

$$E_\Gamma(\epsilon, M) = \{\mu : \mu = \mu(\nu, \epsilon, Q, M) : \nu \gg 0, Q_i \in \mathbf{co}(B_i)\}.$$

The set of limit distributions E_Γ is defined as the set of accumulation points as $\epsilon \rightarrow 0$ and $M \uparrow \infty$ of $E_\Gamma(\epsilon, M)$,

$$E_\Gamma = \{\mu : (\exists \epsilon^n \rightarrow 0)(\exists M^n \uparrow \infty)[\mu^n \in E_\Gamma(\epsilon^n, M^n) \ \& \ \mu^n \rightarrow \mu]\}.$$

Rather than taking any and all kinds of limits, one could let $\epsilon^n \downarrow 0$ first, then send M^n to ∞ . Or the reverse if you want to be perverse.

It is easy to show (by the compactness of Δ) that $E_\Gamma \neq \emptyset$ for all finite Γ . This means that this kind of evolutionary theory is not empty. It seems fairly each to show that if $e \in E_\Gamma$ is a point mass, then e must be a Nash equilibrium, so that at least the pure strategy predictions match what we are familiar with.¹³ It is rather hard to say whether all pure Nash equilibria or all pure Nash equilibria in undominated strategies belong to M . KMR and Young are famous for showing the existence of variants of these dynamics for which (in some games) there are strict pure strategy equilibria that do not belong to E_Γ . For symmetric 2 person games, it's the strict pure strategy equilibrium with the larger basin of attraction.

It is very easy to show that there are games Γ where E_Γ is a strict superset of the one mixed strategy Nash equilibrium even for fixed and reasonable ν and Q . Also, there are 2×2 games with the property that for given Q and for fixed ν , the accumulation points of $\mu(\nu, \epsilon, Q, M)$ as $\epsilon \rightarrow 0$ may not include the mixed Nash equilibrium of Γ .

7.4 Summary

So far as giving a justification of Nash equilibria, the evolutionary exercise is a failure. This may be because Nash equilibrium as a theory is mistaken, or it may be because evolutionary dynamics are the right object of study rather than some notion(s) their stable points. On the whole, evolutionary theory seems to work better for pure strategy Nash equilibria.

¹³I haven't completely checked the details of this claim but it seems right.

One could reverse the point of view though and regard E_Γ (or the asymptotically stable set for something like the replicator dynamics, or some subset of E_Γ arrived at after restrictions on the ν and Q as $\epsilon \rightarrow 0$ and $M \uparrow \infty$) as the true prediction set, and conclude that Nash's definition, while attractive, is not particularly sensible. After all, the process by which people adjust their actions ought to have a great deal to do with what we observe.

A counter-argument is that whittling E_Γ down to a manageable size is going to be very difficult, and calculating elements of E_Γ is already quite a strain. So far as calculational difficulties though, perhaps we should not take limits as $\epsilon \rightarrow 0$, just give a dynamic.

Bibliography

- [1] Börgers' (1994) ('Weak Dominance and Approximate Common Knowledge,' *Journal of Economic Theory* **64**(1) 265-277)
- [2] Dekel, E. and D. Fudenberg (1990). Rational Behavior with Payoff Uncertainty, *Journal of Economic Theory* **52**(2), 243-268.
- [3] Gintis, H. *Game Theory Evolving*.
- [4] Harris C. J., M.B. Stinchcombe, and W. R. Zame (2001). Nearly Compact and Continuous Normal Form Games: Characterizations and Equilibrium Existence. Working Paper, Department of Economics, University of Texas at Austin (2001).
- [5] McMillan, J. (19??). *Games, Strategies, and Managers*
- [6] Mokhiber, R. (19??). Corporate Crime and Violence.
- [7] Rasmussen, E. *Games and information : an introduction to game theory*
- [8] Skyrms, B. (1996). *Evolution of the Social Contract*. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge.
- [9] Stinchcombe, M. B. (2001). General Normal Form Games. Working paper, Department of Economics, University of Texas at Austin.